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Are leftist parties the beneficiaries of the failure of market-oriented economic reforms in 
Latin America? This dissertation examines the impact that economic reforms implemented in 
Latin America during 1980s and 1990s had on the shift to the Left of many countries in the 
region. In particular, it seeks to answer three research questions: a) what particular features of 
market-oriented economic reforms, and what economic and political conditions, have 
benefited left- leaning parties’ electoral performance? b) What are the determinants of Latin 
Americans’ vote for left-oriented parties? And c) how does the linkage between the micro 
and macro level of analysis work?  
A combination of methodologies was used to answer these questions. First, a macro-
level analysis was performed using data from 17 countries covering the period from 1985 to 
2004. The dataset includes the percentage of votes received by leftist parties, the level of 
neoliberal reforms implemented in each country, economic variables which appraise 
economic well-being and political variables that account for the political context. Second, an 
individual-level analysis was carried out with survey data from Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay 
to answer the question about the factors that lead Latin American voters to choose a leftist 
party.  
This investigation leads to three main conclusions. First, more market reforms did not 
produce more votes for political parties on the left. More than neoliberal economic reforms, 
the key variable to understand the increase in the Left is unemployment. Left-leaning parties 
in Latin America do increase their electoral chances when unemployment is high. Second, 
Latin Americans are not voting Leftist parties because they are against neoliberal policies. 
The current shift to the Left is more a result of popular discontent with the economic situation 
than anything else. Finally, the electoral possibilities of success that leftist parties have by 
capitalizing on social discontent depend on the number of “untainted opposition” parties 
available in the political system. In countries like Brazil and Uruguay where leftist parties 
embody the only “untainted opposition,” it was easier for them to capitalize on popular 
discontent than in Mexico, where a party on the right also represented an “untainted 
opposition.” 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Since the final years of the Twentieth Century, many Latin American countries have 
elected governments that identified themselves with the ideological Left.  In 1999, Hugo 
Chávez, a former coup plotter, was elected President of Venezuela after campaigning against 
the “Washington consensus” model, and promising to upend the old social order and improve 
the lives of the poor. Brazil also veered toward the left with the victory of the Workers Party 
(Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) in the 2002 general elections. Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, 
the PT candidate, was elected President and it is highly probable that he will be reelected in 
the second round of the 2006 election.  In Argentina, a left-wing political faction of the 
Peronist Party headed by Néstor Kirchner won the 2003 election; while in neighboring 
Uruguay, the Broad Front (Frente Amplio) a left-leaning coalition party which has steadily 
increased its electoral participation since it was founded in 1971, finally gained the 
presidency in 2004. Chile has been governed by a center-left coalition since its return to 
democracy; the chair of the government has alternated between social democrats and 
socialists, and in the 2005 election a female socialist candidate became President. Also in 
2005, Bolivians decided to grant Evo Morales, the presidential candidate of Movimiento al 
Socialismo (MAS), and an important leader of the coca producers’ union, the chance to 
govern one of the poorest and most unequal countries in Latin America.  More recently, at the 
end of 2006, Nicaragua and Ecuador have chosen leftist political parties to be in charge of the 
government. Daniel Ortega, former president of Nicaragua from 1985 to 1990, and leader of 
the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) was reelected as president in November 
2006. In Ecuador, Rafael Correa won the presidency in the second round of the election with 
the support of leftists’ political parties and indigenous movements.  
The movement of Latin America towards the Left led journalists, political analysts 
and political scientists to look for explanations. The most widespread of these suggests that 
Latin Americans’ vote for political parties on the left is a backlash against the neoliberal 
model implemented in the region during the 1980s and 1990s. The Economist magazine 
states this argument as follows: “Rightly or wrongly, voters blamed the slowdown on the 
free-market reforms known as the Washington consensus. As happens in democracies, they 
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started to vote for the opposition- which tended to be on the left.” (The Economist, May 20th 
2006).  However, this is not the only answer.  Others have pointed out that, behind this shift 
to the left, there lies primarily a need for a change. Popular discontent at traditional parties 
unable to solve problems of poverty, corruption and inequality led Latin Americans to vote 
for political parties perceived as being more likely to deliver a better standard of living. To 
put it simply, Latin America’s shift to the left is rooted less in ideological stances than in a 
desire to punish incumbents for poor economic performance.  
Alternative arguments question the very existence of a movement towards the Left. 
First, by pointing out that other countries, such as Colombia and Mexico, have recently 
elected governments that positioned themselves close to the ideological Right. And second, 
by arguing that the differences between left-wing governments are more significant than the 
similarities. It is common to read that Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay belong to a moderate left or 
“right left” (Castañeda 2006), close to a social democracy; while Bolivia and especially 
Venezuela are regarded as a “radical,”  “populist,” or “wrong left” (Castañeda 2006).  
This project will disentangle what is true in each of these arguments. What is the 
impact that market-oriented economic reforms have had on the vote for leftist parties in Latin 
America? Are Latin Americans voting for the Left depending on their ideological stances or 
because parties on the Left merely benefit from voters’ discontent towards traditional parties? 
Not all countries in the region moved to the left after the implementation of economic 
reforms in the ’80s and ’90s. In reformist countries such as Paraguay and the Dominican 
Republic, leftist parties did not increase their share of the vote. Taking into consideration that 
most Latin American countries implemented neoliberal reforms, a central question is what 
particular features of these reforms, and what economic and political conditions, have 
benefited left-leaning parties’ electoral performance. Are purely economic outcomes, such as 
inflation or unemployment, more important than market-oriented reforms in understanding 
the vote for leftist parties? Are economic factors relevant in understanding the movement of 
some countries to the left only under certain political conditions?  
Macro factors, however, do not explain the totality of the phenomenon, and the 
increase in the leftist vote may be better explained by analyzing the micro foundations of 
voting behavior. In the view of many scholars who study voting behavior and public opinion, 
perceptions are what really count when trying to understand why citizens act the way they do.  
Individuals make their political decisions based on the way they perceive reality rather than 
on any objective reality. As a consequence, economic assessments can by no means be 
considered objective. Citizens can judge the country’s economic performance negatively 
even though macro indicators show that the economy is doing fine. The same may happen 
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with Latin Americans’ perceptions of neoliberal economic reforms. The perception of 
economic reforms, or the opinion about them, may be not related to the actual level of 
reforms. It is possible that, contrary to conventional wisdom, in countries where fewer 
reforms have been implemented, inhabitants are more tired of them, and consequently, 
change their voting behavior in favor of political parties that traditionally oppose efficiency-
oriented policies. In order to test whether perceptions about reforms are more important for 
understanding the vote for the Left than the actual level of reforms, it is necessary to run an 
analysis at a micro rather than a macro level.  
Latin Americans can vote Left because they want more state intervention in the 
economy, a more egalitarian economic distribution, or more investment in social policies. 
After a decade of neoliberal economic reforms, they may be claiming that it’s “time for a 
change” (Schlesinger 1986), and consequently, may behave in a policy-oriented way. 
Alternatively, it is possible to argue that voters are not policy oriented, they only care about 
outcomes, and they are voting Left because the neoliberal model failed to deliver sustainable 
economic development and to overcome the endemic problem of unemployment. These two 
explanations are not incompatible, both can be true. Latin Americans may be voting Left 
because they do not want more market-friendly economic policies, and also because they are 
punishing incumbent parties for poor economic performance.  
It is true that not all countries in the region are voting for parties on the Left. And it is 
also correct to say that not all the governments usually identified as “leftist” are the same. 
Some are closer to the center or could be considered social democrats, while others tend to 
the radical left. Some have a more populist style, while others represent an institutional left. 
Or to use Castañeda´s classification (2006), there is a “Right left” which is “modern, open-
minded, reformist, and internationalist, and it springs, paradoxically, from the hard-core left 
of the past,” and the “Wrong left” born of “the great tradition of Latin American populism, is 
“nationalist, strident and close-minded.”  However, I argue that despite their differences, they 
share certain characteristics that make the classification conceptually relevant. In particular, 
left-leaning parties, or “left-of-center” parties as Panizza named them (2005), in Latin 
America can be described by their emphasis on economic redistribution, poverty reduction, 
and social policies in general. Rather than getting into a discussion that compares leftist 
parties in Latin America, the next section discusses the current meaning that the Left-Right 
ideological dimension has in Latin America and defines what a Left leaning political party is 





1.1 THE CURRENT SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LEFT-RIGHT IDEOLOGICAL 
DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA 
There is debate over the validity that a Left-Right ideological dimension could have after the 
fall of the Soviet bloc. Those that argue that the ideological dimension has disappeared point 
to the crisis of ideologies, the lack of a true antagonism in the way problems can be stated, 
the possibility of a Third Way, and the loss of descriptive value that the dimension has 
undergone. Because the existence of the Left depends on the existence of the Right, and vice 
versa, the breakup of the Soviet bloc undermined the Left, and consequently endangered the 
whole dimension (Bobbio 1995).  
If the validity of the ideological dimension has been disputed around the world, the 
sense of unease is even greater in Latin America where scholars have argued that voters make 
limited use of ideological labels (Echegaray 2005). Since Converse (1964) there has been a 
great deal of debate about how readily voters rely on ideology when voting, and to what 
extent citizens organize their political opinions around the ideological dimension. The same 
doubts are cast regarding the importance of ideology in predicting Latin Americans’ voting 
behavior. Echegaray (2005) considers ideological clues to be an irrelevant source of guidance 
for Latin American voters, but he does not empirically test this contention.  
Contrary to Echegaray, I argue that the ideological dimension is meaningful in Latin 
America; it represents an important methodological and analytical tool for analyzing politics 
in the region. First of all, around eight out of ten Latin Americans were able to place 
themselves in the ideological dimension from 1996 to 2004 (Latinobarómetro 2004). This 
percentage varies depending on the country; left and right ideological labels mean more to 
Chileans and Uruguayans than to Argentineans. But, as a first appraisal, ideological thinking 
is part of Latin Americans’ political behavior. Second, previous research has also shown that 
elite groups and citizens are linked by ideological commitments (Luna and Zechmeister 
2005a). Country differences are also relevant in that respect; Chile and Uruguay present 
higher levels of ideological congruency, while Ecuador ranks very low. Regardless of these 
differences, what this research indicates is that ideology is indeed a relevant category to 
understand political representation in Latin America.  
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Finally, there is empirical research pointing to ideology as a relevant voting clue for 
Latin Americans (Cameron 1994; Carreirao 2002a; Singer, 2002; Torcal and Mainwaring 
2003). Electorates use the overarching continuum between Left and Right, or from Liberal to 
Conservative in the United States, as a shortcut to processing political information and 
making their electoral decisions. It is not necessary to have high levels of political 
sophistication in order to vote ideologically. On the contrary, ideology can be understood in 
its weak meaning as a heuristic tool used by citizens to simplify information, evaluate 
political alternatives and make political decisions more efficiently and precisely (Downs 
1957; Sartori 1976). In Latin America, ideology, mainly understood in its weak meaning, is a 
relevant determinant of voting behavior (Singer 2002; Zechmeister 2006). 
The research on the meaning of the Left-Right ideological dimension is more 
extended in Western Europe and the United States (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Inglehart 
and Klingemann 1976; Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990) than in Latin America. However, 
recent studies have made substantive progress on the study of what Left and Right means in 
the region (Luna 2004a; Luna and Zechmeister 2005a; Luna and Zechmeister 2005b; 
Zechmeister 2006). For example, Luna and Zechmeister (2005b) have found that what 
defines the placement of parties and electorates on the Left is a strong emphasis on deepening 
democracy, the defense of state intervention in the economy, a secular profile in religious and 
moral topics, and a profound concern for social issues.  
Apart from these common characteristics, there is no doubt that the meaning of being 
a left-leaning political party varies among countries and even within the same country. For 
example, Castañeda (1993) classifies the Latin American left into four parts: the traditional 
communist parties, the populist left, political and militaristic organizations, and reformers. 
Each of them has a particular set of defining features. Leftist parties also differ over time.  
The breakdown of the Soviet bloc had an enormous impact on the way in which leftist parties 
positioned themselves in the ideological dimension in Latin American and elsewhere. In 
Latin America, scholars have distinguished two moments of the Left. The first one goes from 
the end of World War II  up to 1990; it is highly influenced by the Cuban Revolution in 1959, 
the Allende government in Chile from 1970 to 1973, and the revolutionary victory in 
Nicaragua in 1979. The second stage of the Left starts with the electoral defeat of the 
Sandinistas in 1990 and the collapse of the communist world (Castañeda 1993; Roberts 1998; 
Rodríguez Garavito, Barret and Chávez 2005). Regardless of the difficulty implied in finding 
the main characteristics of left-leaning parties in Latin America, the task is necessary for the 
conceptual clarity of this project. 
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Starting from their most general feature, leftist parties emphasize equality. Bobbio 
(1995) argues that equality is the only principle capable of differentiating Left from Right 
regardless of time. The distinction between right and left comes from the French Republic, 
where those representatives that were more egalitarian and radical placed themselves on the 
left, and those more conservative representatives, supporters of the aristocratic order, sat on 
the right. The defense of policies that improve equality among citizens is a trait that leftist 
parties share.  
A second characteristic is the emphasis placed on deepening democracy. Leftist 
parties want to increase the accountability of elected representatives, to control political 
corruption, to strengthen popular participation, augment popular control over collective 
decision-making, and enhance the use of direct democracy mechanisms (Castañeda 1993; 
Roberts 1998; Rodríguez Garavito, Barret and Chávez 2005). This position towards 
democracy represents a change in Latin American leftist parties before and after 1990. Before 
1990, most of them dismissed democracy in favor of revolution. As Roberts points out, “two 
responses to formal democratic institutions predominated in the Latin American left: outright 
rejection because democracy was an instrument of bourgeois class domination, or 
rationalized participation on instrumental grounds” (1998: 18). Nowadays, leftist parties in 
the region have reclaimed democracy as an integral character for their project. This change 
came about partly because of the breakup of the Soviet bloc and the failure of revolutionary 
means, and partly because of the traumatic experience of dictatorships (Castañeda 1993; 
Roberts 1998; Rodríguez Garavito, Barret and Chávez 2005).  
The debt crisis that the region suffered in the early 1980s and the way in which the 
neoliberal revolution undermined state-led models of economic development (Roberts 1998; 
Rodríguez Garavito, Barret and Chávez 2005) have led Latin American leftist parties to agree 
that the state, by itself, cannot manage the economy. It is also necessary to respect the rules of 
the market. There are no recipes indicating the proportion of state to market intervention the 
combination should have, but it is clear that both components, income redistribution and 
correct market operations, are necessary to reduce inequalities and to improve 
competitiveness, social spending and the control of inflation (Castañeda 1993). Leftist parties 
tend to favor state intervention in order to provide public services, to redistribute income, and 
to articulate social policies for equalizing social opportunities, whilst keeping fiscal accounts 
under control (Rodríguez Garavito, Barret and Chávez 2005; Luna and Zechmeister 2005b).    
In conclusion, there are some commonalities that make leftist parties substantially 
different from parties on the right of the ideological dimension, or even from centrist parties. 
In this project, Latin American political parties are classified in the Left-Right ideological 
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dimension following Michael Coppedge’s classification (1997). Right parties are: “1) Parties 
that target heirs of the traditional elite of the nineteenth century without moderating their 
discourse to appeal to middle- or lower- class voters; 2) Parties that employ a fascist or 
neofascist discourse; and 3) Parties sponsored by a present or former military government, as 
long as they have a conservative (organicist, authoritarian, elitist, looking to the past) 
message and are not primarily personalist vehicles for particular authoritarian leaders”. 
Center-Right parties are “parties that target middle-  or lower- class voters in addition to elite 
voters by stressing cooperation with the private sector, public order, clean government, 
morality, or the priority of growth over distribution”. Center parties are: “1) Parties that stress 
classic political liberalism – broad political participation, civic virtue, the rule of law, human 
rights, or democracy – without a salient social or economic agenda; and 2) Governing parties 
whose policies are so divided between positions both to the left and to the right of center that 
no orientation that is mostly consistent between elections is discernible.” 
Center-Left parties are “parties that stress justice, equality, social mobility, or the 
complementary distribution and accumulation in a way intended not to alienate middle- or 
upper – class voters.” Left parties are “parties that employ Marxist ideology or rhetoric and 
stress the priority of distribution over accumulation and/or the exploitation of the working 
class by capitalists and imperialists and advocate a strong role for the state to correct social 
and economic injustices. They may consider violence an appropriate form of struggle but not 
necessarily. They do not worry about alienating middle- and upper- class voters who are not 
already socialist intellectuals.” 
In addition to these categories, Coppedge classifies parties that are not classifiable in 
the left-right dimension as “personalist” or “other bloc.” Other Bloc parties are “any parties 
that represent an identifiable ideology, program, principle, region, interest, or social group 
that cannot be classified in the left-right or Christian-secular terms.” Personalist parties are 
the ones that 1) “base their primary appeal on the charisma, authority, or efficacy of their 
leader rather than on any principles or platforms, which are too vague or inconsistent to 
permit a plausible classification of the party in any other way, or they are 2) Independents; or 
are 3) unusually heterogeneous electoral fronts formed to back a candidate”.  
Two remarks should be made. First, one of the Coppedge’s criteria to define a Left 
party is that “they do not worry about alienating middle- and upper- class voters who are not 
already socialist intellectuals.” This criterion was relaxed to classify the parties during the 
1990s and 2000s because the implementation of the neoliberal model has weakened the 
organized labor movement and other traditional social bases of leftist parties, and led them to 
appeal to broader electorates  in order to increase their chances to govern. Second, 
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Coppedge’s classification is far from perfect and can be easily criticized, but it is by far the 
most complete, systematic and exhaustive ideological classification of Latin American parties 
available. What’s more, a classification of this type should be broad enough to encompass 
changes in ideologies over time, but it also needs enough precision to be relevant. 
Coppedge’s classification fulfills both criteria.  
As a result, in this project, a leftist party is understood according to Coppedge’s 
definition of a Left and a Center-left party: a left-oriented party stresses justice, equality, 
social mobility, or the complementary distribution and accumulation in a way intended not to 
alienate middle- or upper- class voters, or employs Marxist ideology or rhetoric and stresses 
the priority of distribution over accumulation and/or the exploitation of the working class by 
capitalists and imperialists and advocates a strong role for the state to correct social and 
economic injustices. This definition matches the characteristics stated before as the defining 
features of the Left in Latin America.  
 
1.2 MACRO AND MICRO EXPLANATIONS TO VOTING LEFT 
This project combines a macro perspective with a micro perspective to explain the 
recent increase for leftist parties in Latin America. Specifically, it seeks to answer three 
concrete questions. The first one is: under what economic and political conditions have leftist 
parties increased their electoral support? Taking into consideration that most Latin American 
countries implemented neoliberal reforms, a central question is what particular features of 
these reforms, and what economic and political conditions, have benefited left-leaning 
parties’ electoral performance. My argument is that economic reforms by themselves are not 
sufficient conditions to produce an increase in the vote share for leftist parties. Only when 
economic reforms generate an increase in unemployment, can left-of-center parties capitalize 
on the discontent with the situation and enlarge their share of the vote. In other words, when 
economic reforms fail, this indirectly benefits leftist parties.   
The macro level perspective represents an incomplete answer to the phenomenon 
which should then be complemented by an analysis of the micro foundations of voting 
behavior. Therefore, the second question is the following: what are the determinants of Latin 
Americans’ vote for left-wing parties? There is no study that accounts for the factors that 
explain this voting behavior from a micro level perspective. Is the vote for leftist parties 
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another example of economic voting theory according to which voters punish the incumbent 
party for bad economic results? Are electorates in Latin America mainly choosing leftist 
parties because their candidates are more appealing? Or, alternatively, are Latin Americans 
becoming more ideological and policy-oriented by voting Left as a reaction to the neoliberal 
paradigm in economic policy? 
 I expect that voters behave differently depending on the role that left-leaning parties 
had performed. Where leftist parties were always outside the government and represent a 
credible opposition, voters will vote for them as a way of trying something different. In other 
words, I do not expect to find Latin American voting in favor of the Left because they have 
become leftist in their policy positions. My expectation is that Latin Americans are voting 
Left because they are just punishing traditional parties that failed to produce economic 
welfare. 
The third question is: how does the linkage between the micro and macro level of 
analysis work? Are the explanations of the increase in the vote for left-oriented parties at the 
macro level compatible with the explanations of why voters chose a leftist party from an 
individual perspective? By looking at the two levels of analysis, I will be able to discuss the 
theoretical connections between both of them and see if they are compatible or compete with 
one another.  
My central argument is that the recent increase of leftist parties in Latin America 
comes about as a result of voters punishing political parties that were unable to improve the 
economic well-being of their electorates. Most Latin Americans have faced economic 
hardship during successive governments under a variety of political parties, and recent 
research demonstrates that voters have long-term economic memories (Benton 2005) and 
punish not only the incumbent party for the material suffering; they also rebuke parties that 
governed before the incumbent came to power. Left-of-center parties took advantage of this 
popular discontent and capitalized on social and economic dissatisfaction when they were 
outside the governing coalitions and remained in the opposition. As a result, by voting left-
oriented parties, Latin Americans seem to be looking for credible political alternatives to the 
status quo rather than becoming anti-market in their policy positions. If this argument is 
correct, macro and micro evidence should support it.  
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1.3 A LOOK AT WHAT FOLLOWS 
The rest of this dissertation is organized in the following way. Chapter 2 examines if 
the shift to the Left in Latin America that started during the last years of the Twentieth 
Century is something new, or if similar ideological cycles have occurred in the region before. 
In order to find comparative evidence that might help us to understand the recent electoral 
increase of the Left, the chapter examines the electoral performance of Latin American 
ideological blocs from the end of World War II up to 2004.  The analysis finds that the recent 
electoral increase of the Left is not a novelty; ideological cycles have existed in Latin 
America previous to the current one. Moreover, the Left was the prevalent ideology in the 
region not so long ago. In addition, the factors that influenced a previous shift to the Left in 
the region look very similar to the ones that may be influencing the present veer toward leftist 
parties. 
Taking into consideration that most Latin American countries implemented neoliberal 
reforms, but not all of them shifted to the Left, a central question is what particular features 
of these reforms, and what economic and political conditions, have helped leftist parties’ 
electoral performance. Chapter 3 analyzes the impact of neoliberal reforms on the vote for 
leftist parties and explores if purely economic outcomes, such as inflation or unemployment, 
or certain political conditions are more important than market-oriented reforms for 
understanding the vote for the Left. In order to answer these questions, it uses a pooled data 
set of Latin American presidential elections from 17 countries. Regressions results indicate 
that more market reforms did not produce more votes for left-wing parties; there is no linear 
relationship between the so-called “neoliberal model” and the Left’s vote share. Overall, the 
unemployment rate is more important than reforms to explain the increase in the vote for the 
Left.   
Leaving aside the macro level of analysis, and starting with the micro level of 
analysis, Chapter 4 describes the main theories that explain voting behavior from the 
individual perspective and these are then going to be tested in Chapter 5 to explain leftist 
voting in Latin America. These theories are: economic voting theory, social class cleavages, 
prospect theory, partisanship theory, and the cleavages created by political processes. Chapter 
4 describes each of said theories, summarizes the major research done in Latin America using 
each of them, and goes over the main hypotheses and variables by which the theories are 
going to be tested. 
Chapter 5 uses a most-different system research strategy and tests the hypotheses 
presented in the previous chapter in three country cases: Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay. First, it 
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describes the three country cases and why they comprise a most-different system design. And 
second, it shows the empirical evidence from the three of them, which points in the direction 
that Latin Americans are not voting for left-of-center parties because they are against 
neoliberal reforms. Electorates in the region are voting Left because they are looking for new 
political alternatives that might provide an improvement in people’s economic well-being. In 
addition, this individual level analysis presents ample evidence that Latin Americans are not 
random voters as other studies have pointed out. Regardless of the differences in voting 
behavior between Brazilians, Mexicans and Uruguayans, all of them take into account the 
economic performance of the incumbent, party attachments and ideological considerations 
while voting. 
The final chapter discusses the results and draws comparative conclusions from the 












2.0  LATIN AMERICAN IDEOLOGICAL CYCLES IN THE POST-WAR ERA  
“Disappointment is the universal modern malady… It is also a basic spring of political change. People 
can never be fulfilled for long either in the public or in the private sphere. We try one, then the other, and 
frustration compels a change in course. Moreover, however effective a particular course may be in meeting one 
set of troubles, it generally falters and fails when new troubles arise.  And many troubles are inherently 
insoluble. As political eras, whether dominated by public purpose or by private interest, run their course, they 
infallibly generate the desire for something different. It always becomes after a while “time for a change.” 
(Schlesinger 1986).  
 
The 21st Century started with the Left in charge of Latin American politics. Venezuela 
elected Hugo Chávez president in 1999. In Brazil, the Labor Party (Partido dos 
Trabalhadores) came to power in 2002, leading Luís Inácio “Lula” da Silva to the 
presidency. A left-wing faction of the Peronist Party headed by Néstor Kirchner won the 
2003 presidential elections in Argentina. In Uruguay, the Broad Front (Frente Amplio), a 
coalition party identified with the Left, won the 2004 presidential and congressional elections 
with a majority vote. Evo Morales also reached the presidency of Bolivia with the majority of 
votes in the 2005 elections. In Chile, the Concertación won the 2006 presidential election 
bringing Michelle Bachelet, a member of the Socialist Party who campaigned in favor of a 
more egalitarian income distribution, to the Presidency. Manuel López Obrador, the 
presidential candidate for the Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD) in México, lost the 
presidential election held in July 2006 for less than 1% of the votes in a very controversial 
dispute.  At the end of 2006, Nicaragua brought Daniel Ortega back to the Presidency; and in 
Ecuador, Rafael Correa was elected in the second round of the election with the support of 
leftists’ political parties and indigenous movements. This electoral trend in favor of leftist’s 
parties is also perceived by looking at Latinamericans’ ideological selfplacement. The 
AmericasBarometer data for 2006 reveal a slight shift to the left within populace since 2004. 
The regional average in 2004 was 6.17 and 5.77 in 2006 (Seligson 2007). 
Although some journalists and political analysts refer to this shift to the Left as 
something new, this chapter will show that the rise of the Left in Latin America is not as 
novel as many claim. There have been other moments in Latin American history when the 
Left took the lead. Moreover, the factors that once caused the predominance of the Left in the 
region may also be producing the current prevalence of the Left.   
 13
There is a great deal of evidence that ideological swings and ideological cycles occur 
in American politics (Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson 1995; Stimson 1999; Erikson, 
MacKuen and Stimson 2002). Change is a part of politics. Governments change, and the 
alternation of political parties in the government is one desirable feature of democracies. If 
alternations, swings and changes of political parties are a part of political life, it might well be 
the case that these changes are shifts in the ideological leanings of the voters. Perhaps shifts 
in “ideology”, understood as self-placement in an ideological dimension, do not occur, but 
more subtle changes do. For example, Stimson (1999) does not call it “ideology” but rather 
refers to the “public mood,” which can be briefly describe as a set of preferences, and finds 
that it follows clearly observable cycles in American politics, and these cycles have an impact 
on the kind of policies that politicians enact. In other words, in the United States “dynamic 
representation” exists:  elected organs of the government are highly responsive to changes in 
the  public mood (Stimson 1995).  The existence of cycles implies that there are political eras 
in which liberalism is predominant, and that after a while, a conservative era takes over. The 
logic is as follows: the longer an electorate has experienced liberal policies, the more 
probable it is that it will choose a conservative government. Conversely, the electorate is 
likely to choose a liberal government after a number of years living with conservative 
policies.  
Are ideological cycles also a part of Latin American politics? In a region generally 
defined as unstable, volatile, and prone to institutional breakdown, is it possible to identify 
cycles? There is no reason to suppose that the ideological cycles that scholars find in other 
parts of the world do not take place in Latin America. However, there is no scholarly work 
demonstrating this effect. One possible reason for the existence of this vacuum is the scarcity 
of public opinion data to build historical series on. A deeper reason is that so much of Latin 
America has, for so long, been dominated by imposed political regimes that voting behavior 
mattered little. Since the mid-1980s, however, when Latin America shifted over to electoral 
democracy, the voting record has become more widely accessible.  
However, if cycles are ubiquitous in politics, why should we pay attention to them? 
The reason to search for prior ideological cycles, from the perspective of political science, is 
a comparative one. In recent years, it has become very common to read journalists and 
political analysts’ reports arguing that the “neo-liberal era” is over and claiming that the 
movement of Latin-American governments to the left is a novelty for the region. Most 
analysts are mainly interested in understanding the impact of market-oriented economic 
reforms pursued during the 1980s and 1990s in the recent increase in the vote for leftist 
parties in Latin America. The only way to know for certain if there is any novelty in this 
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electoral phenomenon and to understand its causes is to examine the ideological history of the 
region. It is possible that leftist parties obtained an important share of the vote in previous 
periods of the region’s history for similar, or maybe different, reasons. It would not be a 
surprise to find that leftist parties increased their share of the vote in a particular period of 
Latin American history, and that after a while, rightist parties took the lead, and vice versa.  
To sum up, this chapter examines the ideological evolution of Latin America since 
1945 in order to find comparative evidence that might help us to understand the recent 
electoral increase of the Left. Is this increase in the vote for leftist parties something new in 
Latin America? How many cycles have occurred in the region’s history since 1945? To 
answer these questions, the chapter analyzes the electoral performance of Latin-American 
political parties from the end of the World War II up to 2004, and finds that the recent 
electoral increase of the Left is not a novelty. Moreover, the factors that influenced a prior 
shift to the Left in the region are similar to the ones that may be influencing the current 
increase in the vote for leftist parties. 
The first section of the chapter defines what is meant by an “ideological cycle.” The 
second section presents and discusses Latin American ideological cycles since 1945. The 
third, and final, section of the chapter focuses on the last two decades (1980-2004), and 
explores the different degrees to which reforms were implemented in the region, as well as 
the degree to which leftist parties have increased their share of the vote.  
  
2.1 THE DEFINITION OF IDEOLOGICAL CYCLE 
Ideological trends, in general, can be of three different types: constant, unidirectional, 


















































































Figure 2.1 Examples of Ideological Trends 
 
A constant is the absence of movement. In the history of the ideological distribution 
of votes, a constant would be graphically represented as a horizontal line. In that case, we 
should expect no differences in the share of the ideological blocs from 1945 to 2004. The 
second type of ideological trend is unidirectional. One case of this type would be, for 
example, a steady increase in the vote share that the ideological left receives, while the center 
and the right monotonically lose votes. The last is the cyclical type.  Stimson (1999) 
understands a cycle as a public opinion trend that is eventually followed by a reversal of the 
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same. One caveat needs to be made regarding this last type: a cyclical ideological trend does 
not imply a regular trend of any kind. Cycles can be asymmetrical; they behave in different 
ways, have various shapes, and do not start or finish in the same place. Common sense, and 
primary historical knowledge, would lead us to expect more ideological cycles than any of 
the other types of trends in the history of Latin America. But this is a presumption that needs 
to be tested.   
 
2.1.1 The Classification of Political Parties in the Ideological Dimension 
We have the definition of cycle. Now we need to define what we mean by an 
ideological cycle. The first clarification to make is that an ideological cycle here is an 
electoral cycle because it is defined by the percentage of votes that leftist parties, center 
parties and rightist parties obtain in each congressional election.2 The electoral ideological 
cycle may represent a public opinion cycle too. In other words, voters may alter their 
ideological preferences, and these changes are reflected in their vote.  
The first step towards analyzing the existence of ideological cycles in Latin America 
is to place all Latin American political parties that received votes in congressional elections 
from 1945 to 2004 into three categories:  left, center and right. Political parties are classified 
in the Left-Right ideological dimension using Coppedge’s indicator of the ideology of Latin 
American political parties. Coppedge (1997) was the first scholar to classify Latin American 
political parties in a systematic way using the ideological dimension. Before him, other 
scholars studied specific types of political parties such as communist parties (Caballero 
1986), populist parties (Conniff 1982), or Christian democratic parties (Mainwaring and 
Scully 2003). They also classified countries by their party systems (Mainwaring and Scully 
1995), or compiled impressive amounts of information about Latin American political parties 
(Alexander 1988; Ameringer 1992; Coggins and Lewis 1992; Alcántara and Freidenberg 
2001). Coppedge’s classification represents an improvement over these previous studies in 
that each Latin American political party, including minor ones, is sorted into an ideological 
bloc in a comprehensive and exhaustive way that makes a rigorous comparative analysis 
possible.    
 
1 These three types of trends are not exhaustive. It is also possible to find random movements or fluctuations, 
but these kinds of movements are not usually described as trends. A random trend sounds meaningless. If a 
trend is random, it does not look like a trend. 
2 In those elections where there are different electoral results for the two chambers (senate and deputies), we use 
the results for the lower chamber (deputies). 
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 Coppedge’s ideological indicator has two dimensions: Christian-Secular and Left-
Right. Right wing parties are: “1) Parties that target heirs of the traditional elite of the 
nineteenth century without moderating their discourse to appeal to middle- or lower- class 
voters; 2) Parties that employ a fascist or neofascist discourse; and 3) Parties sponsored by a 
present or former military government, as long as they have a conservative (organicist, 
authoritarian, elitist, looking to the past) message and are not primarily personalist vehicles 
for particular authoritarian leaders”. Center-Right parties are “parties that target middle –or 
lower- class voters in addition to elite voters by stressing cooperation with the private sector, 
public order, clean government, morality, or the priority of growth over distribution”. Center 
parties are: “1) Parties that stress classic political liberalism –a broad political participation, 
civic virtue, the rule of law, human rights, or democracy –without a salient social or 
economic agenda; and 2) Governing parties whose policies are so divided between positions 
both to the left and to the right of center that no orientation that is mostly consistent between 
elections is discernible.” Center-Left parties are “parties that stress justice, equality, social 
mobility, or the complementary distribution and accumulation in a way intended not to 
alienate middle- or upper –class voters.” Left wing parties are “parties that employ Marxist 
ideology or rhetoric and stress the priority of distribution over accumulation and/or the 
exploitation of the working class by capitalists and imperialists and advocate a strong role for 
the state to correct social and economic injustice. They may consider violence an appropriate 
form of struggle but not necessarily. They do not worry about alienating middle –and upper 
class voters who are not already socialist intellectuals” (Coppedge 1997). 
In addition to these categories, Coppedge classifies parties that are not readily 
classifiable in the left-right dimension as “personalist” or “other bloc.” Other Bloc parties are 
“any parties that represent an identifiable ideology, program, principle, region, interest, or 
social group that cannot be classified in the left-right or Christian-secular terms.” Personalist 
parties are the ones that 1) “base their primary appeal on the charisma, authority, or efficacy 
of their leader rather than on any principles or platforms, which are too vague or inconsistent 
to permit a plausible classification of the party in any other way, or they are 2) Independents; 
or are 3) unusually heterogeneous electoral fronts formed to back a candidate” (Coppedge 
1997).  
Several observations regarding Coppedge’s classifications are necessary.  
First, one of the Coppedge’s criteria to define a Leftist party is that “they do not worry 
about alienating middle –and upper class voters who are not already socialist intellectuals.” 
This criterion was relaxed to classify the parties during the 1990s and 2000s. It should be 
noted that for the purpose of this chapter and the next, I work with three ideological 
 18
                                                
categories: Left, Center, and Right. The Left is composed of left and center-left political 
parties, while the Right is made up of right and center-right parties. The main reason to 
reduce the five categories defined by Coppedge to three is that I am interested in tackling the 
main ideological trends and cycles in Latin America, not the more subtle movements between 
center-right and right, or between left and center-left. This chapter is not about how polarized 
Latin-Americans party systems are. The main aim is to explore the ideological cycles 
between Left and Right, regardless of how extreme each of them may be.    
Second, Coppedge (1997) only classifies political parties until 1995. Using his 
criteria, the classification was extended to political parties that participated in parliamentary 
and presidential elections until 2005.3  This expansion takes into consideration the 
movements in the ideological dimension that some parties made either because they were in 
power, on the opposition, or simply because they redefined their ideology.4 The expanded 
classification uses information extracted from handbooks,5 political party websites, and 
consultations with experts from several countries.6  
It can be argued that some of the ideological movements over time could be produced 
by having a different team recoding political parties from the mid 90s. In order to maximize 
coding reliability and reduce the possible differences implied by the need to update the 
dataset, I proceed in the following way. First, whenever it was possible, I include two country 
experts for each country. Second, it is important to mention that most parties remained 
classified in the same way that they were in Coppedge’s classification. Only when both 
coders agreed that a party moved away from Coppedge’s original classification, I decided to 
change the party’s ideological placement but not before 1994. In that sense, I respect 
Coppedge’s original classification as much as possible. Finally, and as a result of that, there 
 
3 In section 2.2, only the results of congressional elections are taken into account. The exception is the results 
for the Peruvian elections before 1978 which are based on presidential rather than legislative votes.  
4 For example, the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) was classified by Coppedge as a center-left 
party until 1994. But in 1994, the PSDB won the presidential election under the candidacy of Fernando H. 
Cardoso with the support of the PFL (Partido do Frente Liberal), indicating that the party has already moved to 
the center. As a president, Cardoso and his party implemented policies more in line with a party with center-
right ideology. Since then, PSDB is classified as CR (center right). The same happens with the Partido 
Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) in 2000. 
5 Alexander (1988); Coggins and Lewis (1992); Alcántara Sáez and Freidenberg (2001). 
6 The extension of this classification was done by Germán Lodola and Rosario Queirolo. The following country 
experts were consulted: Germán Lodola and Belén Amadeo (Argentina), Lucio Renno and Rachel Meneguello 
(Brazil), Daniel Moreno Morales and Vivian Schwarz (Bolivia), Francisco Díaz and Juan Pablo Luna (Chile), 
Laura Wills and Miguel García (Colombia), Mitchell Seligson, Juliana Martínez, and Harold Villegas Roman 
(Costa Rica), Grisel Lerebours (Dominican Republic), Agustín Grijalva and Pablo Andrade (Ecuador), Cynthia 
McClintock, Ricardo Córdova and Margarita Correa (El Salvador), Dinorah Azpuru and Margarita Correa 
(Guatemala), José René Argueta and Margarita Correa (Honduras), Luis Jiménez and Juan Antonio Rodríguez-
Zepeda (México), John Booth and Margarita Correa (Nicaragua), Aníbal Pérez-Liñán and José Costa 
(Paraguay),  Cynthia McClintock and Luis E. González (Perú), Juan Pablo Luna, Fernanda Boidi and Rosario 
Queirolo (Uruguay), Aníbal Pérez-Liñán and Margarita López-Maya (Venezuela). 
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are several countries cases where Coppedge’s classification remained almost7 unchanged as 
Peru and Paraguay. 
Third, the chapter uses two different samples of countries. In section 2.2, it uses a 
sample composed of countries for which we have reliable data for the whole period of study 
(1945-2004): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. This section works with the results of congressional elections. 
On the other hand, section 2.3 works with the result of presidential elections in a more recent 
period of time (1980-2005) for which it is easier to gain access to reliable data for the whole 
region. As a result, the sample is wider and includes 17 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
Fourth, Coppedge classifies each political party using two dimensions, the ideological 
and the religious dimension. The latter identifies if the party is secular or religious. In this 
study, the religious dimension is not taken into account; therefore, the blocs are left, center 
and right, independent of whether the parties are Christian or secular.  
Finally, some political parties are impossible to sort as leftist, centrist or rightist. In 
those cases, the party, and its share of the vote, is excluded from the analysis but remain in 
the denominator to not alter the real share of the vote that each ideological bloc has. 
Examples of those political parties are personalist parties where the charisma of the leader is 
more important than any ideology (e.g. Cambio 90 in Perú), or parties with an identifiable 
ideology or program that cannot be interpreted with the left-right dimension (e.g. the 
Argentine Partido Justicialista during most of the period under study), or parties for which 
there is not enough information available to know their orientation.  
Coppedge was able to classify into the left-right dimension, “97 percent of the vote 
cast in all but 5 elections (all in Argentina and Ecuador). Less than 10 percent of the vote is 
unclassified in all but 14 elections, and less than 1 percent is unclassified in 58 percent of the 
elections” (Coppedge 1997). These percentages are high given that Latin American party 
systems are usually described as being highly volatile and weakly institutionalized. Scholars 
commonly define political parties in the region as highly personalistic and clientelistic (Ames 
2001). For the period under study (1945-2004), the results of the classification are similar to 
those mentioned by Coppedge. Argentina and Ecuador are the countries in the region with the 
highest percentage of the vote unclassified. This means that in those countries, political 
parties that were not possible to classify in the left-right ideological dimension as the Partido 
 
7 With the exception of the coding of new parties. 
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Justicialista or the Partido Roldolsista Ecuatoriano, obtained a significant percentage of the 
vote. During Fujimori´s government, Peru was another case in which a high percentage of the 
vote was impossible to categorize (59%) due to the presence of Cambio 90, among others. 
Excluding these exceptions, the classification of Latin American political parties into 
ideological blocs is quite comprehensive.8  
2.1.2 Data and Methods 
After classifying each party into an ideological bloc, we tally the percentage of vote 
obtained by each bloc in all the legislative elections held from 1945 to 2004. In order to build 
a series, we assume that the ideological distribution obtained in a legislative election remains 
unchanged until the next election. For example, in the Bolivian election of 1960, the left 
obtained 77 percent of the vote, the center 0, and the right 23 percent. Therefore, the result 
for 1961 is also 77 percent, 0 percent and 23 percent, respectively. In 1962, Bolivians had 
another election, and the vote share of each ideological bloc changed. This methodological 
rule was followed for every country with two exceptions: when the country was under 
authoritarian rule and when the election was considered fraudulent by the country experts 
consulted.9 In both cases, the solution was to substitute the result by dots in the dataset and 
exclude the country from the Latin American average of that year.  
Electoral results are taken from different sources. To cover the period from 1945 to 
1995, we use the electoral results in the Coppedge (1997) dataset. Since 1995, the main 
source of electoral data has been the Political Database of the Americas (PDBA) at 
Georgetown University. Complementary sources were consulted to fill in blanks or verify the 
information: www.observatorioelectoral.org, Nohlen (2005), and the web pages of electoral 
offices in each country.     
The final step was to build an average that represents the electoral weight that each 
ideological bloc had in every year from 1945 to 2004. The average only includes countries 
for which we have reliable data: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.  In addition, when those countries were 
under dictatorships or elections were suspected of being fraudulent, the country was excluded 
from the average. Following these criteria, the dataset excludes Brazilian congressional 
                                                 
8 A table listing the political parties in each country that do not fit into the left-right dimension from 1980 to 
2005 appears in Appendix A. The table also indicates the percentage of the total vote that these unclassified 
parties obtained in the presidential elections.   
9 An election is considered “fraudulent” when there is doubt that the real electoral results are significantly 
different from the official ones.   
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elections from 1965 to 1985 because they were carried out under an authoritarian regime. On 
the other hand, the dataset includes Mexican elections since 1961. Despite most scholars 
agreeing that Mexican elections during those years had a certain level of fraud, I decided to 
include them because scholars also agree that the country underwent a process of 
democratization and political liberalization, and the regime allowed some ideological 
competition.10  However, I also run the analysis excluding Mexican elections occurred from 
1961 to 1990, and the results do not change significantly.11 
The 1970s is the decade in which the greatest number of countries were under 
authoritarian regimes, and for that reason, the averages for that decade have been built with 
fewer countries. In 1977, the average is only comprised by four countries.   
 
2.2 CYCLES IN DECADES 
For most of the twentieth century, Latin America alternated between liberal 
democracy and authoritarian regimes. By 1945, the region was undergoing a period of 
democratization, social and political participation had increased almost everywhere, and in 
most countries, the incorporation of the labor movement into the political arena was already 
finished (Collier and Collier 2002). However, the trend towards democratization was far from 
stable. First, populist regimes hostile to political competition in Argentina and Brazil, and 
later, a new wave of authoritarian regimes in the 1960s, interrupted the optimistic post-war 
period. Despite the fragility of the period, the end of World War II was chosen as the starting 
point for the analysis of Latin American political cycles. The reason is that the beginning of 
the Cold War brought with it the appeal of alternatives to liberal democracy such as 
communism, socialism, and later the Cuban Revolution, which had a huge impact on the 
ideological alignment of Latin American political parties. 
 Figure 2.2 shows the trends, swings and cycles of the ideological blocs in Latin 
America since 1945. The first unexpected finding is the general ideological distribution: 
while Left and Right always obtain between 20% and 50% of the votes, the Center fluctuates, 
most of the time, around 10% and 20%. Latin America’s ideological distribution looks more 
 
10 Mexico fulfils the first three rules set out by Przeworski et al. (2000) to define a democracy, but it does not 
pass the “alternation rule.” 
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bimodal than normal. The highest point reached by the Right was in 1949. Conversely, the 
lowest point of the Left was in 1949, and the highest in 1970. The Center hit its peak in 1976 
and 1977.  During those years, most of the countries were under dictatorships. Therefore, the 
average only takes into account the results of Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Venezuela. 
However, this might indicate two different ways in which the region dealt with the “socialist 
threat,” political polarization, and radicalization during the 1960s. One was the breakdown of 
democratic institutions, and subsequent authoritarian regimes. The other was the institutional 
ability of centrist parties to channel demands, and manage popular discontent.  
 The ideological cycles in Latin America were mainly between the Right and the Left. 
In Figure 2.2, the dotted line (representing the Right) and the thick unbroken line 
(representing the Left) cross each other several times; they appear to be highly and negatively 
correlated: when one goes up, the other goes down. In other words, the most important 
ideological movements in Latin America have more to do with the Left and the Right than 
with changes in the vote share obtained by the ideological Center.  
Using an average for the whole region brings with it the risk of obscuring the 
differences between countries. Latin American ideological distribution can be bimodal 
because every country, or most of the countries in the region, has a bimodal distribution too, 
or can hide different types of distributions. In this case, the average fits into the first 
alternative. Generally speaking, most of the countries included in the average have a bimodal 
ideological distribution (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela). The 
exceptions are Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico.12 
  
 
11 Figure A.1 in Appendix A shows Latin American ideological cycles excluding these Mexican elections. The 
main difference between this figure and Figure 2.2 is that the predominance of the Left in the second cycle is 
longer and more pronounced when these controversial Mexican elections are excluded.  
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Source: based on Coppedge (1997) and Political Database of the Americas (Georgetown University) 
 
Figure 2.2 Ideological Cycles in Latin America (1945-2005)  
  
 
A bimodal distribution indicates that Latin American political history has not been 
dominated by one ideology. Only the Left obtained over 50% of the vote, and it did so in a 
single year: 1970. The region has not been predominantly leftist or rightist at any moment 
since the end of World War Two. Neither has the Center prevailed. Politics in the region have 
alternated between Right and Left, without either gaining the upper hand. This bimodal 
ideological distribution does not yet enable us to say that the region had a strong ideological 
polarization during most of the post-war period, which is one of the hazards for the stability 
and consolidation of democracy (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Sani and Sartori 1983). The 
dearth of public opinion and elite’s data to measure ideological polarization in a systematic 
way through the whole period of study prevents us from making that argument.13 Although 
the polarized image can be overstated, the vacuum of the Center is real.  
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13 For the same reason, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) were not able to measure ideological polarization, but 
taking into account the analysis of the case-studies presented in their book, they categorize Costa Rica as a low 
polarization system; Colombia, Paraguay, and Argentina as systems with moderately low polarization; 
Venezuela, Uruguay, Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador had moderately high polarization; and Mexico, Peru and Brazil 
as highly polarized systems. In this classification made in 1993, there are more countries with moderately high 
to high polarization than countries with low polarization.  
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There are four main ideological cycles during the period of study: 1946-1956, 1969-
1976, 1979-2000, and an ongoing one since 2001.14 The first and third cycles have the Right 
as the leading ideology, while in the second and fourth, the Left is predominant. The first 
cycle is dominated by the Right, starts at the end of World War Two (WWII), lasts until 
1956, and comes as a response to the unstable economic conditions of wartime. During the 
war years, the state took more responsibilities and intervened more in the regulation of the 
economy in diverse ways: providing services like electricity, and handling problems such as 
import shortages and dollar inflation. Social expenditure grew during wartime, and so did 
inflation. For important sectors of the population, their salaries and wages were undermined 
by the rise in the cost of living, thus generating popular discontent that was expressed in 
social upheavals.  Income inequality also increased during those years (Bulmer-Thomas 
2003). This was the economic situation of the region when the Second World War ended. 
The war had a strong and negative economic impact in Latin America because it disrupted 
the region’s traditional markets. This trade disruption was joined by a pessimistic mood 
towards the export-led model, and the two factors together encouraged a greater commitment 
to an alternative development model: import substitution industrialization (ISI). 
The years after WWII were optimistic times in Latin America. In economic terms, 
this period of the region’s history was marked by a general confidence produced by the 
inward direction that the regional economies had undertaken during the war, plus the 
expectation of the reopening of European trade (Halperín Donghi 1993). But this enthusiasm 
for the economic future brought conflicts regarding the best way to distribute wealth and 
power in the society, bringing the defenders of industrialization up against those who 
supported the export-oriented model. The dilemma between export-led growth and the 
inward-looking model was solved mostly in favor of import substitution industrialization.15 
But by the middle of 1950, when almost all the countries in the region had undertaken the 
first stage of industrialization, the hopeful mood of 1945 was over (Halperín Donghi 1993). 
The main reason for this change was the ending of beneficial conditions for international 
commerce. 
The ideological cycle that starts up immediately after the end of the war shows the 
Right increasing its share of the vote until 1949, while the Left loses votes until that year. 
After 1949, those trends were reversed: the Left started to win votes while the Right lost 
 
14 From 1956 to 1969, and from 1976 to 1979, there are more random movements between Left, Center and 
Right than specific trends.  
15 Not all Latin-American countries opted for ISI, and they embarked on a process of industrialization in 
different ways. Bulmer-Thomas (2003) considers that Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay adopted an inward-
looking development model, while Colombia, Venezuela and some of the smaller republics did not.  
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them, and the trend continued until 1956. Despite those swings, the Right was predominant 
during the whole cycle. The prevalent development model was the ISI. Was there something 
different in economic terms before and after 1949 that might have caused the swing of 
ideological trends in Latin America?  Among the many things that might have affected the 
cycle, the frame of mind produced by the deterioration in international trade conditions could 
be relevant. The new international economic order primarily benefited the developed 
countries. Latin American countries did not take advantage of this new order due to their 
inward-looking policies, their concentrated commodity lottery based on primary products, 
and the protection that developed countries established on agriculture (Bulmer-Thomas 
2003).   
In terms of politics, the background to the first cycle is the Cold War. The power of 
the Soviet Union in Latin America was not strong, and the predominance of the United States 
was beyond question. But the Cold War implied more than a confrontation of real power; it 
was also an ideological conflict, and in that respect, “the forces of communism appeared 
more robust” in the region (Halperín Donghi 1993). The United States took several measures 
to maintain their supremacy in Latin America. First, through control of the Organization of 
American States (OAS). Second, through their determination to repel any internal threat of 
foreign inspiration in the Americas, and later the classification of communist activities as 
“internal threats.” Finally, by the 1954 intervention in Guatemala to oust President Jacobo 
Arbenz from the government. In a way, those efforts were exaggerated because the region 
was supportive of liberal democracy. Socialism, at least before the Cuban Revolution in 
1959, was mainly seen as a device to incorporate social reform into the political agenda.  
The second cycle also came about in the context of the Cold War; it started in 1969 
and had ended by 1976, but the political and economic circumstances of the 1970s were very 
different from those of the first cycle. This second cycle coincided with disenchantment with 
the ISI model, and was accompanied by “the socialism threat.” In addition, the shape of this 
cycle is different from the previous one. At the beginning of the cycle, in 1969, the Right 
obtained 46% of the vote and the Left 36%. The following year, in 1970, the Left surpassed 
the Right (52% and 32% respectively) and continued to outdo the Right throughout the whole 
cycle. But what made this cycle different was the progress of the Center. As from 1970, the 
Center started to gain votes while Left and Right lost them, and in 1976, it became the 
prevailing ideology in the region.  
Dissatisfaction with the economy became widespread in the 1960s. Countries that had 
adopted the inward-looking model suffered from balance of payments crises, inflationary 
pressures, and labor strife, while those that had chosen the outward model, also experienced 
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balance of payments crises plus extreme vulnerability to international economic instability. A 
general sense of failure existed despite the positive growth rates obtained during the 1950s 
and 1960s, an improvement in several social indicators such as life expectancy, and the 
classification of most Latin American countries as “middle-income” or  “upper-middle 
income” by the World Bank. A possible explanation for the sense of failure and the 
increasing popular discontent can be found in the rising inequality in income distribution, the 
high levels of unemployment, and an increasing informal sector living in urban areas 
(Bulmer-Thomas 2003).  
The above economic scenario was an opportunity for governments and politicians to 
gain votes by capitalizing on social discontent. Voters clamored for social reforms, and 
political and social tension grew in the first half of the 1970s.  In general, between 1969 and 
1976, politics in the region were under a strain. After the Cuban Revolution, which redefined 
Latin America-US relationships, socialism was seen as a possibility for some countries in the 
region, or at least, for some social and political groups within it. As a result, U.S. intervention 
in the region increased, even by supporting military regimes. In summary, the high levels of 
social and political turmoil, in combination with increasing inflation and the threat of 
socialism, contributed to the collapse of civilian governments in Latin America (Bulmer-
Thomas 2003). As Halperín Donghi points out the “more institutionalized form of armed 
intervention in political life responded to the increasing fear of socialist revolution (…)” 
(1993: 298).   
The singular shape of this cycle might be explained by looking at the history of those 
years. Many countries in which the Left had an important share of the vote during the first 
years of 1970s, like Chile, became authoritarian regimes. This is not a coincidence: one of the 
goals of military regimes was to stop communism or the threat embodied by leftist parties. As 
a result, there might be a selection bias in the ideology of countries that remained democratic 
during the 1970s. Those Latin American countries where the Left did not represent a 
challenge were not subject to the breakdown of their democratic regimes. But this argument 
is not true for all countries: in Costa Rica and Venezuela, the Left had a significant share of 
the vote but there was no democratic breakdown. Therefore, this argument only explains part 
of the phenomenon.  
Another explanation for the increase of the Center is methodological. During the first 
years of the 1970s, many Latin Americans governments changed over from being democratic 
to authoritarian, and countries under dictatorships do not count on the ideological averages of 
the region. Despite the fact that most of the authoritarian regimes of that time were close to 
the Right, we excluded them from the average because it is impossible to know the popular 
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support that those regimes received. The average for 1976 and 1977, the years in which the 
Center became the majority bloc, are made up of only four countries: Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Mexico, and Venezuela.  The Center became prevalent because Colombia and Mexico have a 
centrist government with a majority share of the vote. It is difficult to think how the Left and 
the Right would have behaved without the breakdown of democracy in so many Latin 
American countries, but one possibility is that the Left would have had the same fate even 
without the authoritarian regimes.  
 The third cycle is the longest of the four; it started in 1980 and finished in 2000. It is 
the result of several years under dictatorships. During those twenty years, the Right always 
had a larger share of the vote than the Left, but the cycle had ups and downs. For example, in 
1989, Latin America was equally divided between the Left and the Right, neither of the blocs 
was dominant. The prevalence of the Right during that period witnessed the wellspring of 
neoliberal economic reforms and the return to democracy in the region.  
The prevailing economic model in the region changed after the debt crisis of 1982 that 
was produced by Mexico’s threat to default. During the second half of the twentieth century, 
Latin American countries had become increasingly dependent on foreign borrowing to afford 
state spending. At the beginning of the 1980s, the debt-led growth model was no longer 
sustainable due to the decline in bank lending to state-owned enterprises, and the opposition 
generated by an emerging consensus in favor of an undersized state and liberal economics 
(Bulmer-Thomas 2003). This new consensus was named “Washington Consensus” by the 
economist John Williamson in 1990s. Williamson (1990) described it as a set of ten policies: 
fiscal discipline, reordering public expenditure priorities, tax reform, liberalizing interest 
rates, a competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, liberalization of inward foreign direct 
investment, privatization, deregulation, and property rights. Those policies were implemented 
in various degrees and times in Latin American, but every country of the region put into 
practice some of these reforms during the 1980s and 1990s.  
The neoliberal reforms were implemented by authoritarian regimes (Chile) as well as 
by democracies (Bolivia, Dominican Republic). In term of politics, redemocratization was the 
distinctive feature of the 1980s. By the mid-1980s, almost every country was moving from an 
authoritarian regime to a democratic one. Democracy brought an outburst of political and 
social mobilization. Political parties in general, and leftist parties in particular, recovered 
their right to compete freely in elections. Those transitions to democracy took the whole 
decade, and in some cases like Chile and Paraguay, the process lasted into the 1990s. After 
the process was complete, and democracy was established in the region, other issues emerged 
on the political agenda. While some of those topics were new like how to consolidate 
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democracy, others were old and recurrent: how to make the economies grow, how to reduce 
the increasing levels of poverty, how to transform Latin American countries into developed 
ones.  
The implementation of the “neoliberal model” was painful. Results started to appear 
during the 1990s with some improvement in living standards, increasing growth rates, and 
most importantly, the lowering of inflation. In contrast to that progress, income inequality 
remained, and the informal sector increased (Bulmer-Thomas 2003; Portes 2003; Huber and 
Solt 2004). By the end of the cycle, a series of financial crises (Mexico in 1994, Asia in 1997, 
and the Russian default in 1998) shook the model’s foundations and brought into doubt its 
advantages.  
The fourth, and last cycle, starts at the beginning of the 21st century. So far it has been 
only possible to identify the turning point of the cycle. The future path that it might take, and 
its potential end, remains unknown. This latest cycle is accompanied by a negative feeling 
towards the neoliberal model.  Latin America seems full of disillusionment towards the 
model that has prevailed during the past two decades. Concurrently, the Left started to 
increase its share of the vote in several countries in the region. The young fourth cycle that 
started in 2001 shows the predominance of the Left (see Figure 2.2). The convergence of 
these two events raises the question of a possible causal relation between them: is the 
increase in the vote for the Left caused by the failure of neoliberal reforms?  
The second cycle (1969-1976) also has the Left as the prevailing ideology, and it has 
as a background an immense wave of popular discontent with the economic situation, an 
experience of failure of the previous economic model (ISI), rising inequality in income 
distribution, high levels of unemployment, and a growing informal sector (Bulmer-Thomas 
2003). These factors are similar to the ones that are currently being blamed for the “reform 
fatigue.”16 I will argue that the economic and social consequences of neoliberal reforms, not 
the reform policies by themselves, influence the electoral fortune of political parties 
benefiting the Left. This hypothesis will be tested in Chapter 3. 
 
16 “Reform fatigue” is a concept appointed by Sebastian Edwards (1997) that encompasses citizens’ tiredness 
with the sacrifices required by economic reforms in their respective countries.  
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2.3 NEOLIBERALISM AND LEFTIST PARTIES FROM 1980S TO 2000S 
In order to determine whether Latin American leftist parties have benefited from a 
failure in market-oriented economic reforms, it is necessary to examine two conditions that 
lie behind this assertion. First, that the economic reforms implemented during the 1990s in all 
Latin American countries have failed. Second, that leftist parties are increasing their share of 
the vote in the region. Only if these two conditions are proved to be true, is it worth 
proceeding by testing the causal relationship between neoliberal economic reforms and leftist 
votes.  This section deals with the first two conditions. The impact of market-oriented 
economic reforms on the vote for the Left in Latin America is the topic of Chapter 3. 
2.3.1 Condition 1: The Washington Consensus failure 
During 1980s and 1990s, the “neoliberal model” based on the so-called “Washington 
Consensus,” was implemented to various degrees in Latin American countries. To be more 
rigorous, the market oriented economic reforms started to be implemented in the 1980s, or 
even earlier in Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, and Colombia (Morley, Machado and Pettinato 
1999).17 In the course of this chapter and those following, “Washington Consensus,” 
“market-oriented economic reforms,” “structural reforms,” “neoliberal model,” or “orthodox 
policies” are used indistinctly, and it is assumed that all of these terms refer to the same set of 
policies described by Williamson as “Washington Consensus.” To remind the reader, the set 
of policy reforms grouped as “Washington Consensus” can be summarized in fiscal 
discipline, public expenditure restrictions, tax reform, interest rate liberalization, a 
competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, liberalization of inward foreign direct 
investment, privatization, deregulation, and property rights.  
As shown in Figure 2.3, the implementation of these reforms in Latin America has 
varied in terms of pace and timing. Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay started this 
process early, in some cases even before the debt crisis of the 1980s (Edwards 1995; Morley, 
Machado and Pettinato 1999; Lora, 1997/2001) but they did it at different speeds: in Uruguay 
and Colombia reforms were milder and carried out in a more gradual way than in Chile and 
Argentina. In contrast, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Peru started 
the process later (in the mid-90s) and rapidly became deep reformers. Finally, Brazil, Costa 
 
17 Morley et al. (1999) point out that most of the rise in the trade and financial reform indexes during the 1970s 
are due to the policies implemented in Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, and Colombia.  
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Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela not only started the reforms later, they also adopted 
less structural reforms (Lora, 1997/2001).18   
 
18 This classification by timing and speed is made by Lora (1997). He distinguishes between Early Reformers 
(Argentina, Chile, and Jamaica), Gradual Reformers (Colombia and Uruguay), Recent Reformers (Bolivia, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Dominican Republic), and Slow Reformers (Brazil, Costa Rica, 
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Figure 2.3  Timing and Speed of Market-Oriented Economic Reforms in Latin America 
 The implementation of the Washington Consensus in Latin America also varied 
depending on the area of reform. Two leading researchers in the field: Eduardo Lora from the 
Inter American Development Bank (IADB), and Samuel Morley from the Economic 
Commission for Latin American and Caribbean (ECLAC) have developed indexes to 
measure the degree to which different reforms were implemented in the region. Lora (1997, 
2001) measures the advance of market-oriented economic reforms from 1985 to 1999 using a 
structural reform index that encompasses the progress of neoliberal policies in five areas: 
trade liberalization and exchange rate unification, privatizations of state companies, financial 
liberalization, tax reform, and deregulation of the labor market. Morley and his colleagues 
(1999) go further than Lora by expanding the index back to 1970, including an index of 
control of foreign capital transactions, and changing other reform indicators.19 Despite these 
differences, they arrived at very similar results to those found by Lora: the major reformers 
are Chile and Uruguay from 1970 to 1982; Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Paraguay from 1985 to 
1990; and Brazil, Peru, Dominican Republic, and El Salvador after 1990.  
Morley et al. (1999) distinguish between structural reforms and macroeconomic 
reforms. The former are defined as “the changes in regulations, tariffs, tax rates or the control 
of capital transactions that affect decisions at the micro level,” while macroeconomic policy 
reforms “involve fiscal deficit control, changes in monetary policy, and exchange rate 
management” (Morley, Machado and Pettinato 1999). The authors argue that the success of 
macroeconomic policies in lowering the inflation of Latin American countries is out of 
question, but there is not enough evidence to attribute the same achievement to structural 
reforms.   
Since then, many scholars have undertaken the task of measuring the success or 
failure of the Washington Consensus (Dutch 2003; Escaith and Morley 2001; Huber and Solt 
2004; Kuczynski and Williamson 2003; Lora and Panizza 2002; Lora, Panizza and Quispe-
Agnoli 2004; Stallings and Peres 2000), and many others had analyzed the impact of a 
particular policy reform (Lora 1997). Regardless of the differences between those studies, 
they agree that after two decades of reforms implementation, the expected result of economic 
development was achieved neither in terms of sustainable economic growth nor in social 
indicators improvement.  
However, in order to evaluate fairly the success or failure of economic reforms it is 
necessary to sort out their different goals and dimensions. The neoliberal model was 
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implemented to introduce fiscal discipline, stabilize monetary policy, and through these 
mechanisms, it was expected that orthodox policies would generate economic growth.  The 
reforms were successful in introducing fiscal discipline and monetary stability in most Latin 
American countries but they failed to generate the ultimate goal: sustainable economic 
growth.  
 
Table 2-1Economic Indicators in Latin America (1980-2004) 
 
 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 
Inflation 66 496 367 16 8 
Growth* 0.81 2.65 4.86 2.54 1.93 
Unemployment 7.78 7.41 7.66 9.12 9.82 
 
Source: International Monetary Found and World Development Bank 
*Annual percent change in gross domestic product, constant prices in US dollars. 
Results are presented in averages. 
 
 
Curbing inflation was one of the achievements of market-oriented economic reforms. 
There is no disagreement on this point. As shown in Table 2-1, inflation has been going down 
since the mid-90s and the regional average for the first years of this decade (2000-2004) was 
only a single-digit figure (8%). But some argue that the decrease in inflation rates should be 
accredited to macroeconomic policy rather than to structural reforms (Morley, Machado and 
Pettinato 1999).  
Economic growth did not have the same fortune. Between 1990 and 1999, the 
region’s growth was higher than during the lost decade (1980’s) showing the immediate 
positive impact of structural reforms, but it diminished to 1.93 for the 2000-2004 period. 
Even scholars who had claimed that neoliberal reforms had produced economic growth (Lora 
1997/200), later acknowledged that the positive and immediate impact was not sustainable: 
“the reforms had only a temporary effect on growth. Our estimates imply that in the period of 
fastest reform, 1991-1993, reforms accelerated annual growth by 1.3 percentage points. 
However, when the reform process started  decelerating, the growth effect dropped 
substantially, and in the period from 1997 to 1999 it accounted for only 0.6 percentage point 
of additional growth” (Lora and Panizza 2002).  
                                                                                                                                                        
19 The main changes introduced by Morley et al. are made in the privatization and domestic financial reform 
indexes “to reflect only the presence or absence of government intervention” (1999: 10).  
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Opponents of neoliberal reforms usually claim that the main problem with the reforms 
is the social consequences that the model produced rather than the insignificant economic 
improvements generated in the region. They argue that the main drawbacks are the increase 
in poverty, income inequality, unemployment, and the percentage of Latin-Americans 
working in the informal sector. During the last years, several scholars have tested these 
claims. Huber and Solt (2004) found an improvement in poverty reduction during 1990s but 
poverty in the region remained above the level of 1980s. One of their main conclusions is that 
countries with higher levels of neoliberalism and more aggressive tactics of liberalization are 
associated with rising inequality and poverty. In other words, radical and rapid reformers hurt 
the poorest segments of society. They also noticed an increase in the informalization of Latin 
American’s economies. In most Latin American countries, unemployment rates increased 
because of market liberalization, public sector cutbacks and privatization. Most formal 
workers who lost their jobs moved to informal sectors of the economy, and as a result, 
informal workers became the largest class in every Latin American country (Portes and 
Hoffman 2003, Sabatini and Farnsworth 2006). Governments had no money to compensate 
the losers of economic adjustment because they had to follow frugal fiscal policies,20 
producing high levels of popular discontent. 
Although this evidence looks pretty conclusive, an alternative view alleges that the 
negative social impact of the Washington Consensus was minor. Lora, Panizza and Quispe-
Agnoli state that “in spite of all the fuss about the employment implications of trade 
liberalization and privatization, there is very scant evidence to support it” (2004: 15). 
However, examining the same studies that they reviewed, we found that the majority 
concluded that the neoliberal model had, at least, some detrimental effect on the social 
conditions of Latin Americans. Narayan and Petesch (2002), and the work by SAPRIN 
(2002) present qualitative evidence about the negative impact of reforms on poor people. 
From a quantitative perspective, Behrman, Birdsall and Székely (2000) show that some 
reforms had the effect of increasing inequality and worsening income distribution among 
lower income sectors. In the opposite direction, MacKenzie and Mookherjee (2003) signal 
that privatization did not have a negative impact on employment. In conclusion, the impact of 
market-oriented economic reforms on the social welfare of Latin Americans remains open to 
question.  
 
20 Some scholars argue that targeted compensation programs presented relief for certain social groups (Weyland 
2002) and they certainly did that in Argentina, Peru and Venezuela, but those policies were not universal, they 
were not implemented in all countries, and even in countries where they were implemented like Venezuela, they 
did not overcome the low levels of support for neoliberal restructuring. 
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Scholars agree that inflation and unemployment are among the economic conditions 
with the greatest impact on voters’ decisions (Hibbs 1979; Powell and Whitten 1993). 
Inflation, as Okun states, undermines “the foundations of habit and custom” (1975: 383), 
generates uncertainty about the future, and decreases voters’ purchase power by increasing 
the cost of products and services. A vast body of evidence shows that Latin Americans care 
about inflation, and reward governments which control it (Lora and Olivera 2005; Remmer, 
2003). Unemployment has an impact not only on those voters that are unemployed or 
underemployed; it also affects a larger number of voters that become afraid of losing their 
jobs. Since inflation was brought under control in most of the region after the mid-90s, it is 
highly probable that Latin-Americans judged unemployment to be more serious than inflation 
and voted against the political parties that implemented the reforms that produced it.  In 
conclusion, there is some evidence to support the first statement that the neoliberal economic 
reforms implemented in Latin America after the debt crisis of the 1980s have failed to 
produce sustainable growth and unemployment.  
Regardless of the objective outcomes of the neoliberal model, Latin Americans’ 
disenchantment with it can be seen everywhere. Even the strongest supporters of the model 
have recognized that the outcome was not the one that they were hoping for. International 
organizations, which strongly supported the “neoliberal model” such as the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, have 
acknowledged that the reforms did not produce the expected results, and they now suggest 
four different types of reforms to overcome this failure: “crisis proofing, completing first-
generation reforms, advancing second-generation reforms, and improving equality” (IDEA 
2004). Furthermore, many scholars who supported the “Washington Consensus” as the way 
to achieve development later moved away from this idea, and became its critics: Jeffrey 
Sachs (2005), Joseph Stiglitz (2002) and Dani Rodrik (2001) are examples of this. Not only 
has the international community shown signs of so-called “reform fatigue”.  The lack of 
public support for the Washington Consensus can also be seen among the general public, 
there is a widespread loss of confidence in the benefits of pro-market reforms among opinion 
leaders, and a less proactive stance toward reforms is the current mainstream tendency among 
Latin America’s policymakers (Lora  2004;  Panizza and Yañez 2005). 
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2.3.2 Condition 2: The Left had increased its share of the vote in all Latin America 
The evidence is not so conclusive to support the second statement that Latin 
American leftist parties are getting more votes in the last wave of elections than they did in 
the 1980s or 1990s. Or, to put it differently, the statement is true only by looking at the 
average share of votes for leftist parties in Latin America, but it is not the pattern followed by 
every country in the region. On average, the Left increased its share of the vote from 1980 to 
2005, the mean of their vote during the 1980s was 29.5%, for the 1990s was 29.3%, and 
during the first presidential elections of the 21st Century it has been 33.9%. This trend is also 
shown in Figure 2.2. During the last part of the third ideological cycle, during the 1990s, the 
Left started to increase its share of the vote. But it is at the beginning of 2000s when it gained 
more votes than the Right.  
One could take as a pattern the recent victories of leftist parties in Bolivia (2005), 
Chile (2006), Uruguay (2004), Argentina (2003), Brazil (2002), and Venezuela (1999), but 
not all Latin American countries have recently elected candidates from the Left or have leftist 
parties that increased their share of the vote (e.g. Colombia in 2006 and 2002). As Figure 2.4 
shows, there is not a unique recognizable trend in the vote for the Left in Latin America from 
the 80s to the last election. According to their tendency in the vote for left parties, Latin 
American countries can be classified into four different categories:21 Continuous Increase, U 
Trend, No Change, and Continuous Decrease.       
 
 
21 The percentages presented on Figure 2.4 group the vote received by left and center left parties in presidential 
elections.  















































































































































































































Source: based on Coppedge (1997) and Political Database of the Americas 
(Georgetown University)  
Figure 2.4 Evolution of the Vote for Left and Center-left Parties in Latin America since 1980s
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Mexico, Guatemala and El Salvador are 
categorized as countries with Continuous Increase in the vote for leftist parties in presidential 
elections. This increase in the share of the vote was not linear for all countries; in particular, 
Brazil’s time series has ups and downs that are an effect of the way in which the PSDB under 
the government of Fernando H. Cardoso was classified.22 Despite this variation, the share of 
the vote for leftist parties in the Southern Cone of Latin America has increased since the 
return of these countries to democracy in the early 1980s. In Mexico, Guatemala and El 
Salvador the increase is less pronounced but still relevant.  
The second category is the “U” Trend. Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Venezuela, and 
Nicaragua belong to it. In these five countries, leftist parties had an important share of the 
vote during the 80s which went down during the 90s (in a similar way to the Continuous 
Decrease countries), but leftists regained their electoral appeal in the last presidential 
elections causing Hugo Chávez (Venezuela), Lucio Gutiérrez (Ecuador) and Evo Morales 
(Bolivia) to the presidency, and a new leftist party in Costa Rica (Partido Acción Ciudadana) 
to obtain 26% of the votes in 2002. In Nicaragua, the recent recovery of the Left is less 
impressive than in these countries but is still significant.   
The No-Change category is formed by those countries in which leftist parties received 
a small percentage of the votes during the 1980s, the 1990s, and the 2000s. In Paraguay, after 
the return to democracy, leftist parties were almost non-existent, and they never gained more 
than 0.5% of the vote in presidential elections. Colombia and Honduras are cases with more 
variation than Paraguay, but leftist parties never gained a significant amount of votes. From 
1982 to 2002, the highest gain that leftist parties obtained in Colombia was 12.74% in 1990.  
(see Figure 2.4). 
Dominican Republic and Peru show a trend of Continuous Decrease in the share of 
the vote that leftist parties have had since the 1980s. In comparison with the rest of Latin 
America, the Left in these two countries had a significant share of the vote during the “lost 
decade” which shrunk during the decade of the neoliberal model implementation. 
Furthermore, during the last presidential elections, leftist parties received a minimal 
percentage of votes (see Figure 2.4).  
                                                 
22 PSDB started to move from left to right before the 1994 election. As a result, the leftist ideological bloc lost 
one of their components. However, the PT compensated this effect by increasing its electoral share of vote 
election through election since 1989.  
As this preliminary diagnosis indicates, different countries present different trends. The 
increase in voter share that leftist parties received in presidential elections since the 1980s in the 
Southern Cone and to a lesser degree in Mexico, Guatemala and El Salvador; and the recent 
increase in Bolivia, Costa Rica, Peru, Venezuela, and Nicaragua cannot be generalized to the 
whole of Latin America.  
2.4 CONCLUSION 
Ideological cycles have existed, and exist, in Latin America in the same way that they 
exist in American politics. The alternation of Left and Right in power since 1945 indicates that 
none of these ideologies was hegemonic, and the current predominance of the Left can be 
understood as the beginning of another cycle. Even though the predominance of the Left is not as 
new as many think, it is interesting to analyze which factors explain it.  
The Left was also the prevalent ideology in the region from 1969 to 1976. Those years 
were full of dissatisfaction with the economy, unhappiness with the ISI model, rising inequality 
in income distribution, high levels of unemployment, and a growing informal sector. These 
factors are similar to those currently blamed for the “reform fatigue” in Latin America. 
Consequently, one possible argument to test empirically is that these factors favor the vote for 
the Left. Or to frame the argument based on more current events: the failure of the neoliberal 
model has lead to the increase of the Left in Latin America. 
Although leftist parties are not increasing their electoral support in every Latin American 
country, this chapter presents evidence that the Left is the current predominant ideology in the 
region. On the other hand, there is evidence indicating that the implementation of market-
oriented economic reforms during the 1980s and 1990s has failed to achieve sustainable 
economic growth and employment. In order to answer if there is a causal relationship between 
the failure of neoliberal policies and the increase in the vote for leftist parties, it is necessary to 
carry out a multivariate analysis. The next chapter does that by analyzing the impact of 
neoliberal reforms, economic variables that measure the economic results of the reforms, and 
political variables in the vote for leftist parties in 17 Latin American countries.  
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3.0  ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS THAT BENEFIT LEFTIST 
PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICA 
Are leftist parties the beneficiaries of the failure of market-oriented economic reforms in Latin 
America? The recent electoral success of the left in Ecuador, Nicaragua and Chile (2006), 
Bolivia (2005), Uruguay (2004), Argentina (2003), Brazil (2002 and 2006), and Venezuela 
(1999), has led journalists, political analysts and political scientists to formulate this question. As 
was shown in Chapter 2, academic consensus states that the neoliberal economic reforms 
implemented in Latin America after the debt crisis of the 1980s have largely failed to produce 
sustainable economic growth and employment (Dutch 2003; Escaith and Morley 2001; Huber 
and Solt 2004; Kuczynski and Williamson 2003; Lora and Panizza 2002; Lora, 2004; Stallings 
2000). As a result, presidents such as Evo Morales or Hugo Chávez who have campaigned 
against the “neoliberal model” may have benefited from its malfunction.  But the previous 
chapter also indicates that not all countries in the region moved to the left after the 
implementation of economic reforms in the 1990s. In reformist countries such as Paraguay and 
Dominican Republic, left-of-center parties did not increase their share of votes.  
Taking into consideration that most Latin American countries implemented neoliberal 
reforms during the 1990s, but that only in some of them have left-leaning parties come to power 
since the late 1990s, a crucial question is what particular features of these reforms, and what 
economic and political conditions, if any, have helped leftist parties’ electoral performance? Are 
pure economic outcomes, such as inflation or unemployment, more important than market-
oriented reforms in explaining the vote for leftist parties? Did voters turn to the left because they 
rejected neoliberal policies on ideological grounds or did they just react to the poor outcomes 
generated by those policies? Are economic factors only relevant for understanding the movement 
of some countries to the left under certain political conditions? And do political conditions, like 
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having a leftist incumbent, affect the electoral possibilities of leftist parties? This chapter uses a 
pooled data set of Latin American presidential elections to address these questions.  
Regression results indicate that more extensive market reforms per se did not produce 
more votes for left-leaning parties; there is no linear relationship between the so-called 
“neoliberal model” and the Left’s vote share. On the other hand, the unemployment rate has 
proved to be more important than reforms in explaining the increase in votes for the Left. Leftist 
parties gain votes when unemployment rises. This leads to the hypothesis that it was not the 
reforms themselves but their impact that led to the rise of the Left.  In particular, we can 
hypothesize that only if the rise in unemployment is a result of the market reforms could we 
argue that neoliberal economic reforms indirectly benefited left-of-center parties.  If this proves 
to be the case, then we can understand why not all neo-liberal reforms produced leftist 
governments. 
The first section of this chapter discusses previous research done on the political 
consequences of market-oriented economic reforms in Latin America, and puts forward a set of 
hypotheses that test the impact of neoliberal reforms, economic conditions, and political context 
on the electoral fortunes of leftist parties in the region. The second section describes the variables 
and statistical techniques used in the empirical analysis, and the third section discusses the 
statistical results. The last section concludes and emphasizes the importance of looking at the 
micro level of analysis in order to find more definitive explanations for the recent increase in 
votes for the Left in Latin America. 
 
 
3.1 MARKET REFORMS, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, AND POLITICAL 
CONTEXT 
 
The question of whether the implementation of market-oriented economic reforms in Latin 
America has produced an increase in votes for the Left is connected with two scholarly research 
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agendas: the literature on the implementation of the “neoliberal model” in Latin America, and 
the voter choice studies, in particular, the research on economic voting.     
 Students of Latin American politics have produced an impressive amount of work trying 
to explain the conditions under which the implementation of harmful economic reforms in the 
region during the 1990s was possible (Corrales 2002; Gibson 1997; Lodola 2005; Murillo 2001 ; 
Stokes 2001a ; Stokes, 2001b; Weyland 2002). The wealth of this production is the result not 
only of the quantity of studies but especially of the variety of perspectives used to explain this 
period of Latin American political and economic history. On the other hand, the research that 
explains the consequences of these reforms has only started to flourish more recently (Lora and 
Panizza 2003; Lora and Olivera 2005; Portes and Hoffman 2003; Remmer 2003; Wise and Roett 
2003). 
Within this latter group of research, two studies ask questions similar to the ones pointed 
out here. Remmer’s article (2003) analyzes the electoral fortunes of Latin American incumbents 
from 1982 to 1999 in an attempt to tackle the political consequences of neoliberal reform. She 
finds that those governments which had controlled inflation were rewarded by the electorate. On 
the contrary, when the incumbent party’s economic performance was poor, the electorate 
punished it by voting for another party. These findings show that economic voting also works in 
Latin America but does not add anything new in relation to the electoral impact of market-
oriented economic reforms because Remmer doesn’t include a measure of neoliberal reforms as 
an independent variable.  
Lora and Olivera’s article (2005) is the first study that tests the impact of neoliberal 
reforms on the electoral fortunes of the incumbent party. Using their structural reform index 
(SRI), they analyze the effect of market-oriented economic reforms on the incumbent party’s 
electoral results in Presidential and Legislative elections in 17 Latin American countries from the 
mid 1980s till 2002. Their major finding is that Latin Americans “dislike pro-market policies 
irrespective of their results” (33).23 They also find that the electorate rewards incumbents that 
control inflation. Ideology enters into their analysis as an independent variable, and it is only 
significant in legislative elections:  “while the electorate dislikes privatization measures, it is 
more tolerant of them when the largest party in the legislature has a pro-market ideology” (40). 
                                                 
23 My italics 
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Even though Lora and Olivera’s paper advances knowledge about the political impact 
that the neoliberal model had in Latin America, we still do not know if the implementation of 
those reforms has caused (or partially caused) the recent increase in the vote for the Left. Their 
dependent variable is the incumbent’s share of the vote, not the vote for leftist parties.  
Leftist parties can be the beneficiaries of the neoliberal model’s failure because they 
traditionally oppose market-oriented economic reforms, and they are more supportive of state 
intervention in the economy. This argument leads to the hypothesis that higher levels of 
economic reforms generate an increase in the share of the vote for left-leaning parties. But the 
idea that the mere existence of neoliberal reforms is sufficient to increase leftist votes assumes 
that voters are policy oriented, and don’t like market-oriented economic reforms regardless of 
their results, which is, in fact, the main finding of Lora and Olivera’s paper (2005). However, 
there are many cases that counter this argument. The Dominican Republic and Paraguay are two 
countries that highly liberalized their economies, and leftist parties are not precisely in an 
ascending phase. On the contrary, Uruguay is one of the least reformed countries in Latin 
America, yet the Left won the 2004 presidential elections. Hence, I predict:  
H1: Higher levels of economic reforms, by themselves, do not produce an 
increase in the share of the vote for leftist parties, but, 
 
H2: Higher levels of economic reforms, accompanied by higher levels of failure of 
these reforms, lead to an increase in the vote for leftist parties. 
 
The comparative literature on voting behavior in Latin America mainly focuses on 
economic voting theory and electoral turnover, while research about partisanship vote is 
performed mainly by case studies. Although Latin American countries, along with other low-
income democracies, have been subject to less economic voting research than the United States 
and Western Europe (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000), the results provided by comparative 
studies indicate that the economy is an important determinant of Latin Americans’ vote 
(Echegaray  2005; Remmer 1991; Remmer and Gelineau 1993; Krueger, 1994; Roberts and 
Wibbels 1999; Anderson et al.  2000;  Molina 2001). There is extensive evidence that economic 
voting exists in Latin America, the economy affects electoral outcomes, and it is a major 
explanation for the high electoral volatility and turnover rate that exist in the region. But we do 
not know what economic conditions favor the vote for the Left.  
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Evidence from developed countries indicates that leftist governments are more concerned 
with economic goals such as full employment and a more egalitarian income distribution, while 
right-wing parties favor low inflation and tax control (Hibbs 1979). More recent research in 
industrialized democracies found that support for right-wing governments is enhanced by low 
inflation and hurt by high inflation, while support for left-leaning governments increases by 
lower than average unemployment (Powell and Whitten 1993). For Latin America, Stokes states 
(Stokes 2001b) that in situations of high inflation and growth, the electorate will vote in favor of 
efficiency-oriented policies, and under high unemployment, they will choose security-oriented 
policies. Generally, left-of-center parties support security-oriented policies while right-wing 
parties are in favor of efficiency-oriented policies. Consequently, I hypothesize that: 
 
H3: In Latin America, high levels of unemployment will raise the votes for leftist parties 
when the incumbent party is not leftist. On the other hand, high levels of inflation will 
hurt left-leaning parties’ electoral chances.  
 
The impact of the economy on electoral outcomes is a phenomenon that receives 
academic consensus. James Carville’s famous phrase “It’s the economy, stupid” is a good 
synthesis of the importance that is usually given to economic factors to explain the fortune of 
political parties in electoral times.24 Nonetheless, scholars have found it extremely difficult to 
replicate in cross-national studies the economic voting effects found over time within countries. 
This puzzle was solved by adding political conditions to the economic conditions to explain how 
elections work. Powell and Whitten recommend that to “explain differences in retrospective 
economic voting across nations and over time we must take into account the political context 
within which elections take place (1993: 409). Following this approach, this project adds the 
ideology of the incumbent as a political condition, and hypothesizes that, 
H4: If a leftist party is the incumbent, and it has a poor economic performance, 
the share of the vote for the left will decrease in the following election as a 
consequence of the erosion of being in charge of the government. 
 
To sum up, these hypotheses add to prior research by testing the argument that the 
increase in the vote for leftist parties is the political response to the implementation of neoliberal 
reforms, and pinpointing alternative causes that explain this partisan vote. In the next two 
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sections, I describe the variables used in the model, the data, and evaluate the previous 
hypotheses empirically. 
3.2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
  
To test these hypotheses I use pooled data from seventeen Latin American countries: Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The 
analysis covers the period from 1985 to 1999.25 The decision to start the analysis in the 1980s, 
and not before or after, is based on two reasons. First, the 1980s is considered the decade of 
democratic transitions in Latin America; before that time most Latin American countries were 
under authoritarian regimes that did not allow free elections. Second, the 1980s is considered the 
“lost decade” in economic terms and represents a natural baseline before the bulk of neoliberal 
economic reforms were implemented.  
The dependent variable is computed in two ways: as the share of the vote that left and 
center-left parties obtained in each presidential election, and as the change in the share of votes 
for the left and center-left parties from one presidential election to the previous one.  I decided to 
analyze only presidential elections for two reasons. First, Latin American countries have 
presidential regimes, and in most of them (Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay), legislative elections are concurrent with presidential 
elections which makes the former highly influenced by presidential campaigns. Second, within 
US literature, which is the most widely-researched area regarding this topic, there is scholarly 
disagreement over the existence of a macro-level relationship between the health of the national 
economy and national congressional vote (see the discussion between Erikson 1990 and 
Jacobson 1990).  
                                                                                                                                                             
24 He was Bill Clinton’s political advisor during the 1992 presidential campaign. 
25 I was constraint by the time frame of one of the main independent variable, structural reform index, which goes 
from 1985 to 1999. In Lora and Olivera (2005), the authors expanded their index of structural reforms (SRI) until 
2002, but data for 2000-2002 is not publicly available. 
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Political parties are classified in the Left-Right ideological dimension following 
Coppedge’s criteria (see Chapters 1 and 2 for the definition of the ideological categories). The 
level of economic reforms is measured by the structural reform index (SRI) built by Lora (Lora, 
1997/2001). This index gives scores to policies based on their degree of economic liberalization 
in five different areas: trade, tax collection, financial markets, privatization, and labor markets. 
Countries receive an average annual score between 0 and 100 on each of these five policies. 
Those with most state-centric policies score 0 whereas the most market-oriented ones receive 
100. To generate the overall SRI, scores for each policy area are averaged. Based on the SRI, 
two different variables are used in the analysis: the SRI mean for the previous period of 
government and the SRI change from one election to the previous one.  
The argument that more reforms lead to more votes for leftist parties rests on two 
possible ideas. The first one is that Latin Americans have an aversion to neoliberal reforms. Lora 
and Olivera’s (2005) article shows evidence in favor of this. The second idea is that market-
oriented economic reforms have failed, and as a consequence, voters will punish those who 
support them, and favor those against them. In order to assess the economic success or failure of 
market-oriented economic results, I use three economic variables: inflation, economic growth, 
and the unemployment rate. These variables are commonly used in the economic voting 
literature. The inflation rate is measured on the basis of changes in the consumer price index and 
logged26 to control for variations produced during hyperinflationary years. Economic growth is 
the percentage change in GDP based on constant local currency. The unemployment rate refers 
to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. 
The data comes from World Development Indicators 2005 and BADEINSO-ECLAC 2005. All 
three variables are included in the analysis in three forms: as the mean for the previous 
government period (inflation mean, growth mean, and unemployment mean), as the election year 
value (inflation election year, growth election year, and unemployment election year), and as the 
change in the value between election years (change in inflation, change in growth, and change in 
unemployment). 
                                                 
26 Because it is not possible to obtain the log of a negative number, I use the following formula to calculate the logs : 
if I>0, LN (1+I); and if I≤0, -1*LN(1+|I|). I am grateful to Aníbal Pérez Liñan for suggesting this formula to account 
for deflationary years.   
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To capture the influence of political context on the vote for leftist parties, I include the 
ideology of the incumbent.27  As the hypotheses on the previous section stated, having a leftist 
incumbent may impact the electoral chances of leftist parties.  The incumbent’s ideology is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the incumbent belongs to a left or center-left 
party and 0 in the remainder of the cases.    
                                                 
27 I tried to include a measure of ideological polarization but I was unsuccessful on finding a proper one. Ideological 
polarization is usually measured using voters’ self placement in the ideological dimension (Sani and Sartori 1983), 
but public opinion data is not available for every election year of each country. I also tried with an alternative 
indicator of ideological polarization built by Coppedge (1998). It takes into account the share of the vote that each 
ideological bloc has, and measures the dispersion of the vote away from the relative center of the party system. 
Polarization ranges from zero when all votes are in one ideological extreme to 100 when half of the vote is at each 
of the ideological extremes, and it is a measure of the system ideological polarization at the time of the election. The 
formula to calculate the relative center (MLRP) is right % + .5 center-right % - .5 center-left % - left %, and the 
formula to calculate the ideological polarization is |1-mlrp|*right % + |.5-mlrp|*center-right % + |-.5-mlrp|*center-
left % + |-1-mlrp|*left %, where mlrp = MLRP/100.  But this measure of ideological polarization is problematic 
because it is not totally independent from the vote share that each ideological bloc gets. The correlation between 
polarization and the percentage of vote is 0.51 with the Left, -0.47 with the Center, and 0.02 with the Right. As a 
result, I decided not to include it to avoid endogeneity.  
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Table 3-1 Summary Statistics 
            
      
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
            
      
Dependent Variables      
% vote for left 85 28.92 23.32 0.00 84.50
Change in left vote share 68 1.43 17.57 -45.56 40.24
      
Economic Reforms      
Structural reform index 59 47.44 9.87 27.20 69.50
Change in Structural reform 
index  46 5.81 14.77 -80.30 26.30
      
Economic Results      
Inflation mean 62 3.56 1.59 0.22 8.31
Inflation election year 62 3.24 1.95 -0.69 9.37
Growth mean 62 3.15 2.26 -3.50 7.75
Growth election year 62 3.10 3.75 -7.00 11.00
Unemployment mean 59 8.16 3.50 3.17 19.00
Unemployment election year 59 8.37 3.77 2.00 19.00
      
Political Variables      
Ideology incumbent 76 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
            
Source: based on Lora and Olivera (2005), Political Database of the Americas (Georgetown University), World 
Development Indicators 2005, and BADEINSO-ECLAC 2005 
 
Table 3-1 shows the descriptive information for each variable included in the model. I 
use OLS regression models with robust standard errors.  
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3.3 ASSESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPETING EXPLANATIONS 
The most straightforward way to check if there is a causal relationship between the degree of 
market-oriented economic reforms implemented in a country and the vote for left-leaning parties 
is to look at the evolution of both variables. Figure 3.1 illustrates that there is not a unique 
pattern for all Latin American countries. There are some countries in which both lines correlate 
in a positive direction; they have high and positive correlation coefficients: Argentina (0.94), 
Chile (0.86), Ecuador (0.52), Guatemala (0.99), Mexico (0.95), Nicaragua (0.99), El Salvador 
(0.99) and Uruguay (0.98). In the rest of the countries each variable moves in a different 
direction: Bolivia (-0.24) and Colombia (-0.46); or in an opposite direction: Costa Rica (-0.74), 
Dominican Republic (-0.99) and Peru (-0.91); or the share of the vote for leftist parties and the 
structural reform index (SRI) have a positive but low correlation: Brazil (0.32), Honduras (0.43), 
Paraguay (0.47) and Venezuela (0.45). What’s more, for the whole region, the share of the vote 
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Figure 3.1 Market-Oriented Reforms and Vote for Left in Latin America, 1980-2005 
 
 
With this preliminary evidence, I expect that the structural reform index will not be 
significant in the models that predict the vote for leftist parties in Latin America. Table 3-2 
reports regression results from several models run using STATA that test the effect of market-
oriented economic reforms, economic outcomes, and political variables on the share of the vote 
that leftist parties obtain in Latin American countries.  All the regressions were run using robust 
standard errors clustered by country.   
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Table 3-2 The impact of market reforms, economic outcomes and political variables on the share of the vote 
for leftist parties in Latin America 
Dependent variable: Percentage of vote for the ideological left 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Structural reform index (SRI) 0.108 0.063 -0.015 0.060 0.254 0.2151
(0.236) (0.433) (0.979) (0.246) (0.246) (0.244)
Inflation mean 3.923 3.803 3.864 3.865 3.799
(3.892) (4.287) (4.066) (4.042) (4.236)
Inflation election year 1.976
(4.189)
Growth mean 0.711 0.733 1.403 0.961 1.689
(1.811) (1.910) (1.705) (1.706) (1.709)
Growth election year 0.061
(0.869)
Unemployment mean 1.566** 0.900 2.002** 1.545** 1.992**
(0.749) (5.596) (0.766) (0.748) (0.774)




Unemployment*Ideology incumbent -4.503 -4.629*
(3.226) (2.592)
Ideology incumbent*SRI -0.852 -0.908
(0.801) (0.824)
Ideology incumbent 12.483 12.092 12.428 48.146* 49.002 88.094*
(9.702) (10.143) (9.623) (25.065) (32.980) (44.241)
Constant -10.373 2.902 -4.089 -14.087 -17.839 -22.154
(22.912) (34.641) (54.352) (22.027) (21.409) (21.167)
Number of observations 53 53 53 53 53 53
R-squared 0.15 0.11 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.22
F-test 2.92** 1.73 2.41* 3.84** 3.35** 3.18**
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.








In agreement with the expectations of H1, and the preliminary evidence shown in Figure 
3.1, Model 1 presents evidence that higher levels of economic reforms, by themselves, do not 
produce an increase in the vote for the Left. Model 2, Model 3, Model 4, Model 5 and Model 6 
lend some further credibility to this finding: the level of economic reforms implemented in Latin 
America doesn’t have a direct impact on the increase in the vote for left-leaning parties in the 
region. 
But market-oriented economic policies may have an impact on the vote for the Left in an 
indirect way.  Previous research indicates that the main problem with the reforms is the social 
consequences that are produced: an increase in poverty, income inequality, unemployment, and 
the percentage of Latin Americans working in the informal sector (Huber and Solt 2004, Portes 
and Hoffman 2003). Building on this evidence, economic reforms could have had an indirect 
effect on the vote for the Left through these negative social and economic outcomes. The 
regression results in Model 1 indicate that there is a degree of truth in this argument. Within the 
economic variables, the one that reaches statistical significance is the closest to being understood 
as an indicator of a social outcome: unemployment. More unemployment leads to an increase in 
the vote for leftist parties in Latin America. On the contrary, inflation and growth are not 
significant. This result is that expected by H2, which pointed out that the failure of neoliberal 
reforms leads to an increase in the vote for the Left. But it is not the combination between the 
level of reforms (SRI) and the failure of these reforms measured by the unemployment rate that 
benefit leftist parties electoral chances. The interaction term in Model 3 does not reach 
significance, indicating that leftist parties benefit from poor economic outcomes rather than from 
the implementation of neoliberal reforms.28  
The regression results of Model 1, Model 4, Model 5 and Model 6 are consistent with my 
expectations in H3. In line with European partisan literature, high levels of unemployment have 
been found to truly benefit left-of-center parties, even after controlling by the ideology of the 
incumbent. Unemployment is significant when it is measured as the average unemployment for 
the whole period of the previous government.  However, high levels of inflation do not hurt the 
Left as was expected. Neither inflation nor growth has a systematic connection with the vote for 
the Left. Neither of these two variables is significant under any specification.   
                                                 
28 The significance of interaction terms was tested using the lincom command in STATA. 
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The political context influences the electoral chances of the Left as I expected in H4. 
Models 4 and 6 indicate that for left-leaning parties, being in charge of the government is 
significantly and positively related to its electoral fortune. But the significance of the interaction 
term between incumbent’s ideology and unemployment in Model 6 also shows that when the 
leftist incumbent had a poor economic performance, the share of the vote for the left will 
decrease in the following election, which reinforces H3 and H4. 
In order to confirm these results, I run the regression model with a different measure of 
the vote for leftist parties. Table 3-3 presents the results of a model using the change in the vote 
for the Left from one election to the previous one. Note that all independent variables, where 
possible, are also measured as changes in the value from one election year to the previous one.  
Regression results reinforce some arguments, but they also reveal some contradictory 
findings. On the reinforcing side, they again show that more neoliberal reforms do not generate 
more votes for the Left. Moreover, Models 1 and 3 indicate that an increase in unemployment 
has a significant and positive impact on the fortune of leftist parties. On the other side, under this 
model specification, being in charge of the government significantly diminishes the electoral 
changes of left-leaning parties in the following election regardless of the implementation of 










                                                 
29 In order to test the robustness of these results, I dropped two cases from the dataset: Brazil 1998 and Dominican 
Republic 2000 that may represent a methodological problem. Since the 1998 elections, the Brazilian PSDB is 
classified as center-right instead of center-left as it was before. The same happens with the Partido Revolucionario 
Dominicano (PRD) in 2000. Both political parties changed their ideology after being in charge of the government. 
Leaving them in the analysis may increase the negative effect that being an incumbent can have on the future 
electoral performance of the left, but even after dropping these cases, the results remain the same. I have also 
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Table 3-3The impact of market reforms, economic outcomes and political variables on the change in 
the vote for leftist parties in Latin America 
 
Dependent variable: Change in the vote share of the left 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3)
Change in structural reform index -0.056 -0.056 -0.043
(0.116) (0.116) (0.112)
Change in inflation 0.883 0.823 0.810
(1.618) (1.575) (1.696)
Change in growth 0.056 0.036 -0.017
(0.432) (0.409) (0.466)
Change in unemployment 1.549* 1.577 1.535*
(0.846) (0.905) (0.869)
Ideology incumbent*change unemployment -0.513
(2.233)
Ideology incumbent*change in SRI -0.488
(0.704)
Ideology incumbent -28.577*** -28.888*** -24.036**
(7.141) (7.729) (9.619)
Constant 7.225** 7.185*** 7.148**
(2.433) (2.350) (2.489)
Number of observations 42 42 42
R-squared 0.46 0.46 0.46
F-test 5.02*** 5.14*** 4.12**
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, **** significant at 1%
* "Ideology incumbent" is still significant when we drop Brazil 1998 and Dominican Republic 2000.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
checked for collinearity problems in the data, but there is anything to be concerned about.  The correlation matrix for 
each regression model is shown in Appendix B.  
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The strategy of pooling different Latin American countries risks masking the real effects 
of certain independent variables on the share of the vote for leftist parties. In order to control for 
the possibility that the impact of some variables is cancelled out by the interaction with the 
diversity of national contexts, I run the regressions including country-fixed effects, and some 
results change. Using country dummies wipes out the significant relationship between 
unemployment and leftist vote, keeps the positive impact that being in charge of the government 
has for leftist parties’ prospect, and reveals a hidden relationship: when a leftist party was the 
incumbent and it implemented market-oriented economic reforms, the share of the vote for the 
left decreased in the following election. In other words, Latin Americans punish leftist parties 
when they implement neoliberal policies. This finding goes against H4 which stated that when 
leftist incumbents have a poor economic performance, their electoral chances will diminish. 
Neither high levels of inflation, nor high levels of unemployment or low levels of growth hurt 
left-leaning parties’ electoral chances. The erosion of being in charge of the government 
occurred independently of the economic performance, it is mainly the result of implementing 
market-friendly reforms. On the other hand, the implementation of neoliberal reforms by rightist 
or centrist parties does not raise the vote for leftist parties.30  
These different results can be partially explained by the smaller N that the regression 
models have, by the different specification of the models, or simply by pointing out that it is 
necessary to go beyond the macro-level analysis to fully understand under what economic and 
political conditions leftist parties increase their share of the vote in Latin America. This 
represents another piece of evidence signaling the need to explore the individual level for 




                                                 
30 These models do not use robust clustered error. Regression results are shown in Appendix B. 
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3.4 GOING BEYOND THE MACRO LEVEL 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to test the argument that the neoliberal model implemented in 
the 1990s has a positive impact on the vote for left-of-center parties in Latin America. The 
findings are conclusive: more market-oriented economic reforms do not produce more votes for 
political parties on the left. Despite the fact that Lora and Olivera (2005) found that Latin 
Americans dislike pro-market policies irrespective of their results, and punish incumbents for 
implementing those reforms, this macro analysis shows that there is no clear and direct 
connection between that dislike and voting for leftist parties.  
From the basis of this evidence alone, however, I cannot conclude that free-market 
policies have no effect on the vote for the Left. The structural reform index measures how much 
a country has liberalized its economy, but it does not say anything about how voters perceive 
those reforms. The perception about economic reforms, or the opinion about them, may be not 
related to the effective level of reforms. It is possible that in countries where fewer reforms have 
been implemented, inhabitants are more tired of them, and as a consequence they change their 
voting behavior in favor of those political parties that traditionally oppose efficiency-oriented 
policies. To test whether the perceptions about reforms are more important to understand the 
vote for the Left than the effective level of reforms, we need a micro-level analysis rather than a 
macro-level one.  
A second purpose of this chapter is to test under what economic and political conditions 
left-of-center parties increase their share of the vote. The main finding is that unemployment 
help leftist parties’ electoral chances. The positive effect that unemployment has on the vote for 
the Left can also be understood as an indicator of the indirect effect of market reforms. 
Regarding the political conditions that benefit leftist parties, the effect of being in charge of the 
government is not clear. When leftist’s governments had high levels of unemployment, the 
electoral chances of leftist parties are hindered. But only a micro-level analysis can shed further 
light on the reasons why leftist parties have recently increased their share of the vote in Latin 
American countries.  
Macro economic and political explanations are relevant to understanding what macro 
conditions are favorable to the Left, but they also enable us to answer questions regarding the 
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factors that influence voters to choose a leftist party. The assumption that explanations at the 
macro level also work at the individual level (the so-called “ecological fallacy”) is one of the 
dangers implicit when researchers want to link the individual and the collective. In order to know 
what are the determinants of Latin Americans’ vote for leftist parties, if Latin Americans are 
voting against reforms, or moving ideologically towards the left, or if they are just punishing the 
incumbent governments for poor economic results, it is necessary to ask these questions at the 
individual level. The following chapters do that. 
  57
4.0 MICRO EXPLANATIONS FOR VOTING THE LEFT IN LATIN AMERICA  
 
Latin American voting behavior is usually understood as being highly volatile and 
unpredictable due to the lack of strong party and ideological identifications. Latin Americans 
seem mainly to base their vote choice on short-term factors such as economic conditions 
(Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Cantón and Jorrat 2002) and candidate image (Echegaray 2005; 
Weyland 2003). It is within this context that the recent victories of leftist parties have become 
puzzling.  If ideology and party identification are not relevant voting clues in Latin America 
(Echegaray 2005), why are voters choosing parties identified with the ideological Left? Is the 
vote for leftist parties another example of economic voting theory according to which voters 
punish the incumbent party for poor economic results? Are electorates in Latin America mainly 
choosing leftist parties because their candidates are, on average more appealing than are the 
candidates from parties of the center and right? Or, alternatively, are Latin-Americans becoming 
more ideological and policy-oriented by voting for the left because ideology does indeed matter 
and voters are rejecting the neoliberal paradigm?  
It is important to take note that this is not the first time in the history of Latin America 
that leftist parties have won elections. As Chapter 2 showed, the Left was also the prevalent 
ideology during part of the 1960s and 1970s. The main difference between now and then is that 
in the 60’s and 70’s the meaning of voting Left was clearer than today. For example, when 
Salvador Allende, the leader of the Chilean Socialist Party, won the presidential national election 
in 1970, his voters identified themselves with a socialist ideology, and they were largely in favor 
of nationalizing major companies, broadening the public sector, and other “leftist” policies 
(Baviskar 2004).  At present, the meaning of voting Left is not so clear. Did Brazilians vote for 
Inácio “Lula” da Silva because they had become more leftist or were they just punishing 
Fernando H. Cardoso (the incumbent president) for not reducing unemployment?  
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In the view of many political analysts, the current increase in the vote for the Left in 
Latin America is a consequence of “reform fatigue.” Simply stated, this argument says that 
because voters are tired of market-oriented economic reforms and their consequences, they are 
voting in favor of parties that allow more state intervention in the economy. Data from the 
Latinobarómetro 2002 (The Economist 2002) supports this argument, and indicates that the 
percentage of those who strongly agree or agree that the state should leave economic activity to 
the private sector had diminished from 1998 to 2002 in all Latin American countries with the 
exception of Mexico.  
On the other hand, the aggregate analysis displayed in Chapter 3 shows that the 
implementation of neoliberal reforms did not favor leftist parties in Latin America. At least at the 
macro level, there is no relationship between the level of market-oriented reforms implemented 
and the share of the vote that leftist parties receive in presidential elections. Only when the 
incumbent was a leftist party and implemented market-friendly policies, the percentage of vote 
for leftist parties diminished in next election. This does not necessary mean that neoliberal 
reforms, and in particular, their failure to produce sustainable economic growth and employment, 
have nothing to do with the recent voting behavior of Latin Americans.  These findings only 
prove that the relationship does not exist at the aggregate level, but it may be possible to find it at 
the individual level. 
In the view of many scholars who study voting behavior and public opinion, perceptions 
are what really count when trying to understand why citizens act in the way they do.  Individuals 
make their political decisions based on the way they perceive reality rather than on any objective 
reality. Yeric and Todd explain that “the real” world is distorted by the individual to fit the 
already existing elements of the cognitive structure” (1983: 39). This assertion is further 
reinforced by Dutch, Palmer and Anderson’s (2000) finding that public evaluations of the 
national economy are shaped by an individual’s information differences as well as by a variety of 
political and socioeconomic factors. As a consequence, economic assessments can by no means 
be considered objective. Citizens can judge the country’s economic performance negatively even 
though macro indicators show that the economy is doing fine. The same may happen with Latin 
Americans’ perceptions of neoliberal economic reforms. The perception of economic reforms, or 
the opinion about them, may be not related to the actual level of reforms. It is possible that, 
contrary to conventional wisdom, in countries where fewer reforms have been implemented, 
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inhabitants are more tired of them, and consequently, they change their voting behavior in favor 
of political parties that traditionally oppose efficiency-oriented policies. Independently whether 
or not these perceptions are false, it is important to test their impact on the vote for the Left, as a 
result, it is necessary to run an analysis at a micro rather than a macro level. 
The individual level analysis also allows one to test the impact of other voting 
determinants, like the economic evaluation, on the vote for the Left in Latin America. At the 
aggregate level, only unemployment is a significant factor to explain the vote for leftist parties. 
Evidence presented in Chapter 3 indicates that as the unemployment rate increases, the electoral 
chances of leftist parties surges too. The relevance of the economic voting theory can be further 
appraised by a micro level analysis because electorates may react to economic promises rather 
than to past performance; and because individualistic pocketbook-oriented reasoning, which is 
not captured by any sociotropic aggregate measure, may be at play.  
The array of possible voting determinants of Latin Americans is much broader than the 
one set out up to now. In Fabián Echegaray’s (2005) book, which can be considered the most 
comprehensive attempt to tackle Latin Americans’ voting decisions, economic and extra-
economic factors are found to be important voting clues. At the aggregate level, Echegaray finds 
that candidate appeal is the most important clue in shaping support for the incumbent party at the 
ballot box, while economic variables rank second. At the individual level, the results are 
different: in addition to economic voting, partisan inclinations are found to be relevant. The 
variation between the relevant voting clues at the aggregate and individual level can be explained 
by the different model specifications. While the aggregate model includes variables to measure 
candidate voting, in the individual level model those variables are absent. What is more, while 
the aggregate model has been tested in forty-one competitive presidential elections held in Latin 
America between 1982 and 1995, the micro level analysis only examines one election in each of 
three countries: Argentina, Peru and Uruguay. Although Echegaray’s study is quite complete, it 
is not devoid of problems. One of the most serious is that his theoretical foundations disregard 
ideology and partisanship as important voting cues for Latin-Americans, but later he finds that 
partisanship is influential at the individual level in countries with a high level of political 
institutionalization like Uruguay. In conclusion, to fully explore the voting determinants of Latin 
Americans, partisanship and ideology should be included in the explanatory models.  
  60
Taking into account the research on voting behavior done on Western Europe and the 
United States, and building on the results of previous studies about Latin American voting, I will 
test five theories to explain the rise of the Left in Latin America: economic voting theory, social 
class cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967); prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979); 
partisanship theory (Campbell 1960); and the cleavages created by political processes 
(Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Torcal and Mainwaring 2003). In particular, the individual level 
analysis aims to understand what the role is of economic evaluations (economic voting theory), 
risk propensity (prospect theory), class structure (social class cleavage theory), partisanship, and 
ideology and policy issues (cleavages created by political processes) in the recent rise of the Left 
in Latin America. At the same time, I will be testing if Latin Americans are policy-oriented 
(ideology and policy issues are significant determinants of the vote), outcome-oriented 
(economic evaluations are the significant predictors of the vote), or both. The following sections 
briefly describe each of the said theories, summarize the major research done in Latin America 
using each of them, and go over the main hypotheses and variables by which the theories are 
going to be tested.  
4.1 ECONOMIC VOTING 
The literature on voting behavior in Latin America is dominated by the economic voting 
explanation. Economic voting theory states that if the economy is doing fine, voters will reelect 
the incumbent party; while in bad times, citizens will punish the incumbent at the ballot box.  
The theory has taken four major forms: pocketbook vote, sociotropic vote (Kinder and Kiewiet  
1981), retrospective vote, and prospective vote (MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson 1992). These 
distinctions lead to four possible combinations in which citizens can appraise the economic 
situation: evaluating how good or bad the economic situation of the country has been during the 
past (retrospective sociotropic), taking into account voters’ expectations of how the country’s 
economic situation is going to be in the future (prospective sociotropic), thinking on how good or 
bad their family’s economic situation has been in the recent past (retrospective pocketbook), or 
considering their expectations for their family’s economic future (prospective pocketbook) .  
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Economic voting theory has noticeably proved its predictive power in the stable 
economic and political contexts of the United States and Western Europe (Fiorina 1981; Kinder 
and Kiewiet 1981; Lewis-Beck, 1982; MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson 1992; Nadeau and Lewis-
Beck 2001; Lewis-Beck, 1986; Lewis-Beck, 1988). And there is a consensus regarding the idea 
that Americans and Europeans respond “to changes in general economic conditions much more 
than to changes in the circumstances of personal economic life” (Kinder 1998).   
In Latin America, scholars have tested the relationship between economic downturns and 
voting for incumbent parties in single-country case studies (Canton and Jorrat 2002; Domínguez 
and McCann 1995; Mora y Araujo and Smith 1984; Remmer and Gélineau 2003; Roberts and 
Arce 1998; Seligson and Gómez 1989; Weyland 1998, 2003), and through comparative studies 
(Echegaray 2005; Remmer 1991; Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Remmer and Gelineau 1993), but 
the evidence is far from conclusive. Economic evaluations matter for Latin-Americans 
depending on the election.  For example, Weyland found that Venezuelans were Pocketbook 
voters from 1989 to 1993 (Weyland 1998) , but Sociotropic voters when they elected Hugo 
Chávez in 1998 (Weyland 2003). Cantón and Jorrat (2002) and Echegaray (2005) also find that 
the impact of the economy on Latin Americans’ vote choice varies across countries and 
elections. Despite these distinctions, scholars confirm that voters in Latin America tend to treat 
elections as plebiscites on the economic performance and capabilities of the government. 
If economic factors are important determinants of the fortune of incumbents, are there 
any specific economic conditions that favor leftist parties in comparison with centrist or rightist 
parties? The aggregate analysis presented in Chapter 3 shows that leftist parties gain votes when 
unemployment increases.  But at the individual level of decision, when do voters favor leftist 
parties? Following the economic voting explanation, I expect that voters who evaluate negatively 
the economic situation will punish the incumbent. In countries where the incumbent is a leftist 
party, citizens will reward or punish it depending on the economic performance.  But in countries 
where leftist parties were never in charge of the government and represent a “credible” or 
“untainted” opposition, electorates which are economically dissatisfied with the economy will 
cast their vote in favor of them.  
H1: The more negatively a voter evaluates the national economic situation, the greater 
the probability he or she will vote for the opposition. In particular, voters who are 
discontented will reward leftist parties when they were not in charge of the government. 
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 To put it simply, if a voter has a negative economic evaluation (x1) and leftist parties 
represent a “credible” or “untainted” opposition (x2), he or she will vote for the Left (y). 
The variables to test the economic voting theory are four: retrospective sociotropic vote, 
retrospective pocket-book vote, prospective sociotropic vote and retrospective sociotropic vote.  
Sociotropic vote measures the evaluation of the country’s economic situation; the higher the 
value, the worse the evaluation. Pocketbook vote measures the evaluation of the family’s 
economic situation; the higher the value of the variable, the worse the family’s economic 
assessment is. Prospective measures the expectations regarding the economic future, while 
retrospective measures the evaluation of the country economic situation in comparison with the 
past. The measurement of these variables is fully described in relation with each dataset in next 
chapter.  
4.2 PROSPECT THEORY 
Another explanation as to why individuals vote for the Left comes from prospect theory. 
Prospect theory states that individuals act in a risk averse or risk acceptant way depending on 
whether they are in the domain of losses or in the domain of gains (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979). If an individual considers himself in the domain of losses, the theory expects that he/she 
will behave as risk acceptant. On the contrary, individuals under the domain of gains behave 
more conservatively, are less willing to gamble with their profits, and become risk averse.  
Scholars who study Latin America have started to test prospect theory in different 
political phenomena. Weyland (2002) applied this theory in order to understand why politicians 
implemented market-oriented economic reforms and why citizens supported these reforms in 
some Latin American countries and not in others. In the voting behavior subfield, many 
Mexicanists have used prospect theory to understand why Mexicans keep voting for the “known 
devil,” (meaning the PRI), instead of voting for the opposition parties (Domínguez and McCann 
1996); Magaloni 1997). Morgenstern and Zechmeister (2001) also used prospect theory to 
understand the 1997 midterm Mexican election result in which opposition parties became 
majority in the lower chamber. They found that risk acceptant voters were more likely to support 
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the opposition when they perceive economic decline, whereas risk adverse Mexicans tend to 
stick with the PRI despite being unhappy with economic performance.  
This explanation can help us to understand why Latin Americans vote for leftist parties. 
In countries where the Left has been outside the government for many years, electorates that 
make a negative assessment of the government economic performance will vote for it if they are 
risk acceptant. This argument leads to the following hypothesis:  
H2: When the incumbent is not a leftist political party, and leftist parties belong to the 
opposition, risk acceptant citizens, more than risk adverse ones, will choose the Left at 
the voting booth. The propensity to vote for the Left will increase if a voter is in the 
domain of losses and if he or she is risk acceptant. 
 
Simplifying, if leftist parties represent a “credible” or “untainted” opposition (x2), voters 
are risk acceptant (x3), and consider themselves in the domain of losses, which is equivalent as 
having a negative economic evaluation (x1), they will tend to vote for leftist parties (y). 
Prospect theory is going to be tested through different variables that capture voters’ risk 
propensity. One set of variables tackles citizens’ opinions about how different political parties 
would manage the economy, deal with the issue of job creation, negotiate with other countries, 
organize public security, and control social unrest. Another set of variables measures how risky it 
is to vote for different candidates. Finally, the question that is commonly used to gauge risk 
propensity asks respondents to agree with one of the two following aphorisms: “Más vale malo 
conocido que bueno por conocer” (“Better the devil you know that the saint you don’t”) or “El 
que no arriesga no gana” (“Nothing ventured, nothing gained”).31   
4.3 SOCIAL CLASS CLEAVAGE 
An alternative theoretical approach links the existence of social cleavages with voters’ 
behavior. This explanation has been developed principally for the Western European political 
parties. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argue that the stability of party systems in Western Europe is a 
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consequence of the historical roots that political parties have in class, religion, and nationality 
cleavages. The social cleavage literature was extended in various ways. This study examines two 
of those extensions.  
The first one is the “class causal linkage proposition” which states that the social position 
that an individual has in society determines his/her political preferences (Lipset and Rokkan 
1967). Class-based clues will explain the vote for the Left through social class:  belonging to the 
working class increases the probability of voting for Left parties while being part of the capitalist 
class reduces this probability.  
This hypothesis goes against the generalized understanding of Latin American voting 
behavior as being highly volatile and unpredictable due to the lack of strong party and 
ideological identification (Remmer 1993; Ames 2001). It is also contrary to the literature which 
points out that class-cleavages do not matter as social bases of the vote in Latin America except 
for the Chilean case. Moreover, the Chilean case is also open to debate. Scholars agree that in the 
pre-authoritarian Chilean party system, class cleavage had an important role; but in the post-
authoritarian period, class-based voting appeared less relevant and there is no consensus about 
how determinant they are in predicting behavior at the ballot box (Roberts and Wibbels 1999; 
Torcal, 2003).  Another argument that undermines the relevance of social position as a possible 
voting predictor are the severe transformations during the 1980s and 1990s that affected Latin 
Americans’ well-being and structure of production which would have weakened social class 
identities (Echegaray  2005).  
Nevertheless, there are two reasons for testing this hypothesis. First, the previous 
characterization of party systems as unstable cannot be applied to all Latin American countries or 
political parties since many countries, such as Uruguay and Chile, have highly institutionalized 
party systems (Mainwaring and Scully 1995).  Second, most of the studies that test social 
cleavage as an explanation of voting behavior and find no evidence rely on aggregate data. In 
particular, the work by Roberts and Wibbels (1999) uses very crude proxies (union density, 
informal sector) to measure the structure of sociopolitical cleavages. Moreover, more recent 
research indicates that social class matters as a vote’s predictor (Roberts 2002 for the Venezuelan 
                                                                                                                                                             
31 A slightly different question is asked in Brazil, but the meaning is the same. Further description of the variables is 
in Chapter 5. 
  65
case under Hugo Chávez, and Canton and Jorrat 2002 for the Argentinean case using survey 
data). Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
H3: The position that a person occupies in the social structure determines his/her vote. 
Workers and members of the popular sectors are more likely to vote for leftist parties, 
while those who belong to the dominant sectors are more likely to vote for rightist 
parties.  
 
In reality, there is no doubt that classical social class cleavage explanation has been 
brought into question by the structural transformations of national economies and the contraction 
of the working class. Przeworski and Sprague (1986), for instance, argue that in the mid-1980s 
the support for leftist parties in Europe weakened due to the shrinking of the working class, but 
political leaders had the opportunity to appeal to a broader electorate by addressing other issues. 
Leftist parties always had to attract support beyond the working class in order to win elections; in 
other words, their electorates include workers, plus people from other social classes. Kitschelt 
(1994) also demonstrates in his study of European social democracy that the electoral prospects 
of the Left are not necessary undermined by the social transformations and policy constraints 
associated with market-oriented reforms. Party leaders can appeal to new electorates and become 
allies of new social sectors.  
Latin America after the implementation of neoliberal economic reforms resembles the 
description made by Przeworski and Sprague, and Kitschelt for Europe. In most Latin American 
countries, the working class remained stagnant or has shrunk as a result of market liberalization, 
public sector cutbacks and privatizations that were implemented during the 1990s. Most of the 
formal workers that lost their jobs moved to the informal economy and, as a result, informal 
workers became the largest class in every Latin American country (Portes and Hoffman 2003). 
Evidence of the shrunk that the formal workers’ sector suffered in Latin America is abundant. In 
Bolivia, formal workers were 31.4% of the EAP in 1989 and 24.8% in 1997; in Costa Rica they 
were 60.1% in 1981 and only 49.9% in 1998; and in Mexico they were 63.1% in 1984 and 47.3% 
in 1998 (Portes and Hoffman 2003, based in ECLAC).  As a counter effect, informal 
employment increased from 44.6% of the Latin American urban EAP in 1990 to 47.9% in 1998 
(Portes and Hoffman 2003).  
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Taking this into account, the recent increase in the vote for leftist parties may not be 
explained by the social class cleavage theory because the class that traditionally voted for the 
Left, the working class, has diminished. An alternative explanation is possible. Building on the 
diagnosis made by Portes and Hoffman (2003) about the changes in Latin American social 
structures, I argue that informal workers are increasingly voting for leftist parties.  Preliminary 
evidence from Venezuela shows that getting the support from the augmented informal sector is 
becoming an efficient strategy for winning elections in Latin America (Roberts 2003). Hence, 
H4: Voters who belong to the informal sectors will be more likely to vote for the Left.  
 
Social class cleavage is tested using a set of five dummy variables; each dummy 
represents one category of social class defined in terms of occupation: dominant class, petty 
bourgeoisie, formal workers, informal workers, and non-employed. This categorization is built 
on Portes and Hoffman’s (2003) definition of Latin American class structure. These scholars 
argue that it is better to add a separate category for informal workers to understand Latin 
America social structure. Each category is entered into the model as a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 when the person belongs to it and 0 when he/she does not.32  
 
4.4 CLEAVAGE CREATED BY POLITICAL PROCESS 
In determining which theory and voting clues best explain the vote for leftist parties in 
Latin America, it is essential to include ideology. Ideology is regarded as one of the most 
influential voting clues. Electorates use the overarching continuum between left and right, or 
from liberal to conservative, as a shortcut to processing political information and making their 
electoral decisions. Since Converse (1964) there has been a great deal of debate about how 
readily voters rely on ideology when voting, and to what extent citizens organize their political 
opinions around the ideological dimension. The same doubts are cast regarding the importance of 
ideology to predict Latin Americans’ voting behavior. Echegaray (2005) considers that 
                                                 
32 A more comprehensive variable description is found in next chapter. 
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ideological clues are an irrelevant source of guidance for Latin American voters, but he does not 
empirically test this contention. Differing from Echegaray’s position, this study will test the 
impact of ideological clues on the vote for leftist parties. Three main reasons make the inclusion 
of ideology reasonable. 
First of all, around eight out of ten Latin Americans were able to place themselves in the 
ideological dimension from 1996 to 2004 (Latinobarómetro 2004). This percentage varies 
depending on the country; left and right ideological labels mean more to Chileans and 
Uruguayans than to Argentineans. But, as a first appraisal, ideological thinking is part of Latin 
Americans’ political behavior.  
Second, previous research has also shown that elite groups and citizens are linked by 
ideological commitments (Luna and Zechmeister 2005a). Luna and Zechmeister’ research 
combine elite and mass survey data to create indicators of representation for nine nations: 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay. The 
level of representation is quantified by how much congruency exists between congressmen and 
voters’ policy preferences. In order to measure the extent to which political parties and their 
constituents have clear and consistent preferences over a set of relevant policy dimensions, they 
use survey data from two different sources: the survey of Latin American legislators carried out 
by the University of Salamanca in 1997 and the 1998 Latinobarómetro survey. Using these 
measures of policy preferences, they build the representation scores and find that country 
differences are also relevant in that respect. Chile and Uruguay present the highest levels of 
ideological elite-mass congruency in the region, while Ecuador ranks in the lowest position. 
Mexico and Brazil are also among the countries with low levels of ideological congruency; 
Mexico scores lower than Brazil.  Regardless of these differences, and some dubious matching 
that the authors performed between indicators at the mass and elite level, what this research 
indicates is that ideology is as a relevant category to understand political representation at least 
in some Latin American countries.  
Finally, there is empirical research pointing to ideology as a relevant voting clue for Latin 
Americans (Cameron 1994; Torcal 2003). Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) point out: “class 
emerges as a major cleavage in party systems to the extent that parties of the left emphasize class 
issues,” and they called this phenomenon the cleavage created by political processes (Przeworski 
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and Sprague 1986; Torcal 2003).33 This theoretical approach to cleavage formation pays 
attention to how cleavages are created by political elites and political factors. The Left/Right 
ideological division can also be considered a cleavage created by political process. In other 
words, politicians can activate this cleavage as a way to get votes.  All this suggests that it is 
appropriate to test for ideological clues:  
 
H5: Ideological self-placement is likely to determine the vote for the left irrespective of 
social and structural determinants. 
 
An alternative way to test the ideological cleavage is to analyze if policy positions are 
determinants of voting behavior. Voting for the Left is usually associated with support for 
government involvement and regulation of the economy, income redistribution, and an increase 
in social spending (Inglehart and Klingerman 1976; Fuchs and Klingerman 1990; Kitschelt and 
Hellemans 1990). In addition, and due to the difficulty in obtaining survey data that deals with 
citizens’ perceptions and opinions towards market-oriented economic reforms, the analysis of 
policy preferences is the best way to approach this issue. Consequently, I hypothesize that: 
H6: Those Latin Americans who support government involvement and regulation of the 
economy, income redistribution and an increase in social spending will be more likely to 
vote for leftist parties, while those who are against these policy issues will be more likely 
to vote for rightist parties.  
 
Ideology is measured by the ideological self-placement of the respondent in a dimension 
that ranges from “0” meaning Left, to “10” meaning Right. Different policy issues are also used 
as independent variables to test the ideological cleavage: support for regional integration, support 
for privatization, support for agrarian reform, opinion about government responsibility, support 
for social spending, and position towards the dichotomy inflation/unemployment.34  
                                                 
33 Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) test the existence of these political cleavages in the Chilean case with three 
cultural-ideological divisions that can be used by political leaders to articulate conflict: the authoritarian/democratic 
cultural division, the perception of social inequality, and religious differences. 
34 Further details on variable measurement can be found in next chapter. 
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4.5 PARTISANSHIP 
Since The American Voter (Campbell 1960), the influence of party identification became 
one of the central theoretical concepts in voting research. Partisanship or party identification 
“acts to filter individual’s views of the political world, providing them not only with a means for 
making voting decisions but also with a means for interpreting short-term issues and candidacies 
since parties are central actors in most political conflicts” (Dalton and  Wattenberg 1993).  
In Latin American voting behavior, party identification does not always work as a strong 
predictor of the vote. Mainwaring and Scully (1995) point out that in Uruguay, Chile, and 
Colombia, between 60% and 70% of citizens mention a party preference, while in Brazil no 
more than 40% declare themselves to have a party identification. In addition to cross-national 
variation, there is cross-party variation in each country. Preliminary evidence from Brazil 
(Samuels 2004) indicates that the PT receives more party preferences than the rest of Brazil’s 
parties do.  
What is the relevance of partisan clues in explaining the vote for leftist parties in Latin 
America? Extant research indicates that Latin American leftist parties help structure party 
systems along ideological lines and they are associated with higher levels of representation 
(Luna and Zechmeister 2005a). Consequently, partisanship can be more important to predict the 
vote for leftist parties than for rightist ones. Hence, I hypothesize that: 
H7: Partisanship is a more relevant voting clue for those who vote for leftist parties than 
for voters who choose centrist or rightist parties. 
 
A strong party identification can influence other voting clues. For example, a Brazilian 
who feels very close to the PT, may evaluate the economic performance of the government 
through their partisanship “lenses,” and be more negative on his/her assessments of Fernando 
Enrique Cardoso’s economic performance. It is probable that for those who have party 
identification, economic evaluations weigh less than for those with no partisanship.35  
H8: Voters with party identification are less likely to take into consideration economic 
evaluations than those without party preferences.    
                                                 
35 Partisanship is measured by a question that asked respondents what their party identification was.  
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 These alternative, but not exclusive, explanations have never been tested together for 
Latin America. In that sense, this study will make two contributions. First, it will shed light on 
which factors are involved in determining the recent rise of the Left in Latin America. In 
particular, it will compare the possible impact of neoliberal economic reforms as against other 
more traditional voting clues like economic evaluations, class identifications and partisanship, 
and also against new ones like propensity risk. Second, and more broadly, it will tell us about the 
most important voting determinants for Latin American electorates because it will test the five 
theories over the 1980-2004 period for three country cases: Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay 
(Chapter 5). 
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5.0  LATIN AMERICANS ARE VOTING LEFT: EVIDENCE FROM BRAZIL, 
MEXICO AND URUGUAY 
Methodologically, an ideal scenario to understand why Latin Americans are voting for 
left-of-center political parties would be to have one public opinion poll for every election that 
was held in each Latin American country from 1980 to 2004. Moreover, in this ideal research 
strategy, all surveys would include the same variables to test all the theories proposed in Chapter 
4.  But survey data accessibility in Latin America, as well as in many other regions of the world, 
is far from ideal. A vast majority of surveys that explore voting determinants are carried out by 
private pollsters who are mainly interested in predicting electoral results, and as a consequence, 
these surveys lack the appropriate questions to examine voting theories.  Taking into account 
these constraints, I decided to follow a most-different systems research strategy (Przeworski, and 
Teune 1970) and thereby test the hypotheses presented in Chapter 4 in three country-cases: 
Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay. For each of these three countries I was able to obtain surveys 
covering almost the entire period under study; furthermore, these surveys have similar questions 
that allow me to replicate the same explanatory model in Brazil, Mexico, and Uruguay. 
Moreover, in two of the countries, left-of-center presidents were elected (Brazil and Uruguay), 
while in Mexico, a right-of-center candidate was elected. 
The most-different systems design works by testing relationships at the individual level 
across a range of very different countries. Przeworski and Teune (Przeworski and Teune 1970) 
conceive this design to determine how robust any relationship among variables is, independently 
of other contextual variables. If Brazilians, Mexicans and Uruguayans evaluate negatively the 
economic situation of their countries, favor anti-market policies and vote for left-of-center 
parties, we might be able to infer that behind this leftist electoral trend, there is evidence of Latin 
Americans’ economic discontent. On the contrary, if Brazilians, Mexicans and Uruguayans are 
voting left-of-center parties for different reasons, we would be more confident that perceptions 
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about market-oriented economic reforms are not crucial at the individual level to explain the vote 
for the Left in Latin America. 
My central argument is that the recent increase of leftist parties in Latin America comes 
about as a result of voters’ punishing political parties that were unable to improve the economic 
well-being of their electorates. Most Latin Americans have faced economic hardship during 
successive governments under a variety of political parties, and recent research demonstrates that 
voters have long-term economic memories (Benton 2005) and punish not only the incumbent 
party for the material suffering; they also rebuke parties that governed before the incumbent 
came to power. Left-of-center parties took advantage of this popular discontent and capitalized 
on social and economic dissatisfaction. In Brazil, after the experience of the PSDB government, 
the most “credible” opposition was embodied by the PT. The search for new alternatives has led 
Uruguayans to vote for the Frente Amplio, a left-leaning coalition party which represents the 
only “credible” or “untainted” opposition after a long succession of Partido Colorado and Partido 
Nacional governments. Mexico represents a different example for the same phenomenon. The 
electorate’s search for something new ended up with their favoring the two credible and 
untainted opposition parties: PAN, a center-right political party and the PRD, a leftist party. A 
“credible” or “untainted” political party is a party that was never in charge of the government 
and cannot be held responsible for the country’s welfare. To summarize, leftist parties capitalize 
social discontent when: 1) they represent a credible or untainted opposition, and even more so 
when 2) they are the only untainted opposition in the political system.  
 This chapter is structured as follows. The first section describes the three country cases 
and why they comprise a most-different system design. Sections two to four present the 
empirical evidence from Brazil, Mexico, and Uruguay respectively. The concluding section 
discusses the findings in a comparative way. 
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5.1 MOST-DIFFERENT SYSTEM: BRAZIL, MEXICO AND URUGUAY 
Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay are all cases of Continuous increase of the Left,36 but the 
electoral trajectories followed by left-of-center parties since the 1980s in each country differ. In 
Brazil, leftist parties gained access to the government in 2002. Before that, in 1994, the Partido 
Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), a social democrat party, carried Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso to the presidency. However, when the PSDB was elected to Brazil’s national 
government, it had already moved to the right of the ideological scale.  Therefore, the first time 
that a left-of-center party gained access to Brazil’s national government after the return to 
democracy was in 2002 through Luis Inácio “Lula” da Silva, the long-time leader of the Partido 
dos Trabalhadores (PT). In Mexico, leftist parties, in particular the Partido Revolucionario 
Democrático (PRD), have increased their share of the vote during the 1990s, and by doing so, 
have helped to raise competitiveness in the Mexican electoral arena. The PRD received almost a 
fifth of the votes cast in the 1994 and 2000 presidential elections, and in 2006 it lost the 
presidency by just 1% of the votes in a highly controversial vote count. In Uruguay, leftist parties 
have progressively increased their electoral participation since the return to democracy in 1984, 
and after twenty years of democracy, in 2004 a left-leaning coalition called the Encuentro 
Progresista-Frente Amplio (EP-FA) won the presidency. All these leftist parties, PT, PRD, and 
EP-FA, are examples of professional parties: they care about party building, they have relatively 
strong party organizations, and they mobilize political support in addition to social support.  In 
that sense, they are more similar to Concertación in Chile than to Movimiento al Socialismo 
(MAS) in Bolivia or Hugo Chávez’s party, the Movimiento Quinta República in Venezuela. 
They are usually categorized as the “institutional” left in Latin America, contrary to the 
“populist” left represented mainly by the Movimiento Quinta República.37   
Regardless of these commonalities, there are several differences between these countries 
that make the case selection relevant. I will only refer to those characteristics that are pertinent 
for the purpose of this research: differences in their party and political systems, differences in the 
level of economic reforms, and differences in their economic well-being. These three sets of 
                                                 
36 See Chapter 2 for the complete trends’ classification. 
37 Following the same general idea, Castañeda (2006) classifies these cases into Right Left or Wrong Left, but he 
consideres that the PRI is a case of Wrong Left.  
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characteristics correspond to the three groups of independent variables tested in Chapter 3: 
political variables, economic reform variables, and economic variables. 
The differences between Brazilian, Mexican and Uruguayan party and political systems 
are large. Brazil is usually defined as a case of party underdevelopment and weakly-established 
political institutions (Ames 2001; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring, 1999). Its 
multiparty system has been described as “highly fragmented, electoral volatility is comparatively 
high, more than one-third of sitting legislators change parties during a term, and individualism, 
clientelism and personalism rather than programmatic appeals dominate electoral campaigns” 
(Samuels 2006). Scholars believe that mass partisanship in Brazil is comparatively weak 
(Mainwaring, Menneguello and Power 2000), but recent research challenges this view and 
indicates that Brazilians have higher levels of party identification than many other new 
democracies, and mass partisanship is particularly strong among PT voters (Samuels 2006).38  
For a long time, Mexico was characterized as a weakly-institutionalized political system 
(Mainwaring 1999) with single-party dominance in the shape of the long-ruling Partido 
Institucional Revolucionario (PRI). The PRI was in charge of the national government from 1929 
to 2000, and opposition parties were unable to win a majority in the lower chamber of congress 
until 1997 when the single, dominant-party system was broken in favor of a multiparty system. It 
was not until 2000 that the Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN), a right-leaning party, ousted the 
PRI from the presidency.  
Uruguay has had a very stable party system (Mainwaring and Scully 1995), with three 
major political parties, Partido Colorado (PC), Partido Nacional (PN) and Frente Amplio (FA), 
and one minor party, Partido Independiente (PI). It was with the emergence of the Frente Amplio 
in 1971 that the party system experienced a major change evolving from a two-party system to a 
multiparty system (Gillespie and González 1989; González 1991). Mass party identification is 
commonplace; an average of two-thirds of Uruguayans reported their party identification since 
the return to democracy.39  
                                                 
38 It is still possible that Samuels finds high levels of mass partisanship within PT voters because the 2002 survey 
was conducted at the end of Lula landslide, and a result, PT partisanship might be overrepresented.  I thank Barry 
Ames for pointing out this caveat. 
39 This percentage is particularly high for the region. According to data from the Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems (CSES), in Peru (2001) only 26% of the population has party identification, while in Brazil (2002) the 34% 
identifies with a particular political party and in Mexico (2000) is the 50%.  
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To put it simply, Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay are dissimilar in their levels of party 
system institutionalization, numbers of political parties, and mass partisanship. Mainwaring and 
Scully (1995) classify Brazil as an inchoate party system, Mexico as a hegemonic party system, 
and Uruguay as an institutionalized one. Several things changed by the end of the 1990s - one is 
that Mexico can no longer be considered a hegemonic party system. In terms of the number of 
parties, Mexico and Uruguay have experienced important transformations by becoming 
multiparty systems and raising their level of party competition. Recent research shows that the 
number of parties affects the way in which voters hold governments accountable; multiparty 
systems strengthen voters’ ability to punish several parties at a time, and therefore, popular 
discontent may be lower in countries with more permissive electoral rules that allow small 
parties to gain congressional representation (Benton 2005).  Regarding partisanship, Mexico and 
Uruguay have higher proportions of their populations with party attachment than Brazil. By 
having diverse party systems and political systems, these countries made an appropriate case 
selection to test voting-behavior theories. 
Market-oriented economic reforms were also implemented very differently in Brazil, 
Mexico and Uruguay. Brazil and Mexico are classified as slow reformers: they started reforms 
later and adopted less structural reforms; while Uruguay is considered a gradual reformer: 
reforms were adopted earlier, but they were milder and carried out in a gradual way (Lora, 
1997/2001).  The differences in the reforms pursued in Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay also depend 
on the area being reformed. Brazil presents some of the highest privatization reform and labor 
reform indexes. On the other hand, Mexico ranks low on their tax reform and labor reform 
indexes, but high on the financial reform index. Finally Uruguay has one of the lowest levels of 
privatization in the region but one of the highest indexes of trade reform (Lora, 1997/2001). 
There are many indicators available to compare the economic well-being of Brazilians, 
Mexicans and Uruguayans. To keep the comparability with the macro-level section of this study, 
I choose to compare two indicators: inflation and economic growth. Inflation40 was an enormous 
problem in all Latin American countries during the 1980s and mid-1990s, and it was finally 
brought under control at the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s. Among the three 
countries, Brazil was the one that suffered most from a hyperinflationary crisis: it experienced 
three-digit inflation from 1980 to 1994. In Mexico and Uruguay hyperinflation was a less 
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common malady, affecting the former in 1983, 1987 and 1988, and the latter in 1990 and 1991. 
In terms of economic growth, the three countries experienced several ups and downs during the 
period of study. Brazil and Mexico have been experiencing an increase in their growth rate since 
the beginning of 2000s. In Uruguay, from 1999 to 2003 economic growth was negative. The 
2002 economic crisis worsened the situation, the percentage change in GDP based on constant 
local currency for 2002 being -10.8.41 This state of affairs was overcome in 2004 with a positive 
growth rate of 4.5. 
Next section examines why Uruguayans voted for the Left.    
5.2 URUGUAY: THE LEFT AS THE ONLY UNTAINTED OPPOSITION 
In the Uruguayan party system, two political parties are considered left-of-center: Frente 
Amplio-Encuentro Progresista (FA)42 and Partido Independiente (PI). The Frente Amplio (FA) 
was founded in 1971. It emerged as a coalition of leftist political parties that received support 
principally from young people, urban sectors, intellectuals, and the middle and upper-middle 
classes (Gillespie 1986). The coalition was formed mainly by the Socialist Party, Communist 
Party, Christian Democrat Party, and splinter groups from the Partido Colorado (Movimiento 
Pregón and Movimiento por el Gobierno del Pueblo, PGP) and Partido Nacional (Movimiento 
Popular Nacionalista). The other current left-leaning party is the Partido Independiente which is 
an offshoot of the Nuevo Espacio.43  
The other two major political parties: Partido Colorado (PC) and Partido Nacional (PN) 
(also called “Partido Blanco” or the “Blancos”) are more closely identified with the center-right. 
The Partido Colorado has more in common with “the Latin American liberal parties, being more 
                                                                                                                                                             
40 Based on IMF data 
41 Based on IMF data 
42 For the sake of simplicity I will use Frente Amplio or FA instead of Frente Amplio-Encuentro Progresista. 
Furthermore, Frente Amplio is what most people call it.  
43 Nuevo Espacio was the right wing of the Frente Amplio, namely the alliance between the Christian Democratic 
Party and the Partido por el Gobierno del Pueblo (PGP). This alliance campaigned as part of the Frente Amplio in 
1971 and 1984; in 1989, it became independent from the Frente Amplio and formed a new party, the Nuevo 
Espacio. In 1994 and 1999, the Christian Democratic Party campaigned again with the Frente Amplio, one faction of 
the PGP ran with the Partido Colorado, and the other group of the PGP remained as the Nuevo Espacio. In 2004, one 
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liberal, cosmopolitan, urban-centered and anti-church than the Blancos, who became the 
Uruguayan conservative party” (González, 1991: 13). The Partido Nacional is more associated 
with the Catholic Church and rural areas, but it is more economically liberal than the other two. 
The Partido Colorado and the Partido Nacional have almost parallel histories; both were 
established in 1830, so are almost as old as the country itself, both are multi-class parties and 
between the two they held office from the country’s independence until 2004. For this reason, 
both are called “traditional parties.”  
The military coup in 1973 prohibited all political party activity; however, the political 
parties managed to survive the eleven years of the authoritarian regime by operating below the 
government’s surveillance. The country returned to democracy in the 1984 general election 
when, much to the military regime’s surprise, the party system had evolved into one that relied 
on a class-based electorate. The Partido Colorado received votes mainly from older, less-well 
educated people, housewives and retirees, the Partido Nacional was the most catch-all party of 
the three, and the Frente Amplio maintained its support among young people and voters with 
high school diplomas and college degrees, but also received high levels of support among 
workers, especially blue-collar workers (González 1991).  
Until the mid-1960s, Blancos and Colorados together won about 90 percent of the vote; 
the party system was clearly a two-party system. With the emergence of the Frente Amplio in 
1971, the party system started to change from a two-party system to a multiparty system 
(Gillespie and González 1989; González 1991). Over the last thirty years, the Frente Amplio has 
increased its electoral successes from election to election. As shown in Table 5-1, the two-party 
system changed first into a “two-and-a-half” party system in 1971, then into a three party system 
in 1984, and to a multiparty system in 1989. In 2004, the Frente Amplio obtained the majority of 
votes, and as a result of the low vote share obtained by the Partido Colorado, the Effective 





                                                                                                                                                             
faction of the Nuevo Espacio became part of the Frente Amplio again, and the other ran alone with the name of 
Partido Independiente. 
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 Table 5-1Vote share in presidential elections, 1971-2004 (%) 
 1971 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 
       
Partido Colorado  40.9 41.2 30.3 32.3 32.8 10.6 
Partido Nacional 40.2 35.0 38.9 31.2 22.3 35.1 
Nuevo Espacio/P. Independiente (*)   9.0 5.2 4.6 1.9 
Frente Amplio 18.3 21.2 21.2 30.6 40.1 51.7 
       
Others minor political parties  0.6 2.5 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.7 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
       
Effective Number of Parties (**) 2.75 2.92 3.33 3.30 3.08 2.49 
 
(*) In the 1971 and 1984 elections, the Nuevo Espacio was part of the Frente Amplio. From 1989 to 2004, the Nuevo 
Espacio was an independent party. In 2004 one faction of the party decided to become part of the Frente Amplio using 
the name Nuevo Espacio, the rest remained independent and ran with the name of Partido Independiente.    
(**) The Effective Number of Parties (ENP) is calculated using the Laakso and Taagepera (Laakso and Taagepera 1979 
)  formula: ENP= 1/Σpi². The formula is based on the number of votes. 
Source: Corte Electoral del Uruguay. 
 
Scholars who work on the Uruguayan party system group political parties in two 
ideological families: “traditional parties” and “challengers” (González 1999; González and 
Queirolo 2000). The former are made up of the Partido Colorado and Partido Nacional, both 
right-of-center parties; while the challengers are Frente Amplio and Partido Independiente, both 
left-of center parties that, until 2004, were never in charge of the national government.  Figure 5-
1 shows the electoral evolution of these two ideological families.44 
                                                 
44 Luna 2004a argues that only the “traditional family” exists as an ideological family because Nuevo Espacio’s 
leaders are closer to the traditional parties’ leaders than to those of the Frente Amplio. However, he presents 
evidence that Nuevo Espacio’s voters are closer to the FA than to the PC or PN. Therefore, it is not so clear that they 
































Figure 5.1Electoral evolution of Ideological Families in Presidential Elections (1971-2004) 
Source: Corte Electoral del Uruguay.  
 
The progressive increase in the vote for the Left (challengers) is puzzling enough to 
require an explanation.  Several explanations for the incremental electoral success of the Left, as 
well as for the decrease in voting for traditional parties, have been offered. These explanations 
include the generational effects (Aguiar 2000; Canzani 2000; González and Queirolo 2000 ) and 
the ability of the Left (mainly the FA) to retain party traditions (Canzani 2000; Monestier 2001; 
Moreira 2000); an increasing ideological moderation and pragmatism of the FA (Garcé and 
Yaffé 2004; Buquet and de Armas 2004), and popular discontent capitalization (González 1999; 
González and Queirolo 2000; Luna 2004b).  
There is a sufficient amount of evidence to show that leftist parties benefit from a 
generational effect. This characteristic of the Frentista electorate is not new; since its foundation, 
the FA has been a political party which is highly attractive to young people. Moreover, different 
scholars point out that the electoral growth of the Left is mainly produced by a generational 
replacement, in which the new voters’ preference for the FA supplies an inertial increment of 1% 
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per year.45  Not only did the FA successfully obtain votes from young people, but it also 
demonstrated the ability to retain party traditions (Monestier 2001; Moreira 2000). In other 
words, those who were young supporters of the FA in 1971 continued to vote for it in 2004. With 
each successive election, leftist parties continued to win young voters who remained in the party 
as they became older; the age effect coincides with a cohort effect. But this explanation does not 
answer why the Left is so successful in capturing new voters and keeping the older ones in their 
ranks.  
The explanation that points out the ideological moderation and increasing pragmatism of 
the Left argues that leftist parties incrementally gained more votes because their leaders chose to 
moderate their political stances in order to capture voters from the ideological center. One way to 
test the validity of this argument is to analyze the ideological identification of FA voters.  If FA’s 
electorate or the leftist parties’ electorate in general became more centrist over time, we can 
argue that the Left has grown by capturing votes from the center.  Table 5.2 shows that the FA 
electorate is more centrist in 2004 than it was in 1989, but those that vote for left-of-center 
parties are not significantly more centrist in 2004 than they were in 1989. In addition, aggregate 
evidence shows that during the 1990s the electorate has become more leftist in ideology (Table 
5.2). The mean ideological self-placement of the electorate in 1989 was 5.8,46 and fifteen years 
later it was 5.0. Considering this preliminary evidence, we can argue that the increase in the vote 
for leftist parties cannot be fully explained by the ideological moderation of their leaders because 
the electorate also moved to the Left ideologically. As a result, it is necessary to look for 
alternative explanations.  
 
  
                                                 
45 See Aguiar (2000) and Canzani (2000) for the Uruguayan case and Abramson and Inglehart (1992) about 
generational replacement. 
 
46 In a ten point scale ranging from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). 
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Table 5-2 Mean ideology by different electorates (1984-2004) 
1984*
Mean Mean Std Dv. Mean Std. Dv. Mean Std. Dv. Mean Std. Dv.
Frente Amplio 3.1 3.0 1.4466 3.8 1.4589 3.5 1.6857 3.4 1.8112
Left-of-center parties 3.1 3.6 1.7246 4.0 1.4718 3.6 1.6628 3.6 1.8634
All the electorate 4.8 5.8 2.4624 5.7 2.1192 5.5 2.5294 5.1 2.5732
(N) (855) (1310) (1646) (1228) (1470)
*Source: Gonzalez, Luis E.(1993). This mean only represents the electorate in Montevideo.
This post-electoral survey was carried out in March 1985, after the 1984 national election. 
** In the 1984 election, the Nuevo Espacio was the right wing of the Frente Amplio.
1989 1994 1999 2004
 
 
As argued in other studies (González 1999; González and Queirolo 2000; Luna 2004b), 
the “popular discontent capitalization explanation” states that leftist parties capitalize on popular 
discontent with the traditional political parties that have been in charge of the government since 
the nation’s independence. Since the Left was never in charge of the government, it represents an 
“untainted” or “credible” opposition.  The next sections present evidence from multivariate 
analysis that supports the popular discontent capitalization explanation. 
 
5.2.1 Data and variable description 
The Uruguayan data comes from five pre-election surveys carried out by two well-known 
public opinion polling firms in that country. The 1984 and 1989 surveys were carried out by 
Equipos/Mori, and the 1994, 1999 and 2004 by CIFRA, González, Raga y Asociados.47 The 
1984 survey includes 400 respondents and covers only the urban population, as it was carried out 
only in the Uruguayan capital, Montevideo. The other four are national surveys that include 
                                                 
47 I would like to thank the directors of CIFRA, Luis E. González and Adriana Raga, and of Equipos/Mori, Agustín 
Canzani and Ignacio Zuasnábar, for giving me access to this data. In the case of González and Raga, they also 
generously allowed me to include some specific questions from the 2004 survey.  
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between 1,200 and 1,500 respondents.48 All the data was collected by personal, door-to-door 
interviews in the respondents’ homes.49 The comparison between the proportions intending to 
vote for leftist parties in these surveys with the proportions that actually voted for the left when 
the elections were held, strengthen the validity of the analysis. In the 1989 presidential election, 
30% of the electorate vote for leftist parties and the pre-electoral survey registered 35%; in 1994, 
36% voted for the Left and the survey’s proportion was also 36%; in 1999 the electoral result 
was 45% and the survey one was 52%; and finally in 2004, the election result was 54% and the 
survey predicted a 60%. Despite the overrepresentation of leftists’ voters in almost every sample, 
a very well-known problem for Uruguayans’ pollsters, the survey data used in this chapter 
represents with enough precision Uruguayan voters’ preferences.   
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that measures the intention to vote for a left-
of-center party, value 1 means that the person intended to vote for the Left: Frente Amplio and 
Nuevo Espacio/Partido Independiente; while 0 represents the vote intention for the remaining 
political parties. The explanatory variables are described following the theories discussed in 
Chapter 4.   
I have used two independent variables, sociotropic vote and pocketbook vote, to test the 
economic voting theory.  Sociotropic vote measures the evaluation of the country’s economic 
situation; thus, the higher the value, the worse the evaluation. Pocketbook vote measures the 
evaluation of the family’s economic situation. Pocketbook vote is not included in the 1984 
model, and sociotropic vote is absent from the 1989 model because these questions were not 
asked in those surveys. The Retrospective Sociotropic, Prospective Sociotropic, Retrospective 
Pocketbook and Prospective Pocketbook variables measure citizens’ economic assessments of the 
country and their own situation in comparison with the past and economic expectations for the 
future.   
Social class cleavage is tested in two ways. First, I used a set of five dummy variables 
(Model 1); each dummy represents one category of social class defined in terms of occupation: 
dominant class, petty bourgeoisie, formal workers, informal workers, and non-employed. The 
social class classification is the one built by Portes and Hoffman (2003):  Dominant class is 
                                                 
48 The four national surveys were weighted to correct for an overeducated sample when aggregate statistics are 
presented, but not when binary logit coefficients are shown. Binary coefficients and their significance do not change 
by weighting the data.  
49 Missing values were imputed using ICE imputation method from STATA. 
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conformed by capitalists (proprietors and managing partners of large/medium firms), executives 
(managers and administrators of large/medium firms and public institutions), and elite workers 
(University-trained salaried professionals in public service and large/medium private firms). 
Members of the Petty bourgeoisie are “own-account professionals and technicians, and micro 
entrepreneurs with personally-supervised staff.” Formal workers are vocationally trained salaried 
technicians and white-collar employees (non-manual formal proletariat) plus the skilled and 
unskilled waged workers with labor contracts (manual formal proletariat). Finally, the Informal 
workers are those “non-contractual, waged workers, casual vendors, and unpaid family workers.” 
The Non–employed are unemployed people, retired people, students and housewives; this 
category is used as base category. I entered each category into the model as a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 when the person belongs to this category and 0 when he/she does not. 
 I then measured social class as socioeconomic status (SES) (Model 2) and consider three 
indicators simultaneously: occupation, education, and income.  I performed a factor analysis with 
these three variables measuring occupation, education, and income and extracted only one factor 
in each election year (1984: Eigenvalue=1.657; 1989: Eigenvalue=1.687; 1994: 
Eigenvalue=1.597; 1999: Eigenvalue=2.081; 2004: Eigenvalue=1.627).50  I saved the values of 
this factor as a new variable named socioeconomic status (SES) and entered it into the model as 
an independent variable.  
Ideology is the independent variable I used to test the political cleavage; I measured it by 
situating the ideological self-placement of the respondent in a dimension that ranges from “1” 
meaning left to “10” meaning right. The non response rate for this variable is very low: in 1989 it 
is 9%, in 1994 is 10%, in 1999 is 5%, and in 2004 only 2%. Partisanship was asked in the 1994, 
1999 and 2004 surveys; therefore, it is only included in the models for those years. Uruguay is a 
Latin American country with strong partisanship, an average of two-thirds of Uruguayans 
reported their party identification in 1994 and 1999. It is important to include partisanship in the 
models for control if the rest of the explanatory variables are still relevant after including it. It 
incorporates five dummies: identification with the PC, identification with the PN, identification 
                                                 
50 For the 1984 and 1989 models, income was measured as family income. For the 1994 and 1999 models, I use the 
household-level instead of family income because there is no measure of family income in the 1994 survey and to 
keep the comparability with the 1999 survey. In the 1999 survey, income and household level are correlated at 0.47 
(p<. 001).  
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with the NE/PI, identification with the FA, and no party identification. No party identification 
serves as reference category. 
Other variables are included in the model as control variables: age, education, family 
income, household level, and urban voter (residence). Age, education and family income have a 
straightforward interpretation; low values denote young people, low education, and low income. 
Household level is an ordinal variable that classifies the interviewees in three categories based on 
an indicator of their household. It takes the value of 1 for low socioeconomic level, 2 for medium 
socioeconomic level, and 3 for high socioeconomic level. Urban Voter is a dummy variable 
representing the region in which the respondent lives; it takes the value of 1 when the person 
lives in Montevideo and 0 when he/she lives in a rural area or in other smaller cities and towns.   
Prospect theory is going to be tested through two questions that ask respondents to agree 
or disagree with two aphorisms: “Más vale malo conocido que bueno por conocer” (“Better the 
devil you know than the saint you don’t”) and “el que no arriesga no gana” (“Nothing ventured, 
nothing gained”).  The two variables were combined into a single measurement named “Risk 
propensity” which ranges from 1 (high risk averse) to 5 (high risk acceptant). Risk averse 
respondents are those that preferred the known devil and disagreed with the maxim “Nothing 
ventured, nothing gained,” while risk acceptant Uruguayans are those that preferred the unknown 
saint and agreed with the above mentioned proverb. Intermediate values were given to citizens 
that answered the risk taker option in one question but the risk averse alternative in the other.   
 
5.2.2 Results 
I present individual-level explanations for voters’ behavior in each post-authoritarian 
election by using one Binary Logit for each election year. All the regressions in Table 5-3 reach 
statistical significance.51 Overall, the models are useful for explaining the factors that lead 
Uruguayans to vote for left-of-center parties. The coefficients of each variable are reported with 
their robust standard errors in parentheses. 
                                                 
51 The 1984 survey has a smaller N than the others because it was carried out only in Montevideo.  
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What are the important factors that determine the vote for leftist parties in Uruguay? 
Moreover, why do voters increasingly vote for the Left? Let me start to answer these questions 
by looking at those variables that reach significance in every election: ideology, party 
identification and area of residence (urban voter).   
Ideology is a significant determinant of the vote for the Left in all the elections; a one-
unit increase in conservative ideology (one space to the right in the ideological scale that ranges 
from 1 to 10) decreases the probability of voting for leftist parties in comparison to voting for 
center and right-of-center parties.  In conclusion, the Uruguayan case provides evidence to 
confirm Hypothesis 5: Ideological self-placement is likely to determine the vote for the left 
irrespective of social and structural determinants. 
Party identification is also a strong predictor of voting behavior in Uruguay; it reaches 
statistical significance in every election. This finding is not a surprise - scholars have already 
pointed out the importance of partisanship in Uruguayan politics (Mainwaring and Scully 1995).  
What’s more, party identification is significant for every political party; there is no cross-party 
variation, partisanship is not more important in predicting the vote for leftist parties than for 
right-of-center or center parties as Hypothesis 7 states.  
At this point, it is necessary to make a caveat. The discussion regarding the possible 
endogeneity problem between ideology and partisanship, or put it differently, that partisan 
affiliation or ideology have each partly caused the other, either because people leaning one way 
ideologically choose particular parties or because those loyal to particular parties come to accept 
certain ideologies, is an old one in the voting behavior literature. Since Campbell (1960), many 
scholars have defended the prevalence of partisanship over ideology as a leading voting clue. On 
the contrary, others scholars, starting from Downs (1957), have pinpointed the importance of 
ideology because it works as a shortcut or heuristic tool to identify the preferred political party. 
In any case, the two variables are conceptually different, and what’s more, they are not always 
highly correlated. In Uruguay, ideology and party identification are only highly correlated for 
those with party attachment to the Frente Amplio. In 1994, the correlation was -0.55, and in 1999 
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52 All the correlation values are reported in Appendix C.  
53 It is also possible that the decision to vote for the Frente Amplio may lead the voter to declare himself/herself as 
leftist to avoid cognitive dissonance. In that case, there would be reciprocal causation between vote and ideology. I 
thank Aníbal Pérez-Liñan for pointing out this issue, which is a certain possibility in the Uruguayan case. However, 
it is relevant to keep ideology as an independent variable in the model to compare the three country cases. In Brazil 
and Mexico, ideology is not always a relevant voting predictor. As a result, the relationship between ideology and 
vote is an empirical question rather than an endogeneity problem.   
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Table 5-3 Vote determinant for Leftist parties in Uruguay (1984-2004) (Model 1) 
Model 1: using different indicators of social class cleavage
Independent Variables: 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004
Economic Voting
Sociotropic Vote 0,369 - 0.534*** 0,248 0.465**
(.303) (.136) (.193) (.148)
Retrospective Sociotropic -0,095 - - - 0,035
(.254) (.172)
Prospective Sociotropic 0,262 - - - 0,157
(.199) (.219)
Pocket-book Vote - -0,012 0,088 0,042 0.336**
(0.130) (.150) (.202) (.162)
Retrospective Pocket-book - 0,174 - - -0,079
(.121) (.184)
Prospective Pocket-book - (.329) - - -0,215
(.130)** (.226)
Social Class Cleavage (1)
Dominant Classes -0.037 -0,161 -0,439 -0.915 0,867
(.487) (.275) (0.345) (.562) (.627)
Petty Bourgeoisie -0,578 0,007 -0,569 0,437 0,003
(.715) (.466) (0.422) (.470) (.395)
Formal Workers 0,205 0,093 -0,049 0,162 0.437
(.360) (.206) (.482) (.374) (.275)
Informal Workers -0,567 0,025 0,015 -0,378 0,139
(.426) (.303) (.262) (.405) (.317)
Education 0.274** -0,006 0.204** 0,123 -0.139*
(.135) (.078) (.088) (.116) (.075)
Household level -0,177 -0.446** -0,152
(.157) (.218) (.177)
Family income -0.042 0.000 - -
(.079) (.043)
Ideology - -0.812*** -0.654*** -0.792*** -0.710***
(.079) (.097) (.084) (.086)
Age 0.202*** -0.136*** -0,009 0,001 -0,006
(.059) (.033) (.007) (.008) (.007)
Urban Voter - 1.159*** 0.899*** 0.853** 0.783***
(.176) (.232) (.282) (.236)
Partisanship (2)
Partido Colorado - - -2.651*** -3.781*** -2.309***
(.412) (.661) (.469)
Partido Nacional - - -2.634*** -2.364*** -2.613***
- - (.393) (.418) (.340)
Frente Amplio 4.525*** 3.954*** 4.861***
(.566) (0.662) (1.042)
Nuevo Espacio/P.Independiente - - 2.999*** 3.902** dropped 
(.927) (1.533)
Prospective theory
Risk propensity - - - - 0.436***
(.099)
Constant -2.429 1.971** 0,318 3.248** 2,236
(1.714) (0.791) (0.976) (1.137) (1.442)
Pseudo R squared 0,17 0,48 0,74 0,75 0,52
Wald chi2 22.8** 132*** 252*** 217*** 188***
Number of observations 312 1219 1577 1062 1388
(1) Includes: retired, students, housewives, and unemployed.
(2) Inludes those that do not have partisanship or do not want to express it as the reference category.
*p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01
Note: Dependent variable is Left, a binary measure of whether the respondent intended to vote for a (1) a left-leaning party, 
or (0) to a  non-leftist party. Entries are binary logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.  
The null hypothesis of the Wald-chi test is that all coefficients are jointly equal to cero.  
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 Urban Voter is also significant in all the elections. Since their inception, leftist parties 
have been identified as urban parties. The Frente Amplio has been extending its electorate to 
more rural regions of the country, and in the 2004 national election it obtained the majority of 
vote in seven54 of the nineteen municipalities. Despite this remarkable electoral growth outside 
Montevideo, the capital city, the urban-rural cleavage continues to influence the party for which 
Uruguayans vote; leftist parties mainly receive the preferences of urban Uruguayans. 
Risk Propensity is only tested in 2004, and as a result, I cannot argue that it was always a 
strong predictor of the leftist vote, but the evidence from the 2004 election shows that 
Uruguayans with higher levels of risk acceptance had a higher probability of voting for left-of-
center parties than those who were risk averse. In other words, regression results confirm 
Hypothesis 2: when the incumbent is not a leftist political party, and leftist parties belong to the 
opposition, risk acceptant citizens will choose for the Left at the booth.55  
In addition, there are some variables that are significant in some elections but not in 
others. One of them is age. The changes found from one election to the other are unexpected if 
we take into account the social bases of leftist parties in the past. Age was significant in the first 
elections after the return to democracy, but it is no longer significant in the 1999 and 2004 
elections. Table 5-4 shows that being young increased the probability of someone voting for the 
FA or NE in the 1984, 1989, and 1994 elections. This characteristic of the leftist electorate in 
Uruguay is not new; since its foundation, the FA has been a political party which is highly 
attractive to young people. Not only did the FA successfully obtain votes from young people, but 
it also demonstrated the ability to retain party traditions (Monestier 2001; Moreira 2000). In 
other words, those who were young supporters of the FA in 1971 continued to vote for it in 1999, 
                                                 
54 Canelones, Florida, Maldonado, Montevideo, Rocha, Salto, and Soriano.  
55 I also tested Prospect Theory in the 1999 election with an alternative indicator: an individual’s judgments about 
the opposition’s governing capabilities. This indicator was used by Cinta (1999) to assess uncertainty in the 1997 
Mexican congressional election, and he found that Mexicans voted for the party whose governing capabilities they 
were more certain of. I find the same results for the 1999 Uruguayan elections. Uruguayans that considered Tabaré 
Vázquez, Frente Amplio’s presidential candidate, the most capable candidate to improve the country’s situation 
(“más capaz de sacar al país adelante”), significantly tended to vote for the Left. On the contrary, those that believed 
Jorge Batlle (PC) or Luis A. Lacalle (PN) were the most capable, tended to vote for the PC or PN respectively. 
Morgenstern and Zechmeister (2001) argue that this variable is highly endogenous to the voters’ party preferences.  
In other words, Uruguayans sympathetic to the opposition are more likely to positively evaluate their party’s 
capacity to govern. I agree with them, it makes sense that those voters who think that a candidate is the better 
prepared to govern, will vote for them. However, because it is a variable highly used in the literature that tests 
Prospect Theory, I run the analysis. Results are available upon request. 
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and this is the reason why age is not more significant in 1999. With each successive election, the 
FA continued to win young voters who remained in the party as they became older; the age 
effect coincides together with a cohort effect.  
The economic voting theory finds support in the Uruguayan case. In other words, voters’ 
economic assessments are significant determinants of the vote for leftist parties in all Uruguayan 
elections following the return to democracy with the exception of the 1984 and 1999 elections.56 
There is evidence to support Hypothesis 1: the worse a voter evaluates the economic situation, 
the greater the probability s/he will vote for the opposition. In particular, voters who are 
discontented will reward leftist parties which were not in charge of the government. As argued in 
other studies (González 1999; González and Queirolo 2000; Luna 2004b), leftist parties 
capitalize on popular discontent with the traditional political parties that have been in charge of 
the government since the nation’s independence. Since the FA and the NE or PI were never in 
charge of the government, they represent an “untainted” or “credible” opposition.  
Uruguayans are sociotropic oriented rather than egotropic oriented or pocketbook voters. 
This finding is consistent with most of the literature on economic voting in Western countries 
which states that voters take into account their society’s economic well-being more willingly 
than their own welfare. In terms of the temporal distinction on voters’ orientations, Uruguayans 
tend to be closer to “bankers” considering the future expectations of the economy (prospective 
vote), than “peasants” thinking about what the economy was like over the previous years.57  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
56 One of the main differences between the results with imputed data and the results without imputation is in the 
relevance of economic voting theory in the 1984 election. Using the data without imputation, sociotropic vote and 
prospective sociotropic reach significance, but using the imputed data, these variables are no longer significant.  
57 The distinction between “bankers” and “peasants” was introduced by MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson (1992). 
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 Table 5-4 Vote determinant for Leftist parties in Uruguay (1984-2004) (Model 2) 
Model 2: using socioeconomic status as an indicator of social class cleavage
Independent Variables: 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004
Economic Voting
Sociotropic Vote 0,395 - 0.518*** 0,306 0.481***
(.287) (.134) (.194) (.148)
Retrospective Sociotropic -0,085 - - - 0,004
(.247) (.169)
Prospective Sociotropic 0,273 - - - 0,128
(.191) (.209)
Pocket-book Vote - -0,059 0,091 -0,041 0.408**
(0.130) (.145) (.207) (.161)
Retrospective Pocket-book - 0,183 - - -0,092
(.122) (.179)
Prospective Pocket-book - 0.328** - - -0,226
(.129) (.218)
Social Class Cleavage 
SES (socioeconomic status) 0.177 -0.142 0,003 -0.275 -0.050
(.162) (.104) (.103) (.189) (0.117)
Ideology - -0.819*** -0.647*** -0.790*** -0.686***
(.079) (.100) (.088) (.083)
Age -0.257*** -0.141*** -0.014** -0,005 -0,005
(.053) (.029) (.007) (.008) (.006)
Urban Voter - 0.184*** 0.952*** 0.915*** -0.667**
(.175) (.227) (.284) (.229)
Partisanship (1)
Partido Colorado - - -2.705*** -3.542*** -2.369***
(.416) (.666) (.482)
Partido Nacional - - -2.588*** -2.274*** -2.651***
- - (.381) (.434) (.339)
Frente Amplio 4.465*** 3.900*** 4.833***
(.558) (.641) (1.039)
Nuevo Espacio/P.Independiente - - 3.024*** 3.889** dropped
0,891 (1.535)
Prospective theory
Risk propensity - - - - 0.419***
(.097)
Constant -1,696 2.119** 0,928 2.998** 1.100
(1.620) (0.686) (0.810) (0.999) (1.130)
Pseudo R squared 0,10 0,41 0,77 0,76 0,55
Wald chi2 6,4 59.9*** 142.6*** 76.2*** 103***
Number of observations 312 1219 1577 1062 1388
(1) Includes those that do not have partisanship or do not want to express it as the reference category.
*p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01
Note : Dependent variable is Left, a binary measure of whether the respondent intended to vote for a (1) a left-leaning party, 
or (0) to a  non-leftist party. Entries are binary logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.  
The null hypothesis of the Wald-chi test is that all coefficients are jointly equal to cero.  
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 At the aggregate level, the key question is if the number of people with a negative 
perception of the country’s economic situation has grown over time. The percentage of 
Uruguayans who negatively evaluated the economy increased from 50.5% in 1994 to 69.3% in 
2004. As these evaluations of the country’s economic health worsened, the main beneficiary of 
this phenomenon continued to be leftist parties for representing the “untainted” or “credible” 
opposition.  
The impact of economic assessments on voting decisions can be diluted by the effect of 
party identifications. As Hypothesis 8 states, voters with party identification might be less likely 
to take into consideration economic evaluations than those without party preferences. I tested this 
argument for the 2004 election using an interaction term between partisanship and retrospective 
personal economic evaluations (retrospective pocketbook). The evidence shown in Table 5-5 
indicates that having a party identification influence the way in which voters take into account 
their personal economic situation but not in the expected direction. Those Uruguayans with party 
identification are more likely than those without party identification to take into consideration 
the evolution of their own economic situation when they decide to vote left. Using the lincom 
command, both coefficients reach significance but the coefficient of those with party 
identification is bigger than the coefficient of those with no party attachment (0.896 and 0.428 
respectively). 
This result needs to be explained looking at the different party identifications. Having a 
party attachment to the Frente Amplio, Partido Nacional or Partido Colorado makes a difference 
in terms of how voters weight their own economic situation in their voting decisions. Results 
reported in Table 5-5 indicate that in 2004, negative retrospective evaluations of the personal 
economic situation increase the chances of voting leftist parties. But more important, these 
chances are amplified when voters feel close to the Frente Amplio and reduced for voters 
attached to the Partido Nacional. Despite the interaction term between retrospective pocketbook 
and Partido Nacional’s attachment does not reach significance in the model, it is significant 
using the lincom command (the coefficient is 1.022 and the standard error is .575). Nevertheless, 
these chances of voting left are more influenced by party identifications than by retrospective 
pocketbook evaluations.  
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Table 5-5 Retrospective Pocketbook and  Party Identification as determinants  
for Leftist parties in Uruguay (2004) 
Independent Variables: (1) (2)
Economic Voting
Retrospective Pocket-book 0.896*** 0.380**
(.112) (.129)
Social Class Cleavage 
Dominant Classes 0.212 1.032
(.641) (.633)
Petty Bourgeoisie -0.199 -0.336
(.231) (.347)
Formal Workers 0.380** 0.352
(.158) (.221)



















PC partyid*Retrospective Pocket 0.003
(.589)
PN partyid*Retrospective Pocket 0.641
(.586)
FA partyid*Retrospective Pocket -.794***
(.113)




Pseudo R squared 0.13 0.57
Wald chi2 194*** 238***
Number of observations 1368 1368
*p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01
Note : Dependent variable is Left, a binary measure of whether the respondent intended to vote for a (1) 
a left-leaning party, or (0) to a  non-leftist party. Entries are binary logit coefficients with robust standard 





 An alternative, and more straightforward, way to analyze the combined effect of party 
identifications and retrospective economic evaluations is looking at the predicted probabilities 
shown in Table 5-6. In 2004, a voter who identified himself with the Partido Nacional and 
considers that his own economic situation has improved during the last government has a 
probability of voting left of 4.1%. This probability will increase to 8.4 for those who consider 
themselves poorer than five years ago.  For a Colorado adherent, the impact of getting poorer is 
similar than for a Blanco sympathizer: the probability doubles when the voter considers his/her 
economic situation is worse off. The same phenomenon happens among those Uruguayans 
without party identification. The only situation when the personal economic situation has no 
impact on the decision to vote left is among those who feel close to the Frente Amplio.  
In conclusion, in 2004, those Uruguayans who feel that their economic situation has been 
impoverished increase their probability to vote for leftist parties, regardless of their party 
identification. The probabilities of voting left are influenced by party identifications: they are 
higher for those that lack party identification, moderate for those that despite feeling themselves 
as “colorados” are disappointed with their party past performances, and low for the “blancos” 
who still trust on their party, but independently of the base on which each sector starts, the 
probabilities are doubled when the voter feels economic deterioration. This evidence reinforces 
the argument that Uruguayan leftist parties grow by capitalizing social and economic discontent. 
 
Table 5-6 Predicted Probabilities of Voting for Leftist Parties depending on Party Identification and 
Retrospective Egotropic Economic Assessments (2004) 
 
Party Identification Retrospective Egotropic Economic Evaluations 













No Party Identification 42.6 64.5 81.7
Note: Data is from the 2004 pre-electoral national survey of Uruguayan electorate done by Cifra, González, Raga y 
Asociados.  Cells entries are predicted probabilities of hypothetical individuals voting for left-of-center parties from 
a logit with the same variables as Model 1 and 2 in Table 5-5. Except for the identified variables, all variables are 




Finally, the Uruguayan results reinforce the extended idea that social class cleavages are 
almost irrelevant to understand voting behavior in Latin America. The social class cleavage 
theory was tested with two different models. Model 1 tests the existence of social class cleavages 
with a set of variables that includes a series of dummy variables measuring occupation, a 
variable measuring education, and another one measuring the household economic level or 
family income58  (see Table 5-3).  The results of Model 1 refute Hypothesis 3: the position that a 
person occupies in the social structure does not determine his/her vote. In Uruguay, workers and 
members of the popular sectors are not more likely to vote for leftist parties, while those who 
belong to the dominant sectors do not necessarily vote for rightist parties.  Hypothesis 4 is also 
refuted: voters who belong to the informal sector are not more likely to vote for the Left.59 
Education is significant to explain the vote for the Left in 1984, 1994 and 2004. In 1984 and 
1994, highly educated citizens had a higher probability of voting for the Frente Amplio; while in 
2004 this effect was reversed: low education leads to more votes for the Left. Socioeconomic 
level was only significant in 1999: citizens with a low economic level had a higher probability of 
voting for the Frente Amplio.  
The second model to test the social class cleavage is based on a single variable named 
socioeconomic status (SES) which considers the three indicators simultaneously: occupation, 
education, and income.  I performed a factor analysis with these three variables measuring 
occupation, education, and income and extracted only one factor in each election year (1984: 
Eigenvalue=1.657; 1989: Eigenvalue=1.687; 1994: Eigenvalue=1.597; 1999: Eigenvalue=2.081; 
2004: Eigenvalue=1.627). I saved the values of this factor as a new variable named 
socioeconomic status (SES) and entered it into the model as an independent variable. Table 5-4 
shows that socioeconomic status is not a relevant voting predictor.60  
                                                 
58 Not all surveys have both measures. The household level is an ordinal variable that captures the classification 
made by the interviewer of the interviewees’ households. It takes the value of 1 for low socioeconomic level, 2 for 
middle socioeconomic level, and 3 for high socioeconomic level. Family income is the self-reported income of the 
family. In the surveys where both variables are available, I prefer to use family income because it is reported by the 
interviewee.  
59 I also include unemployed people as an independent dummy variable but it does not reach significance. 
60 This is another difference between imputed and non imputed data. Using the data without imputation, SES reaches 
significance in 1984, 1989, and 1999. This difference can be explained by the large percentage of people that do not 
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These two ways in which the social class cleavage is tested do not rule out the possibility 
that social class has an indirect impact on voting left acting entirely through partisan affiliation 
or ideology. It might be possible that social class predicts ideological leanings or partisan 
affiliation, variables that determine the vote for leftist parties in Uruguay. However, the 
correlation between these independent variables contradict this possibility.61 Social class does 
not have a positive and high correlation with ideology or party choice. In other words, social 
class is not a key variable neither to predict leftist vote, nor to predict party identification or 
ideology.   
 In conclusion, Uruguay is not a case of the class-cleavage party system. Since the FA’s 
foundation in 1971, its electorate has not only been made up of working-class people; it has 
received support from students, intellectuals, and the middle and upper-middle classes (Gillespie  
1986)  The vote for leftist parties has increased among different social sectors, not only formal 
and informal workers. I understand this change as an indicator of the FA’s transformation into a 
catchall party. In particular, after the 2002 economic crisis, which is considered the severest 
economic crisis in Uruguayan history and one which affected all socioeconomic sectors, 
citizens’ economic discontent grew. As a result, in the 2004 election citizens voted for left-of-
center parties irrespective of their socioeconomic status because they were considered the 
“untainted” opposition.   
 
5.2.3 Discussion 
Bearing in mind the value that each theory has to explain the rise of the Left in Latin 
America, we can summarize the Uruguayan results in the following way. First, the traditional 
social-class theory (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) does not explain the vote for the Left in post-
dictatorship Uruguay. The FA became the largest party and won the general election in 2004 
because it expanded its electoral base beyond the traditional, left-urban-middle class coalition, 
                                                                                                                                                             
report their income; as a result, SES has many missing values. By imputing those missing values, the significance of 
SES in those elections vanishes.  
61 All the correlation matrixes for each regression model are shown in Appendix C. 
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without losing the support of these social sectors. The vote for the Left is a multi-class vote 
rather than a working class one.  
Second, the FA formed a coalition that is ideologically center-left, but is catchall in terms 
of class. This finding is extremely puzzling because, although ideology is an important factor in 
explaining voting behavior, social class is not. This result goes against the common 
understanding that ideology and social class are matched: workers are on the left, and the 
dominant sectors are on the right. In Uruguay, this attachment between social class and ideology 
does not hold as it is shown in Table 5.7. Furthermore, as Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) show, 
this attachment between social class and ideology does not hold in post-dictatorship Chile either.  
 
 














Dominant 35.7 35.7 28.6 - 100 
Petty bourgeoisie 35.3 44.1 20.6 - 100 
Formal workers 44.4 37.3 16.4 1.9 100 
Informal workers 39.4 34.7 23.1 2.8 100 
Unemployed 42.8 35.8 18.9 2.5 100 
All (1) 38.0 36.2 23.3 2.5 100 
(1) Includes retired, housewives and students. 




One possible explanation for this unexpected combination of ideology and catchall 
parties may be that ideology works as a political cleavage used by political parties to mobilize 
support, as Torcal and Mainwaring suggest. In other words, the ideological cleavage is a political 
cleavage that becomes active when politicians use it to get votes; it is not a structural cleavage 
determined by social class. Ideology is a relevant predictor of vote even after controlling for 
partisanship. Moreover, partisanship is also an extremely important vote determinant in Uruguay 
for leftist and non-leftist parties. This clear distinction in two ideological families might be 
reinforced by politicians’ agendas.  
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Third, economic voting theory and prospect theory work to explain the increase in the 
vote for the Left in Uruguay. Leftist parties have gained votes from those dissatisfied with the 
country’s economic situation because they have never been in charge of the national government 
and citizens cannot blame them for economic hardship. By being in the domain of losses, 
Uruguayans take more risks:  they vote against the “known devil” and in favor of the “unknown 
saint.”  Table 5-8 indicates that among those that intended to vote for leftist parties in 2004 there 
was a higher level of risk propensity than among those that were going to vote for “traditional” 
parties. Voting for a party that was never in charge of the government implies higher levels of 
uncertainty than voting for the parties that had governed the country since its independence. 
 
 
Table 5-8 Risk and Vote Choice (%) 
Risk Propensity Leftist parties Non-Leftist parties All
















High Risk Acceptant 65.26 22.39 48.25
N 829 545 1374
Note: Data is from the 2004 pre-electoral national survey of the Uruguayan electorate carried out by Cifra, 




Moreover, the probability of voting for the Left in 2004 also increased with the 
disenchantment with the economic situation, but not all voters who feel discontent with the 
economy would “gamble” their vote.  Table 5-9 shows that a risk averse citizen with a negative 
evaluation of the country’s economy has a probability of voting Left of .42, while a risk-taking 
voter with the same negative evaluation doubles the probability of choosing the less known 
opposition (.84). In other words, individuals with a lower risk-taking attitude prefer to stick with 
the “devil they know” despite their economic discontent.62  
                                                 
62 This explanation follows the same logic as (Morgenstern 2001). These scholars found that risk propensity directly 
and indirectly affects voting behavior in the 1997 Mexican congressional election. The indirect effect is produced by 
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Table 5-9 Predicted Probabilities of Voting for Leftist Parties depending on Risk Propensity and 
Sociotropic Economic Assessments (2004) 
 
Risk Propensity Economic Evaluations 














Note: Data is from the 2004 pre-electoral national survey of Uruguayan electorate done by Cifra, González, Raga y 
Asociados.  Cells entries are predicted probabilities of hypothetical individuals voting for left-of-center parties from 
a logit with the same variables as Model 1 in Table 5-3. Two changes were made in order to produce predicted 
probabilities: 1) Risk propensity and Sociotropic were merged into three categories to use the prtab STATA 
command, and  2) Frente Amplio party identification and P. Independiente party identification were dropped from 
the model. Except for the identified variables, all variables are held constant at their means.  
 
 
In conclusion, more than voting against neoliberal reforms, Uruguayans are punishing 
political parties that produced economic hardship. Uruguayan evidence reinforces Benton’s 
(2005) argument that Latin Americans have long memories and punish not only the incumbent 
party for the material suffering; they also rebuke parties that governed before the incumbent. 
Left-of-center parties in Uruguay (or the challengers), and in particular the Frente Amplio, took 
advantage of this popular discontent and capitalized on social and economic dissatisfaction 
towards the “traditional parties.” 
 
 
5.3 BRAZIL: VOTING LEFT IN A WEAKLY INSTITUTIONALIZED PARTY 
SYSTEM 
It can be considered that left-of-center parties in Brazil have reached the presidency twice since 
the return to democracy in 1985. The first time was in 1994 with the Partido da Social 
Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), the second time in 2002 with the Partido dos Trabalhadores 
(PT). However, there is evidence that when PSDB reached the national government, it was no 
                                                                                                                                                             
affecting the importance of economic assessments. I included an interaction term between risk and sociotropic to test 
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longer a party on the left of the ideological spectrum, and it was elected as a centrist political 
party. If this second classification of PSDB is followed, leftist parties only won the Brazilian 
presidency in 2002.   
The PSDB was formed in 1988 from a dissident faction of the Partido do Movimiento 
Democratico Brasileiro (PMDB).  The members of PMDB that set up the PSDB were considered 
the left-wing of the former, they supported redistributive policies, and during their first years of 
existence, they voted more times with the left than with the right (Power, 2001/2002). As a 
result, PSDB was considered a center-left party in its origins. However, the PSDB moved 
rightward even before taking office. In 1994, PSDB in coalition with PFL (Partido do Frente 
Liberal) won the presidential election and led Fernando Henrique Cardoso, former finance 
minister of Itamar Franco, to the presidency. Cardoso immediately took a market-oriented 
approach, and started to implement an ambitious plan of neoliberal reforms that included 
privatizations and free-trade policies. Market-oriented policies were accompanied by the “Plano 
Real”, a currency reform that was impressively successful in reducing inflation, and became the 
major achievement of Cardoso’s government. This movement to the right of the ideological 
spectrum was also present among PSDB legislators. Power (Power, 2001/2002) shows that in 
1990 the mean position of PSDB legislators in the 10 points ideological dimension was 3.52, in 
1993 it was 3.81, and in 1997, three years after being in charge of the executive, it was 4.77 and 
for the first time, it was slightly to the right of the congressional mean.63  To sum up, the PSDB 
was created as a left-of-center party but it was elected in 1994 as centrist, and it was reelected in 
1998 as a right-of-center one.  
Therefore, the first time that a leftist party was elected to preside the Brazilian national 
government was in 2002 with the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). The PT was created in 1980 
from the “bottom-up,”  and “united a hodgepodge of Marxists of all shades of reds, liberation 
theology-oriented Catholics, base community activists, moderate intellectuals, and union and 
social movement leaders” (Samuels 2004: 1002), as well as left-wing congressmen and members 
of the Movimiento Democratico Brasileiro. Despite the ideological heterogeneity of its members, 
the PT was clearly identified as “socialist” and an advocate of radical land reform, workers’ 
                                                                                                                                                             
for the indirect effect of risk but it was not significant.  
63 In the ten point’s ideological dimension, “1” represents the extreme left and “10” the extreme right. 
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government, repudiation of external debt, nationalization of the country’s banks and mineral 
wealth (Meneguello 2002; Samuels 2004).  
In 2002, Inácio Lula da Silva, PT’s presidential candidate, won the election with 61.3% 
of the vote. Many scholars have pointed out that this success of the PT can be explained by the 
ideological transformation that the party has experienced since its formation, in particular since 
the 1994 electoral defeat (Meneguello 2002; Samuels 2004). The “deradicalization” of PT can be 
traced through its party platform that changed from supporting “economic socialism” in 1982 to 
favoring “democratic socialism” or “democratic revolution” with an emphasis on making the 
state more transparent and accountable in 2002. PT’s 2002 presidential campaign even insisted 
that a PT’s government would keep price stability and budget surplus, while fighting 
unemployment and poverty. There were no references to the nationalization of natural resources 
in the 2002 presidential platform. Regardless of the ideological moderation, and after four years 
in charge of the government, PT can still be considered a left-of-center party. 
To sum up, leftist parties have been in charge of the Brazilian national government only 
once since the end of the authoritarian regime. Figure 5.2 shows the electoral evolution of left, 
center and right-wing parties in Brazilian presidential elections. In 1989, the stacked bar does not 
reach 100% because Fernando Collor and his party were classified as Personalist. In the 
following election, 1994, the centrist PSDB won the election. Four years later it was reelected, 
but in 1998 the PSDB was considered a right-of-center party. Finally, in 2002, PT won the 
presidential elections, and for the first time since the return to democracy, a leftist party took 
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Figure 5.2 Electoral Evolution of Ideological Blocs in Brazilian Presidential Elections (1989-2002) 
 
Are the factors that led Brazilians to vote for leftist parties in 1989, 1994 or 1998 similar to the 
ones that persuaded them to vote for Lula in 2002? There is a wide range of studies explaining 
why Brazilians vote the way they do, and assessing the impact of partisanship (Carreirao and 
Kinzo 2004; Kinzo 1992; Samuels 2006), ideology (Carreirao 2002a; Singer 2002), economic 
evaluations (Baker 2002; Camargos 2001), personalism and candidates’ personal attributes 
(Meneguello 1995; Carreirao 2002b), and political discussion within social networks (Baker, 
Ames and Renno 2006) on voters’ decisions. Most of these works analyze the vote for political 
parties; there is no research done on the factors that influence Brazilians to vote for a particular 
ideological bloc.  
One possible explanation for this lack of research on ideological voting is that Brazilian 
electoral behavior is usually considered highly volatile and weakly determined by ideology or 
partisan identifications. If that is the case, voting for the Left would be indistinguishable from 
voting for the Right. However, recent research would tend to counter this point. Carreirão and 
Kinzo (2004) argue that partisanship is a relevant predictor of voting for the ideological bloc to 
which the party belongs. Samuels (2004) found that party attachment is important to explain the 
vote for PT. Singer (2002) and Carreirao (Carreirao 2002a) claim that despite not all Brazilian 
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voters being able to place themselves on the ideological scale, ideology is a significant vote 
predictor for many Brazilians, in particular those with more education. Furthermore, Singer 
(2002) finds evidence that in the 1994 national election, Brazilians voted for the candidate who 
was closer to their party’s ideological position. 
This section explores the determinants of voting Left in the weakly-institutionalized and 
highly-fragmented Brazilian party system. I argue that the vote for leftist parties in Brazil is an 
indicator of social and economic discontent, as it is in Uruguay. Voting for PSDB in 1989 or PT 
in 1994 was voting for a credible opposition. Neither of them was in charge of the government; 
therefore, it makes no sense for voters to punish them for hyperinflation, unemployment or 
poverty. In 1994, Cardoso’s short term as President Itamar Franco’s finance minister gave him 
more popular support than rejection, and in 1998 Cardoso was reelected as a result of his 
successful plan to reduce and control inflation. Nevertheless, Brazilians that were disappointed 
with the country’s economic situation voted against him. Four years later, inflation was no longer 
a serious problem, and voters were disappointed with the economic consequences of Cardoso’s 
implementation of market-oriented reforms. Therefore, they would keep voting for the left, now 
embodied by the PT and other leftist parties but no longer by the PSDB.  
 
5.3.1 Data and variable description 
The data that is analyzed in this section comes from different national surveys. In order to 
analyze the factors that explain the vote for leftist parties in 1989, 1994 and 1998, I use three pre-
election national surveys carried out by Datafolha. The 1989 survey was carried out in 
September, and includes 2,083 cases; the 1994 survey was done during August and includes 
10,459 cases; and the 1998 survey includes 4,380 cases and the data collection occurred during 
July. To test the hypotheses in the 2002 presidential election, I use data from Brazil’s 2002 
National Election Study (BNES), a national post-election voter behavior survey which includes 
2,513 respondents. Finally, to complete the analysis, I also use data from a 2002 four-wave panel 
study of eligible voters in two mid-sized Brazilian cities: Caxias do Sul (Rio Grande do Sul) and 
Juiz de Fora (Minas Gerais). Only data from the first wave of the panel, which was conducted 
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during March and April 2002, is used.64 In all the surveys, data was collected by personal, door-
to-door interviews in the respondents’ homes.65 As is the case for Uruguay, Brazilian survey data 
also fits very well the proportion intending to vote left with the proportion that actually voted 
left. The 1989 survey predicted a 34% of votes for the left and the actual percentage was 46%; in 
1994 the survey’s proportion was 36% and the actual vote was 30%; the 1998 survey anticipated 
that 43% of Brazilian will vote for leftist parties and the real percentage was the same 43%; 
finally, the 2002 survey was carried out after the election and 68% of the respondents said that 
had voted left, but the actual percentage was 77%.66   
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that measures the intention to vote for a left-
of-center party, value 1 means that the person intended to vote (or voted in the case of the post-
election survey) for the Left. The following political parties were classified as left-of-center in 
each presidential election: in 1989 PDT, PT, PSDB, and PCB; in 1994 PT and PDT; in 1998 PT, 
PPS and PSTU; and in 2002 PT, PSB, and PSTU. I explored the following independent 
variables, each of which fits within one of the theories discussed in Chapter 4.  Several of these 
variables are composite indices.  
The Sociotropic vote and Pocketbook vote in the 1994 and 1998 surveys, measure 
respondent’s evaluation of the Plano Real for the country and for voters’ own life. Higher values 
correspond to negative evaluations. Prospective inflation, Prospective unemployment and 
Prospective purchasing power measure prospective economic assessments; higher values mean 
that inflation, unemployment, and purchasing power will decrease. In the 2002 panel survey, 
Retrospective Sociotropic, Prospective Sociotropic, Retrospective Pocketbook and Prospective 
Pocketbook measure citizens’ evaluations of the country and their own economic situation during 
the last year, and economic expectations for the following twelve months.   
Social class cleavage is tested using a set of five dummy variables; each dummy 
represents one category of social class defined in terms of occupation: dominant class, petty 
bourgeoisie, formal workers, informal workers, and non-employed. The definition of each 
category follows Portes and Hoffman (2003) classification which was described in section 5.2. 
                                                 
64 Missing values were imputed using ICE imputation method from STATA. 
65 I want to thank Rachel Meneguello and Simone Aranha from the Center for Studies on Public Opinion (CESOP) 
at the University of Campinas (UNICAMP) in Brazil for giving me access to Datafolha and BNES data. I am also 
very grateful to Barry Ames, Andy Baker and Lucio Renno for letting me use their 2002 Panel Data.   
66 This result is counterintuitive because post-election surveys usually overrepresent the winner. 
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Each category is entered into the model as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the 
person belongs to it and 0 when he/she does not. Non-employed people (the unemployed, retired, 
students and housewives) are taken as the base category. To capture the other dimensions of the 
socioeconomic status, I include Education and Family Income.  Higher values mean higher 
levels of education and higher family income.   
Ideology is measured in two ways. The first one is the respondent’s self-placement in the 
ideological dimension. In the 1989 survey, the ideological dimension goes from 1 (left) to 7 
(right), and in the 2002 survey it goes from 0 (left) to 10 (right).  Finally, the 2002 panel survey 
measures ideology with a question with five answer categories: left, center left, center, center 
right, and right. The second way to measure an interviewee’s ideology is through a series of 
questions asking citizens’ opinions toward a series of policy issues: state interventionism, 
redistribution, socialism, state regulations of private firms, agrarian reform, nationalization, and 
privatizations. Higher values in each of these policies correspond with liberal positions, which I 
expect to be negative correlated with the vote for leftist parties.   
Partisanship is tested using a set of five dummy variables; each dummy represents one 
category of partisanship: party identification with left-of-center parties, party identification with 
parties at the center, party identification with right-of-center parties, party identification with 
parties that cannot be classified in the left-right dimension and those that lack partisanship. Each 
category is entered into the model as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the person 
belongs to it and 0 when he/she does not. Those that have partisanship to unclassified parties are 
the base category in the regression.  
Prospect theory is tested through different variables that capture how risky it is to vote for 
different candidates. In the 1998 survey, the Risk Propensity Lula and Risk Propensity FHC are 
composite indices that include the following hypothetical questions about the perceived risk 
implied by a Lula or FHC governments: if unemployment increased under Lula/FHC, if the Real 
remained stable under Lula/FHC, and if the country experienced chaos under Lula/FHC. The 
propensity risk indexes for the 2002 election combines variables that measure which is the most 
trustworthy candidate, the most honest candidate, the candidate with most experience, the one 
with the best governmental plan, the best prepared for the task, the candidate that will generate 
more jobs, and the one who would keep inflation low.  Higher values correspond to higher levels 
of risk. The 2002 panel survey asks respondents to agree with one of the two following 
  105
aphorisms: “É melhor ter um pássaro na mão do que dois voando” (“A bird in the hand is worth 
two in the bush”) or “quem não arrisca, não petisca” (“Nothing ventured, nothing gained”), which 
is a common question used to measure risk propensity.   
Finally, Age (the higher the value, the older the respondent), and urban voter (a dummy 
in which 1 is urban and 0 is rural) are added to test for the existence of alternative cleavages. In 
the 2002 post-election survey, the urban voter variable captures if the respondent lives in a state 
capital or not, rather than if the place of residence is urban or rural.  
5.3.2 Results 
From the individual perspective, there are four main voting behavior theories to explain the vote 
for leftist parties in Brazil since 1989: economic voting, risk propensity, partisanship and 
ideological identification. Table 5-10 shows the regression results for each democratic 
presidential election since the end of the authoritarian regime.  
The first thing to notice is, as Camargos (2001) pointed out, that Brazilian vote choice is 
not irrational, random, or merely the result of electoral campaigns as it is sometimes described. 
In each presidential election model, at least five variables attain statistical significance. Overall, 
the models are useful for explaining the factors that determine voters’ behavior in Brazil, in 
particular the vote for left-of-center political parties. Brazilians, when voting, take into account 
short-term factors such as economic evaluations, as well as long-term ones such as partisanship 
and, to an inferior degree, ideological identifications.  
Ideology is a significant predictor of the vote for the Left in one of the two instances in 
which I was able to include a direct measure of it: the individual self placement on the 
ideological scale. In 1989, a one unit increase in ideology (one space to the right on the 
ideological scale) decreases the probability of voting for a left-of-center party rather than voting 
for a center or rightist party. However, in 2002, the ideological self placement does not reach 
significance. As a result, the evidence is not conclusive to support Hypothesis 5 which states that 
Latin Americans who identify themselves with the Left will vote for leftist parties, or to reinforce 
Singer’s (2002) argument that ideological self-placement is one of the most important factors to 
explain Brazilians voting behavior.    
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Singer (2002) points out that Brazilians have more stable ideological identifications than 
party identifications, and argues that voters use the ideological dimension as a shortcut to 
distinguish between political parties.67  Singer finds that Brazilians who are identified with the 
Left and those identified with the Right are not very different in terms of their opinions towards 
the role of the state in the economy or even egalitarianism. The majority of both like state 
interventionism, and want a country with more economic and social equality. What really 
differentiates the two is the best way to achieve equality. Those identified with the Right want 
the state to be in charge of the process; while leftists favor social mobilization as the best method 
to accomplish social equality.   
Following Singer’s research, I put it to the test whether policy issues that usually 
discriminate Left from Right are irrelevant among Brazilians. To do so, I include a series of 
variables that measure Brazilians’ opinions towards: state interventionism, redistribution, 
socialism, state regulation of private firms, agrarian reform, nationalization, and privatizations. 
The results shown in Table 5-10 indicate that only one of these variables is a significant 
determinant to vote for a left-of-center political party: opinion towards privatization. These 
results refute Hypothesis 6 which states that Latin Americans who support government 
involvement and regulation of the economy, income redistribution and an increase in social 
spending will be more likely to vote for leftist parties, while those who are against these policy 
issues will be more likely to vote for rightist parties. Despite ideology is sometimes a relevant 
voting predictor, almost none of the policy issues traditionally associated with the ideological 
distinction explains why Brazilians choose a leftist party. These results strengthen Singer’s 
argument that Brazilians cannot explain what they mean by Left or Right, but despite that, they 
are able to place themselves, political parties, and candidates on the ideological dimension. In 
other words, ideology, understood in its “weak” meaning, is sometimes important to explain 
Brazilians’ voting behavior.  
Party identification is also a strong predictor of voting for leftist parties in Brazil; it 
reaches statistical significance in every election.  Brazilians identified with a leftist political party 
tend to vote for a left-of-center party in presidential elections. On the contrary, those identified 
with a party that belongs to the ideological center or the ideological right do not necessarily vote 
within the same bloc. This finding goes along with Carreirão and Kinzo (2004), who had pointed 
                                                 
67 The correlations between partisanship and ideology are very low in Brazil. See Appendix C. 
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out that partisanship is a relevant predictor when the outcome to explain is the vote for an 
ideological bloc instead of a particular political party. I go further by adding to their statement 
that in Brazil, party identification is a significant vote predictor mainly to explain voting for the 
Left.  
To sum up, party identification is not significant for every ideological bloc. As stated in 
Hypothesis 7, partisanship is more important to predict the vote for leftist parties than for right-
of-center or center parties. The data which is used to analyze the 2002 presidential election was 
collected after round one of the election; as a result, and given the weakness of Brazilian parties, 
endogeneity might be a problem. For example, PT partisanship could be the result of voting Lula 
instead of voting Lula the result of PT partisanship. Ames (2007) overcomes this endogeneity 
problem for the 2002 election using panel data. By using partisanship values in wave 1 and 
voting behavior in wave 3, he finds that PT partisanship become weaker as a voting determinant 
while PSDB and PMDB partisanship loses its significance. 68   
One important exception is the 1994 election, when partisanship was significant for every 
ideological bloc, including for those that lacked any party attachment. In 1994, Brazilians 
identifying with a left-of-center party tended to vote within the leftist bloc; while those identified 
with a centrist party, right-of-center party, and those with no partisanship, had a significantly 
higher probability of voting for a center or rightist party. This finding is surprising because many 
scholars have pointed out that in the 1994 presidential election, “party identification did not 
translate into support for the candidates of major parties (Meneguello 1995: 637), or the election 
was mainly determined by economic evaluations of the Plano Real (Carreirão 2002). Contrary to 
these authors, Singer (2002) has also found that in addition to economic voting, the 1994 
decisions were influenced by ideology and party identifications.  The regressions results 
presented in Table 5-10 confirm Singer’s findings: in the 1994 presidential election, economic 
evaluations were powerful voting determinants but partisanship was relevant too.   
Economic voting theory also helps us to understand why Brazilians vote for leftist 
parties. Since the return to democracy, leftist parties seemed to have capitalized on Brazilians’ 
economic discontent. In order to test the influence of economic assessments on vote decisions, I 
use two questions that asked Brazilians to evaluate how good or bad the Plano Real had been for 
themselves (pocketbook vote) and for the country as a whole (sociotropic vote). At the time of 
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the 1994 presidential election, the booming results of Plano Real had just started to become 
noticeable. Brazilians who negatively evaluated the new monetary policy, tended to vote more 
for left-of-center parties than for center or rightist ones. The same happened in the 1998 election. 
Citizens who were discontented with the results that Plano Real had on their own lives, or in the 
country’s well-being, voted for left-of-center parties, while those that made a positive evaluation 
reelected the government. The positive signs on the sociotropic and pocketbook coefficients in 
Table 5-10 indicate that the worse the economic evaluation, the higher the probability to vote for 
the Left.  
Camargos (2002) describes the Brazilian electorate as more sociotropic than pocketbook 
oriented, and more prospective than retrospective. Table 5-10 indicates that prospective 
economic assessments have an important influence on voting for leftist parties. In the 1998 
presidential election, Brazilians that thought inflation and unemployment were going to increase, 
and purchasing power was going to shrink, tended to vote for the Left.  
In conclusion, voters’ economic assessments, the ones related to the country’s welfare as 
well as the ones related to their own pockets, are significant determinants of the vote for leftist 
parties in Brazil. As Baker (2002) states, when voting, Brazilians take into account the economic 
dimension. The Brazilian case presents more evidence to support Hypothesis 1: the worse a voter 
evaluates the economic situation, the greater the probability s/he will vote for the opposition. In 
particular, voters who are discontented will reward leftist parties which were not in charge of 
the government. 
                                                                                                                                                             
68 I thank Barry Ames for pointing out this problem. 
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Table 5-10 Vote determinants for Leftist parties: Brazil 1989-2002 
Independent Variables: 1989 1994 1998 2002
Economic Voting
Sociotropic Vote - 0.526*** 0.207*** -
(0.048) (.067)
Pocket-book Vote - 0.415*** 0.506*** -
(0.041) (.061)
Prospective Inflation - - -0.240*** -
(.074)
Prospective Unemployment - - -0.203*** -
(.056)
Prospective purshasing power - - 0.175*** -
(.062)
Social Class Cleavage (1)
Dominant Classes -0.835* -0.759*** - 0.230
(.434) (.243) (.447)
Petty Bourgeoisie 0,214 -0,142 - -1.622***
(.178) (0.093) (.612)
Formal Workers 0,103 -0.001 - -0.027
(.139) (.062) (.149)
Informal Workers 0.429** 0.021 - 0.271*
(.207) (.068) (0.161)
Education 0.104*** -0.122*** -0.043 -0.006
(.039) (0.041) (.028) (.015)
Family income - -0.092*** -0.001 -0.000
(0.024) (.000) (.000)
Ideology 
Ideological selfplacement -0.134*** - - -0.027
(.036) (.018)
Opinion state interventionism 0,036 - - 0.001
(.082) (.011)
Opinion redistribution 0,035 - - -
(.081)
Opinion socialism 0,088 - - -
(.063)
Opinion state regulations - - - -0.006
(.016)
Opinion agrarian reform - - - -0.174
(.126)









Independent Variables: 1989 1994 1998 2002
Age 0.159** -0.008*** 0.003 -0.016***
(.065) (.002) (.003) (.004)
Urban Voter -0.507*** -0,054 - -0.024
(.169) (.052) (.139)
Partisanship (2)
Left 2.658*** 1.135*** 1.664*** 1.115**
(.281) (.093) (.168) (.532)
Center 0,303 -0.485*** 0.151 -1.524
(.283) (.105) (.166) (1.745)
Right -0.102 -0.892*** -0,077 -0.844*
(.304) (.153) (.160) (.504)
No partisanship 0.446* -0.261*** 0.133 -0.449
(.234) (.089) (.136) (.491)
Prospective theory
Risk propensity FHC/Serra - - 0.201*** 0.090***
(.019) (.009)
Risk propensity Lula - - -0.187*** -0.092***
(.022) (.012)
Risk propensity Ciro 0.042***
(.012)
Constant -1.422** -1.064*** -1.695** 0,833
(.569) (.174) (.387) (.764)
R squared 0,21 0,14 0,35 0,39
Wald chi2 189*** 1123*** 520*** 242***
Number of observations 1771 8617 3644 1878
(1) Includes: retired, students, housewives, and unemployed.
(2) Inludes those with partisanship to political parties that cannot be clasified
 into the left-right ideological dimension. 
*p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01




Prospect Theory was tested for the 1998 and 2002 presidential elections using voters’ 
judgments about candidates’ governing capabilities. The results shown in Table 5-10 indicate 
that Brazilians that considered Lula a low risk candidate tended to vote for leftist parties; while 
those that believed FHC ranks lower in the risk propensity index, tended to reelect him or vote 
for another non-leftist party. By 2002 the “golden age” of Plano Real was over, and Brazilians 
had gone through major unemployment problems.  The same results are found for the 2002 
  111
election: Brazilians who considered Lula the most capable candidate, or to put it differently, the 
less risky one, significantly tended to vote for the Left. On the contrary, those that believed José 
Serra (PSDB-PMDB), or Ciro Gomes (PPS-PDT-PTB) were the most capable, tended to vote for 
a non-leftist party. As it was pointed out before for the Uruguayan case, I consider this way of 
testing Prospect Theory problematic. People can decide to vote left and later they think Lula is a 
low risk candidate. However, it is the best proxy available to test the theory for the Brazilian 
case, and it is frequently used by other scholars (for example Cinta 1999).  
The evidence from the Brazilian case reinforces the prevalent idea that social class 
cleavages are not relevant to predict voting behavior in Latin America. Neither occupation, nor 
education69 nor family income, are stable significant predictors of voting for left-of-center 
parties. Education was significant only in 1989 and 1994 but in different directions. In 1989, 
voters with high education had higher probabilities to vote Left, while in 1994 those with low 
levels of formal education and low income tended to vote more for leftist parties. Income was 
only significant in 1994. Workers, formal or informal, are not significantly more inclined to vote 
for the Left than those who belong to the “dominant” classes with few exceptions. In 1989 and 
1994, those that belong to the dominant classes tended to vote for the Right. The same happened 
with the petty bourgeoisie in 2002. On the contrary, informal workers were more inclined to vote 
for the Left in 1989 and 2002.  In other words, Brazilian evidence, in general, disproves 
hypotheses 3 and 4, the position that a person occupies in the social structure does not determine 
his/her vote.70  
Leftist parties are usually more appealing for young people, and traditionally have more 
electoral strength within urban electorates. The Uruguayan case supports this traditional view of 
left-of-center parties’ cleavages. However, in Brazil, and despite PT and other leftist parties’ 
electoral support in major cities, only in 1989 the level of urbanization of the place of residence 
was relevant to explain the vote for the Left. Neither the age of the respondent is a consistent 
                                                 
69 Barry Ames pointed out that in the 2002 election education mattered in a different way: neighborhood education 
dominates individual-level education. To put it differently, poored neighborhoods votes Lula, and middle class 
people in poor neighborhoods also voted Lula. This effect cannot be seen with the 2002 data shown in Table 5-10  
because it does not discriminate between neighborhoods.   
70 By imputing missing data, some variables reach significance. In 1989, dominant classes, informal workers and 
age become significant. In 1994, nothing changes; maybe because the sample size is large enough even with missing 
data. In 1998, opinion toward privatization reaches significance and education loses it. Finally, in 2002, informal 
workers, age and party identification (with leftist parties and rightist parties) reach significance, while ideology loses 
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explanatory factor in Brazil. In 1989, the vote for the Left was associated with older people; 
while in 1994 and 2004, younger voters were more inclined to it.   
 
5.3.3 Discussion 
The analyses of the factors that influence Brazilians to vote for left-of-center political 
parties have several commonalities with the Uruguayan case. First, the traditional social-class 
theory (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) does not explain the vote for the Left in post-authoritarian 
Brazil. The vote for the Left in Brazil is a multi-class vote rather than a working class one.  
Second, in a similar way to Uruguayan leftist parties, leftist parties in Brazil, and mainly 
the PT, have formed a coalition that is ideologically center-left, but is catchall in terms of class. 
This result goes against the common understanding that ideology and social class are matched: 
workers are on the left, and the dominant sectors are on the right. In Brazil, as in Uruguay, this 
correspondence between social class and ideology does not hold. It is clear that the meaning of 
left and right categories has changed, but despite this transformation, these categories are still 
significant to predict voting behavior even in countries with weakly-institutionalized party 
systems like Brazil. In other words, the Brazilian case provides evidence in favor of Torcal and 
Mainwaring’s (2001) idea that ideology works as a political cleavage used by political parties to 
mobilize support. 
Third, economic voting theory also explains the increase in the vote for the Left in Brazil. 
Brazilians’ dissatisfaction with the economic situation has benefited leftist parties because they 
were recognized as credible opposition. Immediately after the return to democracy, the Left in 
Brazil embraced political parties ranging from social democratic center-left PSDB to the socialist 
PT. All of these leftist parties were accepted by the electorate as credible or untainted opposition 
because, till then, they had not been in charge of the national government. By 1994, the PSDB 
was no longer considered a left-of-center party: Fernando Henrique Cardoso had served as 
Finance Minister on the Itamar Franco’s government, the PSDB made an electoral alliance with 
the PFL, and had gradually “replaced a traditional social democratic line with a more market-
                                                                                                                                                             
it. These changes do no follow a particular pattern of missing data as it was the case with income in the Uruguayan 
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oriented approach” (Power 2001/2002 :625). As a result of their movement to the right, the 
PSDB no longer capitalized on social discontent; on the contrary, it captured votes from 
Brazilians who approved of the results of Plano Real, while those Brazilians that were 
dissatisfied with the economic situation tended to vote for leftist political parties, in particular for 
the PT.71  
Fourth, prospect theory is also important to explain why Brazilians vote for the Left. 
Table 5-11 indicates that among those that intended to vote for leftist parties in 2002 there is a 
higher level of risk propensity than among those that were going to vote for non-leftist parties. 
Voting for the Left implied a higher level of risk because leftist parties had never been in charge 
of the national government.  
 
 
Table 5-11 Risk and Vote Choice in 2002 Brazil (%) 
Risk Propensity Leftist parties Non-Leftist parties All












High Risk Acceptant 38.17 32.40 34.74
N 1538 2259 3797
 
Note: Data is from the first wave of the 2002 panel survey carried out in Caxias do Sul and Juiz do Fora by Ames, 
Baker and Renno. The first wave of the panel was collected during March and April 2002.  
 
 
Voting for a leftist party not only implied higher levels of risk acceptance, it also depends 
on how strongly voters believe they are in the domain of losses. To put it simply, the probability 
unhappy of a Brazilian voting for a leftist party in 2002 increased when the voter had a high level 
of risk acceptance and strongly felt that he/she was in the domain of losses, which is translated 
into a negative evaluation of the country’s economic situation. Table 5-12 shows that a risk 
                                                                                                                                                             
datasets. 
71 For the 1994 election, when regressions are runned using the vote for PSDB versus the vote for PT as dependent 
variable, it is the PT that capitalized the vote of those disappointed with their own economic situation or Brazil´s 
economic situation. Also parties identified with the right get votes from those economically unhappy, this shows that 
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taking citizen with a negative evaluation of the country’s economy has a probability of voting 
Left of .54, while a risk averse voter with the same negative evaluation reduces the probability of 
choosing the less known opposition to .37. This evidence reinforces what Morgenstern and 
Zechmeister (2001) pointed out for Mexicans, and I previously showed for the Uruguayan case, 
that risk averse citizens prefer to stick  with the “devil they know” than “gamble” their vote with 





Table 5-12 Predicted Probabilities of Voting for Leftist Parties in 2002 Brazilian election  
depending on Risk Propensity and Sociotropic Economic Assessments  
 
Risk Propensity Retrospective Sociotropic Evaluations 
 Positive Neutral Negative
High Risk Averse 36.9 41.4 46.0
Risk Averse 
Risk Acceptant  











Note: Data is from the first wave of the 2002 panel survey carried out in Caxias do Sul and Juiz do Fora by Ames, 
Baker and Renno. The first wave of the panel was collected during March and April 2002.  
Cells entries are predicted probabilities of hypothetical individuals voting for left-of-center parties from a logit with 
the same variables than the model presented in Table 5-8.  
 
 
To make a long story short, the analysis of Brazilians’ voting behavior has shown that the 
vote for leftist parties has nothing to do with voting against neoliberal reforms in themselves.  
None of the policy issues were significant predictors of the vote for leftist parties, not even the 
opinion towards privatizations, one of the most controversial and unpopular market-oriented 
reforms. By voting Left, Brazilians are punishing political parties that produced economic 
hardship regardless of any policy stance. They did not vote for Lula looking for a reversal of 
privatizations or more state intervention in the economy, they voted for leftist parties because 
they were the only “untainted” opposition.   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
the possibility to capitalize economic discontent depends on how many alternatives are available in the political 
system. See Appendix C, Tables C-2 and C-3. 
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5.4 MEXICO: BETWEEN TWO CREDIBLE OPPOSITIONS 
During the last two decades, Mexican politics pivoted around a democratization process different 
from the one experienced by Brazil and Uruguay. While Brazil and Uruguay in the mid-1980s 
left behind authoritarian regimes led by the military, the Mexican political system started to 
move towards democratization by increasing party competition and undermining the dominance 
held by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the long-ruling party since 1929. As a result 
of this, many scholars have pointed out that the most relevant political dimension to understand 
Mexicans political behavior is the pro-regime/anti-regime cleavage rather than the left-right 
ideological dimension (Domínguez and McCann 1995, Domínguez and McCann 1996, Greene 
2002, Klesner 2004, Klesner 2005, Magaloni and Poiré 2004a, Moreno 1998, Moreno 1999). 
The pro-regime/anti-regime cleavage was summarized by Domínguez and McCann 
(1995) with the following question: “Am I for or against the party of the state and its leader?” 
These authors argue that Mexicans voting decisions can be analyzed through a two-step model. 
First, Mexicans decide if they are against or in favor of the PRI. Second, and only those who are 
against the PRI, they decide between the opposition parties depending on their policy preferences 
and social cleavage attachments.   
From 1929 to 2000, the “party of the state” was the PRI, whose traditional electoral base 
is stronger within rural areas, among older Mexicans with low levels of formal education, 
peasants, public employees, and owners of large businesses (Ames 1970, Lawson 1999, Klesner 
2004). The opposition, or those that were “against the party of the state” until 2000, was 
represented by the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) and the National Action Party (PAN). 
The PRD was founded in 1989 by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, a former PRI member who splintered 
from the party before the 1988 presidential election and ran for president in that election with a 
coalition of political parties named National Democratic Front (FDN).  After the 1988 election, 
Cardenistas merged with the Mexican Socialist Party to create the PRD, a left-of-center political 
party with strong electoral support in southern states, among Mexicans with low income but a 
high literacy rate, skeptical of economic reforms but interested in politics (Bruhn 1999, 
Domínguez 1999, Klesner 2004, Lawson 1999).The PAN is older than PRD, it was founded in 
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1939 and combines a socially conservative strain linked to the Catholic Church with a younger 
fiscally conservative tendency (neopanistas) associated with northwestern business interest in 
favor of free markets (Klesner 2004, Klesner 2005, Lawson 1999, Shirk 2005). PAN’s electoral 
base is urban, catholic,72 educated and mostly belongs to middle classes.  
Ideologically, PAN and PRI can be considered parties on the right half of the ideological 
dimension, while PRD is a left-of-center party. But there is some discussion regarding the 
meaning of the ideological dimension in Mexican politics. First, during most of the 1980s and 
1990s, the ideological dimension was considered a “second level” dimension, subsumed to the 
regime cleavage. Second, some scholars argue that during the 1990s, the left-right dimension 
was defined in non-economic terms. Being leftist in Mexico only meant to be in favor of 
opposition and change, while being on the right corresponded to supporting the status quo. 
Again, the prevalent dimension was democracy versus authoritarianism rather than an economic 
policy one (Moreno 1998, Moreno 1999). But Moreno (1999) also recognizes that Mexicans who 
placed themselves on the left were stronger supporters of economic equality and state 
intervention in the economy, while those that placed themselves on the right were in favor of 
economic liberalism. Finally, and as a result of the previous arguments, Mexican politics have 
been structured by two dimensions. Following the ideological dimension based on economic 
policy, the PRD is placed on the left and PRI and PAN on the right; while the political-regime 
dimension positions PRD and PAN together (Magaloni and Poiré 2004b).   
Regardless of these caveats, PAN and PRI are parties on the right side of the ideological 
dimension, and there is no doubt that PRD can be taken as a leftist party (Moreno 1999, 
Zechmeister 2006).  What’s more, it was expected that as soon as the PRI’s dominance ended, 
the regime dimension would disappear and the ideological dimension would regain its 
importance on Mexican politics (Greene 2002). PRI’s dominance was gradually becoming 
weaker. Until 1982, the party of the state always filled no fewer than 80% of the seats in the 
Chamber of Deputies; opposition parties had to wait till 1997 to win a majority in this Chamber. 
Until 1989, no opposition party won a gubernatorial election, but in 1997 Cárdenas was chosen 
as the first elected mayor in Mexico City.  Finally, PRI’s dominance ended in 2000 when it lost 
the presidency to PAN. 
                                                 
72 Against this image of PAN as the party that receives more votes from religious people, Moreno (2003) provides 
evidence that the most religious segment of the Mexican population votes for PRD.  
  117
It is proper to ask why the right-wing PAN and not the left-wing PRD beat the PRI in 
2000. Considering that the economic crisis and the failure of the free market economic model to 
provide for stable economic growth had eroded the PRI’s long term support, these same factors 
could have buttressed the electoral chances of parties in pro of economic equality and state 
intervention in the economy. In that sense, Mexico represents a different case from Brazil and 
Uruguay because the party that finally defeated the long-ruling party was a party on the right-of-
center ideological dimension, rather than on the left. Figure 5.4 shows the percentage of vote 
obtained by each ideological bloc in the presidential elections from 1982 to 2006.73 In each of 
these presidential elections, rightist parties at least doubled the percentage that leftist parties 
gained. Only in the past 2006 election were leftist parties close to winning the presidency with a 
plurality of vote, but they finally lost to the right-wing PAN.74  
Contrary to the Brazilian and Uruguayan cases where only leftist parties finally 
represented a “credible” or “untainted” opposition, in Mexico, voters had two alternatives to vote 
for the “untainted opposition.” Despite the PAN and PRD having governmental experience at the 
state and city level, none of them had been in charge of the national government before 2000, 
and as a result, Mexicans couldn’t blame them for material scarcity. Why then, if both parties 










                                                 
73 The center does not show up in this graph because there are no parties classified as centrist that received votes 
during those elections.   
74 The 2006 presidential election was extremely competitive: PAN obtained 14,027,214 votes and PRD 13,624,506 
votes. As a result, during the following days, PRD’s presidential candidate Manuel López Obrador, argued that the 
election was fraudulent, and mobilized Mexicans to protest against the result. The danger of post-election 
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Figure 5.3 Electoral Evolution of Ideological Blocs in Mexican Presidential Elections (1982-2006) 
 
Some reasons can be mentioned. First, several students of Mexican politics have 
emphasized the relevance that Prospect Theory has to explain why voters elected the PRI for so 
many years. Their argument is that Mexicans believe that voting for the inexperienced opposition 
was a highly risky enterprise, and as a result, they keep voting for the “known devil.” Between 
PAN and PRD, the former was considered more competent to manage the economy, fight crime, 
and reduce corruption. In conclusion, it was less risky to vote for PAN than for PRD (Cinta 
1999, Domínguez 1999, Klesner 2004, Magaloni 1999, Magaloni and Poiré 2004a). Other 
scholars pointed out that campaign effects were extremely important in defining the 2000 
Mexican presidential election. Fox’s personal characteristics (PAN’s presidential candidate in 
2000) as well as the high levels of campaign exposure increased PAN’s electoral chances (Bruhn 
2004, Domínguez 2004, Lawson 2004, Lawson and McCann 2004, Moreno 2004). To put it 
simply, PAN was preferred to PRD in 2000 because it was considered the party with higher 
probabilities to defeat PRI and more capable to be in charge of the national government.   
With PRI’s defeat, the regime cleavage was superseded as expected (Bruhn 1999, Greene 
2002).  As a result, and as long as elections leave aside their transitional character, it is highly 
probable that other voting clues will become relevant to understand Mexican voting behavior. 
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For example, it is probable that with democratization, the left-right dimension will recover its 
policy distinction, or that voters will pay more attention to retrospective and prospective 
economic assessments than before (Poiré 1999).   
This section explores why Mexicans vote for leftist parties, whether those voting 
determinants have changed over time or not, and if voting for the Left is related to anti-market 
economic policies. I argue that voting Left in Mexico was always a way to vote for the 
“untainted” opposition that Mexicans cannot blame for the severe backlog of unaccomplished 
social demands. Contrary to Magaloni (1999) who argues that the “uncertain opposition,” those 
that were outside the government and inexperienced, had fewer probabilities of being elected; I 
argue that those parties that were always in the opposition have the opportunity to capitalize on 
social discontent. In Mexico, PAN and PRD had this chance before 2000, but after 2000, only 
the PRD has remained in that position.   
 
5.4.1 Data and variable description 
Three different national surveys are used to test the hypotheses for the Mexican case. First, 
for the 1988 presidential election, I will use a Gallup/ECO pre-electoral survey. The survey was 
conducted from May 12 to June 1 1988; it is representative of all the adult Mexican population 
and includes 2,960 face to face cases.75 Second, to analyze the 1994 election, I use Warren 
Mitofsky’s national exit poll which includes 5,635 cases.76 Third, the vote for leftist parties in 
the 2000 presidential election is analyzed through the Post-Electoral Cross-Section survey 
carried out as part of the Mexico 2000 Panel Study.77 This survey includes 1,199 cases collected 
from July 6 to July 9 at respondents’ homes.78  As for Brazil and Uruguay, the proportions 
intending to vote left according to the Mexican data correspond very closely with proportions 
                                                 
75 This survey was obtained through the Roper Center. I am really grateful to Jorge Domínguez and James McCann 
who helped me to reconstruct the codes for several variables on the dataset. 
76 Many thanks to Alejandro Poiré for giving me access to this data.  
77 Participants in the 2000 Mexico Panel Study included (in alphabetical order): Miguel Basañez, Roderic Camp, 
Wayne Cornelius, Jorge Domínguez, Federico Estévez, Joseph Klesner, Chappell Lawson (Principal Investigator), 
Beatriz Magaloni, James McCann, Alejandro Moreno, Pablo Parás, and Alejandro Poiré. Funding for the study was 
provided by the National Science Foundation (SES-9905703) and Reforma newspaper. 
78 Missing values were imputed using ICE imputation method from STATA. 
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actually voting left when the elections were held, ensuring the validity of the analysis. In 1888, 
the survey predicted 23% of votes for the Left and the actual percentage was 31%. For the 1994 
exit poll and the 2000 post-electoral survey, it is only possible to separate the vote for PRD (not 
for others leftist parties), and the comparisons between the survey and election proportions are 
the following: 15% to 20% and 15% to 19% respectively.  
                                                                                                                                                            
Each of these surveys has been used by other scholars: the 1988 survey by Domínguez and 
McCann’s key study of 1995; the 1994 Mitofsky survey by Poiré 1999; the Mexico 2000 Panel 
Study has been the data source for Mexico’s Pivotal Democratic Election, the most 
comprehensive book analyzing the 2000 election edited by Domínguez and Lawson (2004). 
However, none of these studies ask the same question that is raised here: why Mexicans vote for 
leftist parties. 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that measures the vote or vote intention (in 
1988) for a left-of-center party, the value 1 means that the person voted (or intended to vote) for 
the Left, and 0 captures all other answers. The following political parties were classified as left-
of-center in each presidential election: in 1988 FDN, PMS, and PRT; in 1994 and 2000 only 
PRD because it was not possible to separate the vote for other leftist parties that have been put 
together under the “other” category.  The explanatory variables are described next.  
Sociotropic vote and Pocketbook vote in the 1988 survey explore respondents’ current 
economic assessments of the country and their own situation. Higher values correspond to 
negative evaluations. The 1988 regression model also has a measure of Prospective inflation and 
Prospective unemployment; higher values mean that inflation and unemployment are expected to 
decrease in the following sexenio (six year term). Prospective Sociotropic in 1988 measures 
citizens’ expectations for the economy at the end of the next government’s term in power (next 
sexenio). Higher values correspond to negative expectations. The operationalization of 
Retrospective Pocketbook and Prospective Pocketbook depends on the survey. In the 1988 
survey, both variables measure citizens’ evaluations of their own economic situation during the 
last year (Retrospective Pocketbook) and the economic expectations for the following twelve 
months (Prospective Pocketbook). The 1994 and 2000 surveys only ask Retrospective 




six years (before Salinas’s government), while in the 2000 survey it is against the previous 
twelve months.  In all cases, higher values equal negative evaluations.  
Social class cleavage is tested using dummy variables; each dummy represents one 
category of social class defined in terms of occupation following Portes and Hoffman’s 
classification (2003). Because the Mexican surveys did not ask respondents’ occupation with the 
level of specificity that the Brazilian and Uruguayans surveys did, it is not possible to distinguish 
between formal and informal workers. As a result, only one dummy named “Workers” is entered 
into the model. The other two dummies in the model are “dominant class” and “petty 
bourgeoisie”.  Each category is entered into the model as a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 when the person belongs to it and 0 when he/she does not. Owing to the same problem of 
lack of specificity, it was also impossible to construct a dummy named “dominant” for the 1994 
election. To capture the other dimensions of the socioeconomic status, I include Education, 
Family Income (1994), Household socioeconomic status (1988 and 2000) defined by the 
interviewer’s judgment of the house, and Household SES defined by a houseware index which 
consisted of the ownership of radio, water heater, television, telephone, cellular phone, and oven 
(2000).  Higher values means higher levels of education, higher family income, and higher 
socioeconomic status.   
As in the Brazilian case, Ideology is measured in two ways. The first one is the 
respondent’s self-placement in the ideological dimension. This indicator is only available in the 
2000 survey and it ranges from 0 (left) to 10 (right).  The second way to measure an 
interviewee’s ideology is by a series of policy issues. This option is used to analyze the 1988 
presidential election. The 1988 survey asked about foreign investment, imports of foreign 
products, payment of foreign debt, and privatizations. Higher values in each of these policies 
correspond to leftist positions.   
Partisanship is tested using dummy variables; each dummy represents one category of 
partisanship: party identification with left-of-center parties, party identification with right-of-
center parties, and those that lack partisanship. Each category is entered into the model as a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the person belongs to it and 0 when he/she does 
not. The 1994 survey does not have a question about party identification, and the 1988 survey 
only asks for the “preferred political party” which is slightly different from party identification 
but is taken as a proxy in the model.   
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Prospect theory is going to be tested in different ways depending on the presidential 
election. For 1988, respondents were asked two questions. First, if Mexican economic conditions 
would improve, remain the same, or worsen if the opposition were to gain power. Second, if the 
country’s social peace would be undermined if the opposition were to win the election.  In both 
variables, higher values mean that citizens distrust the capabilities of opposition parties to lead 
the country along a good path.   The 1994 survey captures Mexicans’ risk propensity by asking 
the voter what was the main reason for his vote, and giving him as an option the popular saying 
“más vale malo conocido que bueno por conocer” (translated as “better the devil you know than 
the saint you don’t”). The question asking the reason for their vote was phrased in the following 
way: “The presidents that have governed Mexico for the past sixty-five years have come from 
the PRI. Which of the following reasons motivated you to vote for the party you chose today? 
The PRI is still the best choice, in politics it’s “better bad but known than good but unknown,” 
voted opposition to protest, want the opposition to win.”  A dummy variable named Risk 
propensity was coded with 1 when the voter answered this option, and 0 for the remaining 
answer categories. It is important to mention that in this survey, the answer to the voting question 
was secret (the respondent marked a separate sheet and deposit it in a box), which diminishes the 
risk of contamination. 
 In 2000, Risk propensity was again measured by respondents’ preference for one of two 
traditional aphorisms: “Better the devil you know than the saint you don’t” and “Nothing 
ventured, nothing gained.”79 This preference was entered into the model as a dummy that takes 
the value of 1 when respondents mentioned “Better the known devil” and 0 when they chose 
“Nothing ventured, nothing gained.” In addition, to explain the 2000 presidential election, a set 
of three indexes tackling Labastida, Fox and Cárdenas’s capacities to govern were added. Each 
index combines respondents’ opinions on the capacity of each candidate to manage the economy, 
fight crime and public insecurity, and improve the educational system. Higher values in the index 
mean worse evaluations of the candidates’ abilities to govern. As it was pointed before, this way 
to test Prospect theory through voters’ opinions towards candidates’ capacities is less valid than 
the one that measure voters’ preferences for traditional aphorisms.  
                                                 
79 In Spanish the exact wording is: “Más vale malo conocido que bueno por conocer” y “El que no arriesga no 
gana.” 
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Finally, and to keep comparability with the Brazilian and Uruguayan cases, Age (the 
higher the value, the older the respondent), and urban voter (for the 2000 election a dummy in 
which 1 is urban and 0 is rural, and for the 1988 a variable that ranges from 1 for the most rural 
areas to 5 for the most urban ones)80 are added to test for the existence of alternative cleavages. 
In the 1994 exit poll survey, the urban voter variable does not exist.  
 
5.4.2 Results 
Mexicanists have endlessly pointed out that the most important factor to understand 
Mexican voting behavior during the last two decades is the regime cleavage, or in other words, 
voters’ position in the pro-PRI/anti-PRI dimension. As a result of this, the relevance of the 
ideological dimension in Mexicans’ voting decisions was undermined. If it really is true that the 
ideological dimension is not relevant, the factors that lead Mexicans to vote for leftist parties 
must be different from the ones that influence Brazilians and Uruguayans to vote for the Left. 
The results presented in Table 5-13 are remarkable in showing that Mexicans’ vote for the Left 
differs from other Latin Americans’.  The following paragraphs discuss these differences and a 
few similarities. I will start with one of these similarities. 
Social class theory showed no explanatory power to understand the vote for left-of-center 
parties in Brazil and Uruguay. The same happens in Mexico. The position that a person occupies 
in the social structure does not determine his/her vote. Only those who belong to the petty 
bourgeoisie are significantly less likely to vote for the Left.81 Even more, workers are not more 
likely to vote for leftist parties than for rightist ones. On the contrary, in 2000, workers tended to 
vote more for rightist than for leftists. This evidence refutes Hypothesis 3.  The generalized idea 
that in Mexico, workers, and in particular, public servants, tended to vote for the PRI (Klesner 
                                                 
80 The exact values are: 1 (1000-5000), 2 (5001-20000), 3(20001-100000), 4 (100001-1000000), and 5 (more than 
1000000). 
81 I also try interactions between urban and social class in order to test for the argument that social class has a 
different impact depending on voters’ place of the residence. Only the interaction between petty bourgeoisie and 
urban residence reaches significance for the 1988 election. Despite belonging to the petty bourgeoisie diminishes the 
chances of voting left, these chances are even lower when the bourgeoisie live in rural areas than when they live in 
urban ones.  In other words, urbanization has a positive, but indirect effect, on leftist parties’ fortune. Results are 
shown in Appendix C, Table C-5 and C-6. 
  124
2004, Lawson 1999) neither finds support in the 1994 election: public servants have a significant 
and positive influence on voting left, while being a private employee increases the chances to 
vote for a non-leftist party.82 The other way to test for the existence of social class cleavages is 
through education and indicators of the material well-being of voters. Regression results indicate 
that Mexicans who vote for leftist parties have high levels of formal education but low income. 
As Klesner (2004) pointed out, they can be described as the “politically engaged poor.”   
Contrary to what happens in Uruguay, the vote for the Left in Mexico is neither 
associated with younger voters, nor with citizens living in urban areas.  Age and Urban Voter do 
not reach significance in any of the three presidential elections analyzed. In Mexico, the 
traditional support that left-of-center parties usually receive from workers goes to the PRI. In 
conclusion, sociodemographic cleavages were not important explanations for voting one 
ideological bloc. Other scholars have found that within those characteristics only region83 is a 
relevant and consistent voting predictor in Mexico; citizens who live in southern states and 
Mexico City have a higher probability of voting for PRD (Magaloni 1999, Poiré 1999, Klesner 
2004).   
In order for political cleavages to become active, politicians need to emphasize them. 
Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) point out that political cleavages are created by political elites as 
a way to get votes.  The ideological cleavage only becomes relevant if political leaders and 
political parties structure political conflict in ideological terms. As mentioned before, Mexican 
politics revolved around a regime cleavage at least until 2000. During that time, the ideological 
dimension remained inactive, or at least, as a minor-league dimension (Domínguez and McCann 
1995, Domínguez and McCann 1996, Greene 2002, Klesner 2004, Klesner 2005, Magaloni and 
Poiré 2004a, Moreno 1998, Moreno 1999). Regression results demonstrate that - Mexicans’ 
ideological self-placement does not determine their vote. In 2000, individuals who placed 
                                                 
82 To keep the comparability among the models in the three country cases, I did not include public servants and 
private employees as independent variables in Table 5-13. However, the model that includes these two dummies is 
shown in Appendix C, Table C-4.  The impact of being a public servant or private employee on voting left is only 
tested for the 1994 election because the 1988 and 2000 surveys do not ask if the respondent work for the 
government or in the private sector. 
83 Region was not included in the model shown in Table 5-13 to keep comparability with the Brazilian and Mexican 
models.   
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themselves on the left side of the ideological dimension did not significantly differ in their vote 
from those that placed themselves on the right.84  
One possible explanation for this finding is the existence of strategic voting in the 2000 
presidential election. Because the prevalent cleavage was Pro-Pri / Anti-Pri and not an 
ideological one, Mexicans who identified themselves as leftist strategically voted for PAN 
because they thought that PAN had higher probabilities to beat PRI than PRD. The relevance of 
this explanation can be overstated because the survey was conducted after the election and 
citizens could have falsely declared their vote as a result of a bandwagon effect. However, the 
self-reporting error is small.85 
An alternative way to test the ideological cleavage is to analyze if policy positions are 
determinants of voting behavior. In the 1988 presidential election, only one of the four policy 
positions reaches statistical significance; Mexicans who considered that the next government 
should stop the payment of the country’s foreign debt were more likely to vote for the Left. 
Surprisingly, the opinion towards privatization of state companies is not a significant voting 
predictor. Moreover, in the 2000 presidential election, Mexicans’ opinion towards the 
privatization of the electric company is not a significant voting predictor for leftist parties. This 
result indicates that Mexicans that vote Left, at least in 1988 and 2000, did not refuse market-
oriented economic reforms.  
To sum up, the Mexican case refutes hypotheses 5 and 6, ideological considerations were 
not relevant voting determinants among Mexicans, at least until the 2000 presidential election. 
This can be explained because party leaders, who are one of the most reliable voting cue 
providers, have not been interested in priming an ideological debate, focusing instead on the idea 
of alteration and change (Estrada 2005). It is highly probable that after the 2000 pivotal election, 
the ideological cleavage has become more influential and achieved more explanatory power in 
the 2006 presidential election; I have no data to test for that.   
Scholars who study Mexican politics are skeptical about the role that partisanship plays 
in Mexicans’ voting decisions.  Kesner (2004) states that partisanship used to be stronger among 
                                                 
84 This finding holds even by looking at vote determinants by political party (PRD, PAN and PRI). See Table C-7 in 
Appendix C. 
85 As it was mentioned in the 2002 Brazilian election analysis, this is a problem of one-shot surveys taken after the 
election. People could have decided their position on the PRI after deciding for other reasons which candidate they 
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PRI voters than among PAN or PRD voters, but regardless of the party, party identification was 
not especially strong in Mexico, and besides its importance has tended to decrease with time. In 
the same way, Magaloni and Poiré (Magaloni and Poiré 2004b) argue that partisan attachments 
were weak in the 2000 presidential election. On the other hand, Estrada (2005) and Moreno 
(2003) provide evidence that party identification is more stable than ideological self-placements 
and vote choice in Mexico. The coefficients shown in Table 5-13 contribute to the idea that 
partisanship is an inconsistent explanation for the voting preferences of Mexicans. Partisanship 
with a leftist or rightist party was a significant predictor of the vote in 1988; individuals who 
identified with a left-of-center party were more likely to vote for a leftist party, while those 
attached to a party on the right, significantly tended to vote for a rightist party. 86 But in the 2000 
election, having a right-wing partisanship or no party identification reach significance, while 
party identification with leftist parties do not, indicating that many Mexicans with attachments to 
left-wing parties did not vote for PRD or other left-oriented parties and strategically voted for 
PAN.87  The regression results disprove hypothesis 7 which states that partisanship can be more 
important to predict the vote for leftist parties than for rightist ones. The Mexican case indicates 
that in elections where competition is between a long-ruling party and the opposition, party 
attachments leave their central place to strategic voting decisions that favor the party with higher 
probabilities of winning.  
Mexico might be the country case for which the interplay between economic voting 
theory and prospect theory has been most fully studied (Cinta 1999, Magaloni 1999, Magaloni 
and Poiré 2004a, Morgenstern and Zechmeister 2001, Poiré 1999).  Scholars have explained that 
Mexicans kept voting for the PRI despite its poor economic performance because they are risk 
averse, and consequently, they avoid voting for the inexperienced opposition. Table 5-13 
indicates that the economic voting explanation works for some presidential elections but not for 
all. In the 1988 election, Mexicans did not take into account the prospects for the nation’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
preferred. Only panel data designed to test this time-sequence counter-argument, could provide more definite 
answers.  
86 Having a left-wing partisanship does not reach significance using the non imputed data in the 1988 election. It is 
one of the few changes between the imputed and non imputed Mexican datasets. The others changes generated by 
the imputation are the following. In 1988, retrospective pocketvote and no partisanship lose significance. In 1994 
there are no changes in the variables studied. And in 2000, being a formal worker reaches significance, while 
Capacity of Labastida loses it.   
87 Results from a multinomial logit provide evidence that party identification with a leftist party increases the 
probability of voting PRD instead of PRI in 2000 but with a significance level: <.10. See Table C-7 in Appendix C. 
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economy or personal finances when making their voting decisions (Domínguez and McCann 
1995). The 1994 election, however, provides strong evidence supporting hypothesis 1: Mexicans 
who were economically dissatisfied with the economy cast their vote in favor of leftist parties.  
Poiré points out (1999) that in the 1994 Mexican elections, retrospective evaluations were crucial 
factors in determining the vote. Table 5-13 demonstrates the same finding.  Finally, in the 2000 
elections, economic assessments neither favored nor undermined leftist parties’ electoral 
chances. As other scholars have pointed out, PRI’s defeat in 2000 has nothing to do with the 
economy; on the contrary, the economic achievements of Zedillo’s presidency were 
acknowledged by most Mexicans (Lawson 2004, Magaloni and Poiré 2004a).  
Prospect theory plays an important role in understanding why Mexicans kept voting for 
the PRI, and the barriers that leftist parties (as well as other opposition parties) had to overcome 
in order to be seen as a sure alternative. In 1988, voters who considered that voting for the 
opposition did not represent any economic risk for the country, were more likely to vote for the 
Left. The same happened in 1994, risk acceptant Mexicans were more likely to choose leftist 
parties. However, risk propensity does not achieve significance in 2000. One of the reasons 
might be that Mexicans who were risk takers voted for the rightist PAN instead of for the PRD.88 
On the contrary, expectations of the competence that each candidate would have in managing the 
country were highly significant in the 2000 presidential election. Those who considered that 
Labastida or Fox were highly capable of managing the economy, fighting crime, and dealing 
with the educational system, voted for rightist parties; while those that believed Cárdenas was 
the candidate with higher capabilities, voted PRD. To put it simply, voters evaluated who was 
the most capable candidate and voted for him.89  
                                                 
88 But regression results show that in 2000, both PRD and PAN voters were more risk takers than PRI voters. See 
Table C-7 in Appendix C. 
89 Similar to the Uruguayan and Brazilian case, these variables are prone to be endogeneous. 
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 Table 5-13 Vote determinants for Leftist parties: Mexico 1988-2000 
Independent Variables: 1988 1994 2000
Economic Voting
Sociotropic Vote 0.010 - -
(.121)
Sociotropic Retrospective - 0.721*** 0,076
(.056) (.179)
Sociotropic Prospective 0,124 - -
(.117)
Pocketbook Vote 0,162 - -
(.142)
Pocketbook Retrospective -0.139 0.331*** 0,105
(.086) (.061) (.184)
Pocketbook Prospective dropped (2) - -
Prospective Inflation 0,015 - -
(.121)
Prospective Unemployment -0,081 - -
(.121)
Social Class Cleavage 
Dominant Classes -0.266 - -0,231
(.492) (.843)
Petty Bourgeoisie -0.749** 0,167 -1.130*
(.291) (.154) (.738)
Workers 0,093 0,136 -0.815**
(.170) (.083) (.356)
Education 0.165*** 0.145*** 0,079
(.045) (0.038) (.152)
Household SES -0.298** - -0,027
(.120) (.199)
Household SES (houseware index) - -0,162
(.116)
Family Income - -0.186*** -
(.046)
Ideology 
Ideological selfplacement - - -0,018
(.055)
Opinion external investment 0,094 - -
(.089)
Opinion payment of external debt 0.448*** - -
(.172)
Opinion open economy to imports 0,022 - -
(.162)
Opinion privatizations 0.161 - 0,033
(.171) (.075)
Distribution - - -0,012
(.058)




Independent Variables: 1988 1994 2000
Age -0,012 0.032 0,013
(.008) (.035) (.010)
Urban Voter 0.030 - 0,093
(.052) (.199)
Partisanship 
Left 1.545** - 1.165
(.703) (.971)
Right -2.233*** - -3.647***
(.700) (.895)
No partisanship -0.989 - -1.690*
(.756) (.921)
Prospective theory
Economic Risk if opposition wins -0.772***
(.135)
Social Risk if opposition wins -0.117
(.162)
Risk Propensity (1) -0.560*** -0.229
(.137) (.424)
Capacity of Labastida to govern 0.148
(.095)
Capacity of Fox to govern 0.378***
(.093)
Capacity of Cárdenas to govern -0.274**
(.115)
Constant -0.636 -3.933*** -0.243
(1.168) (.189) (2.230)
R squared 0,45 0,10 0,68
Wald chi2 316*** 408 139
Number of observations 1914 5635 950
(1) Risk propensity in 1994 is measured by a dummy variable coded 1 for those who said
 "better the devil you know" and 0 for the rest. In 2000, it is measured by a question that ask
respondents to agree with one of the two following aphorisms: (1)"Better the devil you know,  
that the saint that you don't" or (2)"Nothing ventured, nothing gained."  
(2) Dropped due to collinearity.
*p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01
Note: Entries are binary logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 5-14 indicates that the 2000 Mexican pivotal election is similar to their 
counterparts in Brazil and Uruguay because among those who voted for leftist parties, the 
percentage of risk acceptant voters is higher than among those that voted for non-leftist parties. 
Voting for the Left, as happens in the 2002 Brazilian election and the 2004 Uruguayan election, 
implied a higher level of risk.  
 
 
Table 5-14 Risk and Vote Choice in 2000 Mexico (%)  
 









N 136 779 915




However, the 2000 Mexican election partially reinforces the theory. On one side, the 
probabilities of voting for a leftist party increased when the voter is risk acceptant, but on the 
other side, these probabilities diminish when the voter considers him/herself in the domain of 
gains, which is translated into a positive evaluation of the country’s economic situation.  Table 5-
15 shows that a risk averse citizen with a highly negative evaluation of the country’s economy 
has a probability of voting Left of .023, while a risk taker voter with the same negative 
evaluation increases the probability of choosing the PRD to .027. In addition, a risk acceptant 
Mexican with a highly positive evaluation of the economy has a probability of voting Left of 
.059, while a risk averse voter diminishes this probability to.052. In other words, and contrary to 
what happens in Brazil and Uruguay, the probability to vote Left diminishes with bad economic 
evaluations. This counterfinding can be explained because there is more than one “credible 
opposition,” one on the Left (PRD) but another on the Right (PAN), and the electorate attributed 
fewer capabilities to the former than to the later.  
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 Table 5-15  Predicted Probabilities of Voting for Leftist Parties in 2000 Mexican election  
depending on Risk Propensity and Sociotropic Economic Assessments  (%) 
 
Risk Propensity Retrospective Sociotropic Evaluations  
 Highly 
positive  
Positive Neutral Negative Highly 
negative 
Risk Acceptant 













Source: Post-election survey, Mexico 2000 
Cells entries are predicted probabilities of hypothetical individuals voting for left-of-center parties from a logit with 
the same variables than the model presented in Table 5-13. 
 
Mexico’s regression results indicate that when more than one political party represents a 
“credible” and “untainted” opposition, and despite leftist parties being part of that opposition, 
risk acceptant citizens won’t necessarily choose the Left at the voting booth as hypothesis 2 
states. In that scenario, voting decisions are made taking into consideration not only the 
credibility of the opposition, it is also important to judge the capacity to govern that each 
political party is able to demonstrate. 
To put it briefly, the factors that lead Brazilians and Uruguayans to vote for leftist parties 
do not concur with the ones found in the Mexican case. During the last two decades, Mexicans 
made their voting decisions following different considerations to other Latin Americans. The 
idea that there is a movement to the left in the region, and Latin Americans may be punishing 
governments for the implementation of market-oriented reforms becomes questionable based on 
the evidence provided by the individual level analysis. Next section discusses this argument in 
further detail.  
 
5.4.3 Discussion 
Mexico has undergone a democratization process in which voters decided their vote using 
a “two-step” model (Domínguez and McCann 1995). First, they asked themselves if they were in 
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favor of or against the PRI. Second, and only among those that decided they were against the 
PRI, they took into consideration other voting cues. Could people decide their position on the 
PRI after deciding for other reason which party or candidate thet preferred? Conceptually, it is 
possible. However, the “usual suspects” to explain voting behavior do not work so properly in 
the Mexican case. Sociodemographic cleavages are not significant determinants of the vote for 
leftist parties in Mexico. The Mexican case provides additional evidence that in Latin America, 
the social class cleavage theory does not work. Neither pro-state nor anti-market policy opinions 
are crucial determinants of voting for left-of-center parties. It seems that there is no anti-
neoliberal reforms cleavage in Mexico. On the other hand, party identification, ideological 
identification, economic assessments and considerations about how risky it is to vote for a 
certain political party are all influential factors on voters’ behavior, but still weaker than in other 
countries of the region. All of them have faded in comparison with the regime cleavage during 
the 1988, 1994 and 2000 Mexican presidential elections. It remains to be analyzed how this has 
changed in the first non-regime cleavage election of 2006. 
 As a result, Mexican leftist parties face a double task. First, they have to convince voters 
to stop supporting the long-ruling party. Second, they have to persuade anti-PRI Mexicans to cast 
their vote in favor of the opposition on the left instead of the opposition on the right.  The 
Mexican case shows that when the political system has two credible oppositions, the Left is not 
necessarily the one that is going to receive more support. The ability a party has to capture the 
votes from a discontented electorate depends on two elements: the skill to articulate an 
antigovernment message and the capacity to reduce the uncertainty voters usually have towards 
inexperienced parties. Domínguez (1999) argues that in the 1997 congressional election, “the 
PAN was defeated because it failed to articulate a clear antigovernment message, for truly 
convinced opposition voters, the PRD was the only credible option” (19). In the 2000 
presidential election, the situation was the reverse, convinced opposition voters chose PAN 
because it was the more credible opposition as well as the less uncertain option. Again, it 
remains to be analyzed what happened in the 2006 presidential election when the Left was the 







The most-different system research design made it possible to understand why Latin 
Americans vote for leftist parties in different political and economic contexts. Table 5-16 
summarizes the findings from each of the individual level analysis. When a positive or negative 
significant relationship is indicated between the predicting theories and voting left, this does not 
mean that every independent variable that test that voting theory in every election year reach 
significance and in that direction; the table just summarized the general pattern. The theories that 
better explained the vote for leftist parties in Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay are the economic 
voting, political cleavage, partisanship, and prospect theory. On the contrary, social class 
cleavage does not predict leftist vote. 
The first thing to notice is that Latin Americans are not voting for left-of-center parties 
because they are against neoliberal reforms. The study of each country suggests that espousing 
pro-state anti-market options has nothing to do with left voting, but does not necessary mean that 
parties’ positions on “neoliberal” policies, for or against, have no impact on voters. What it really 
means is that the impact of certain policies stances or anti-neoliberal discourses is not 
determining of Latin Americans’ voting decisions. Electorates in the region are voting Left 
because they are looking for new political alternatives that might provide an improvement in 
people’s economic well-being. The relevance that economic voting theory has to explain leftist 
vote indicates that Latin Americans might be punishing traditional parties that failed to provide 
material security to their electorates, and these parties usually are the ones that implemented 
market-oriented economic reforms, but this castigation is less driven by policy stances than by 

















Economic voting √ √ √ (only in 1994) 
Social class cleavage    
Political cleavage √ √  
Urban-rural cleavage √   
Partisanship 
With leftist parties 









Prospect theory √ √ √ 
 
 
Second, the possibilities of leftist parties capitalizing on Latin Americans’ social 
discontent depend on the number of “credible” or “untainted” oppositions. In countries like 
Brazil and Uruguay where leftist parties embody the only “credible opposition,” it is easy to 
capture votes from those unhappy with the status quo. But in countries where more than one 
“credible opposition” exists like in Mexico, leftist parties have to win over the vote of voters 
who take into account other considerations, mainly the party’s capacity to govern. Prospect 
theory predicting power to explain voting behavior in the region points to the importance that 
reducing uncertainty has for left-leaning parties electoral chances. As far leftist parties succeed in 
reducing the uncertainty that voters might have in voting an experienced party, they will be able 
to capture the votes of dissatisfied Latin Americans.90 But it is important to remember that 
despite it being crucial that they reduce the uncertainty that the electorate feels towards 
inexperienced parties, the same lack of experience is what makes them more ”untainted.” 
Third, although ideology is an important factor in explaining voting behavior, social class 
is not. This result goes against the common understanding that ideology and social class are 
matched: workers are on the left, and the dominant sectors are on the right. The evidence from 
Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay show that this attachment between social class and ideology does 
not hold in Latin America. Left-oriented parties in the region have formed a coalition that is 
ideologically center-left, but is catchall in terms of class.91 Despite that ideology and social class 
                                                 
90 One way that leftist parties in the three country cases presented in this chapter have managed to reduce voters’ 
uncertainty is to gain governmental experience at the local, city, municipal or state level.  Another alternative is to 
become more pragmatic and less radical in their party platforms. 
91 This relationship is less articulated in Mexico. 
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are not significantly related, ideology remains as an important voting predictor. One possible 
explanation for this unexpected combination of ideology and catchall parties may be that 
ideology works as a political cleavage activated by political parties and politicians to mobilize 
support, it is not a structural cleavage determined by social class. 
Finally, the individual level analysis presented in this chapter provides ample of evidence 
that Latin Americans are not random voters. Regardless of the differences in voting behavior 
between Brazilians, Mexicans and Uruguayans, all of them take into account the economic 
performance of the incumbent, party attachments and ideological considerations while voting. 
This represents good news for a region demanding a more accountable democracy. Furthermore, 
the same search for an “untainted opposition,” or the vote cast in favor of change regardless of 
how risky it is, can be seen as a healthy indicator that voters still care about democracy and they 







6.0  CONCLUSION 
This dissertation examines the impact that neoliberal economic reforms implemented in Latin 
America during 1980s and 1990s had on the shift to the Left of many countries in the region. In 
particular, it seeks to answer three concrete research questions: a) what particular features of 
market-oriented economic reforms, and what economic and political conditions, have benefited 
left-leaning parties’ electoral performance? b) What are the determinants of Latin Americans’ 
vote for left-oriented parties? And c) how does the linkage between the micro and macro level of 
analysis work?  
A combination of methodologies was used to answer these questions. First, a cross 
national regression analysis was performed using data from 17 countries covering the period 
from 1985 to 2004. This dataset, in addition to containing the percentage of votes for each 
ideological bloc during that period, includes variables that measure the level of neoliberal 
reforms implemented in each country, a set of economic variables which appraise economic 
well-being, and a series of political variables that account for the political context. Second, an 
individual-level analysis performed in a most-different system design was used to respond to the 
question about the factors that lead Latin American voters to choose a leftist party. The three 
country cases analyzed are Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay. I was able to obtain survey data for 
each election held from 1980 to 2004 in each of these countries, and carry out a multivariate 
analysis testing the influence of different factors on the intention to vote for leftist parties. 
Examining voting choice both from the macro and micro perspectives has the advantage 
of overcoming the flaws present in each approach. The aggregate-level examination offers 
insights into the impact different levels of market-oriented economic reforms, as well as macro-
economic conditions and different political contexts have on the electoral fortunes of leftist 
parties. To put it differently, it has the benefit of assessing the impact of objective conditions on 
political behavior. But it also has an important shortcoming: individuals do not always behave by 
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taking into account objective conditions; on the contrary, they often act depending on their 
perceptions. This is the reason why it is so important to complement the investigation with an 
individual-level analysis.  
The micro-level perspective takes into account the reasoning processes through which 
individuals make decisions at the ballot box, and makes it possible to examine how macro-level 
conditions (reforms, inflation, unemployment, etc.) are perceived and valued by citizens 
(Echegaray 2005). For example, it may be that in a particular Latin American country few 
neoliberal economic reforms have actually been implemented but because of an intense 
campaign against these reforms, the electorate perceives them to have been deep and highly 
harmful. Perceptions about reality do not necessarily coincide with objective reality. But the 
micro analysis also has some problems; one of the most important is the danger of respondents 
giving spurious answers (Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002). By comparing the results of the 
individual level of analysis with the macro level of analysis, the concerns about spuriousness can 
be overcome, or at least, reduced. 
Several conclusions can be derived from this investigation. First, ideological cycles have 
existed in Latin America in the same way that they have existed in the more advanced world. 
Latin America experienced four ideological cycles since 1945. The beginning of each cycle 
correlates with pessimistic popular moods, popular discontent and dissatisfaction with particular 
developmental models implemented in the region. Left and Right have switched their 
predominance since 1945, neither of them being the leading ideology throughout. The Left was 
prevalent from 1969 to 1976, a period in Latin American history that happens to be full of 
dissatisfaction with the economy, unhappiness with the ISI model, rising inequality in income 
distribution, high levels of unemployment, and a growing informal sector. Despite during some 
of those years the region had positive growth rates, the sense of failure and unfulfilled 
expectations were widely spread.  
The Left became predominant when social discontent was widespread, which is 
something that also happened at the beginning of the new wave, in the 2000s. Despite leftist 
parties not increasing their electoral support in every Latin American country, the Left is the 
current predominant ideology in the region. If before the 1969-1976 leftist predominance, the 
dissatisfaction was with the ISI model; at the beginning of 2000s, the disappointment was with 
the model promoted by the Washington Consensus. Many things have changed on the Left from 
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the 60s and 70s to the 2000s, but perhaps the most relevant one is the attitude towards 
democracy. Leftist parties in Latin America moved from supporting revolutionary change and 
underestimating democracy as a bourgeoisie tool, to defend democratic participation, compete in 
elections, and claim for deepening democracy in the region. The current leading role of the Left 
in the region implies a different, and more positive, prospect for democracy.  
Second, despite discontentment at the neoliberal model, this does not necessarily mean 
that more market reforms produce more votes for political parties on the left. The cross-national 
analysis provides strong evidence against that argument. Even though Lora and Olivera (2005) 
found that Latin Americans dislike pro-market policies irrespective of their results, and punish 
incumbents for implementing these reforms, this macro-level analysis shows that there is no 
direct connection between that dislike and voting for leftist political parties.  The key variable to 
understand the increase of leftist parties’ electoral chances is not the level of neoliberal reforms 
implemented in each country, the central variable is unemployment. Left-leaning parties in Latin 
America do increase their electoral chances when unemployment is high. This finding matches 
the research on the economic conditions that benefit leftist parties in Europe. On the other hand, 
the implementation of market-friendly reforms by leftist parties hurts their electoral chances in 
the following election. Leftist parties, when they reach government, lose votes when 
unemployment increases and also when they implement neoliberal policies.   
Third, the previous finding is confirmed by the results extracted from the multivariate 
analysis in Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay. Latin Americans are not voting left-of-center parties 
because they are against neoliberal policies. Policy positions are not among the most influential 
factors in determining voters’ decisions. For example, Brazilians that vote for the Left are not 
significantly more in favor of state intervention than Brazilians that vote for other ideological 
blocs. Not even their positions towards socialism or egalitarianism determine their vote. Despite 
Latinobarometro’ data has shown that the percentage of pro-market Latin Americans has 
diminished during the last years, pro-market or pro-state policy stances are not influential factors 
for Latin Americans when casting their vote.  
Electorates in the region are voting Left because they just want to try new alternatives 
that might improve their economic well-being. If Latin Americans punish traditional parties that 
implemented structural reforms, this is less a result of their policy stances against neoliberalism 
or the market than of bad economic outcomes. In other words, voters are more outcome-oriented 
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than policy-oriented. This evidence reinforces the argument that voters, in order to make 
politicians accountable, do not necessarily need to be policy-oriented, it is enough for them to be 
outcome-oriented. The congruency of the findings extracted from the two levels of analysis, the 
macro and micro, make them more trustworthy. The current shift to the Left in Latin America is 
more a result of popular discontent with the economic situation than anything else. In particular, 
espousing pro-state anti-market options has nothing to do with voting Left. 
Finally, and in this context, the electoral possibilities of success that leftist parties have 
by capitalizing on social discontent depend on the number of “untainted opposition” parties 
available in the political system. In countries like Brazil and Uruguay where leftist parties 
embody the only “untainted opposition,” they only needed to overcome voters’ natural resistance 
to voting for inexperienced parties. On the other hand, Mexico’s recent history shows how leftist 
parties can have a hard time when they have to compete with another “untainted opposition” as 
was the case between PRD and PAN. It is the interplay between macro and micro factors that 
better explains voting decisions. Voters’ economic discontent, a micro level explanatory factor, 
can be capitalize by leftist parties depending on how many parties are seen as untainted 
opposition, which is a party system characteristic, a macro level factor.  
This argument can be generalized beyond these three country cases. In Bolivia, the recent 
success of Evo Morales indicates than another “untainted opposition” has become credible 
enough to merit the chance to govern one of the poorest countries in the region. In Venezuela, 
Hugo Chávez also embodied a new and distinctive alternative from the traditional COPEI and 
Acción Democrática (AD). Regardless of the differences between these leftist parties and the 
more institutionalized Frente Amplio or Partido dos Trabalhadores, they share with them their 
character of “untainted opposition.”  
Aside from answering the three specific research questions, this dissertation also 
contributes to a broadening of our understanding of political behavior, and especially voting 
behavior, in Latin America. There is a predominant scholarly preconception that depicts Latin 
Americans as random and unpredictable voters. Voting behavior in the region was traditionally 
underestimated as a result of unconcealed exchanges of support for particularistic benefits. In 
addition to the clientelistic motives, candidates’ attributes and campaign influence are usually 
mentioned as relevant voting clues followed by electorates in the region. This project does not 
dismiss the importance of these factors, which is very well proved for some countries, but the 
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individual-level analysis presented here indicates that other voting clues are also very influential 
in the way Latin Americans process their voting decisions. Brazilians, Mexicans and Uruguayans 
take into account the economic performance of the incumbent, as well as their party attachments 
and ideological identification while they make their decisions at the ballot box. To put it simply, 
Latin American electorates are more discriminating than scholars have sometimes considered, 
and as a consequence, are capable of make politicians accountable.  
Perhaps as importantly, another by-product of this dissertation is that their findings can 
be taken to be good news for the future of democracy in the region. Despite the fact that Latin 
America finished its transition to democracy some years ago, it still needs to consolidate and 
improve the quality of its democracy (Roberts 1998). In order for democracies to work properly, 
they need certain amounts of popular support (Easton 1953), and recent research has shown that 
support for democratic political institutions and democratic systems depends on which side of 
the winning-losing equation citizens are (Anderson, Blais, Bowler, Donovan and Listhaug 2005).  
Citizens that have voted for a party that lost the election (losers) tend to have lower levels of 
support for democracy than winners. As a result, democracies could become unstable if losers 
are continuously ignored in the political game, excluded from the political process, and if they 
are always the same people. Furthermore, the gap in support for democracy between winners and 
losers does not exist at all times for all types of voters. Losers’ ideology matters: voters on the 
extreme left expressed more negative evaluations of the political system than those on the right. 
To make democracy strong and stable, it is better to have alternation in power and it is preferable 
to incorporate minorities (Anderson, Blais, Bowler, Donovan and Listhaug 2005).  
Taking all these arguments into account, the findings of this dissertation represent good 
news for democracy’s prospect for two reasons. First, they show how Latin Americans have 
changed governments incorporating left-oriented parties into the political game. The future of 
democracy can be in danger if certain political actors are always on the losers’ side. For many 
years, several leftist political parties in the region played as losers in the electoral game. 
Moreover, some of them dismiss democracy as a valid method to achieve power. Therefore, the 
arrival of left-leaning parties to the government of several Latin American countries, rather than 
being a cause of concern, should be considered an indicator of a healthy democracy and a 
mechanism to strengthen democratic support among citizens. Second, the results of this project 
show that when Latin Americans have institutional and democratic ways to channel their 
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discontent, they go for them. At least in Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay, voters prefer to vote for 
“untainted parties” rather than looking for non-democratic alternatives to achieve their demands. 
Latin Americans are capable of making their political leaders accountable, remove them 
from office when they do not accomplished what was expected, and change those in charge of 
the government by voting for “untainted parties.” The success of “untainted parties” in Brazil, 
Mexico and Uruguay implies an increase in institutionalization, in political representation, and a 
sign of political maturity (López 2005). In a region demanding a more accountable and 
responsive democracy, the examples of Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay show a particular way this 
can be done. The recent shift towards the Left in Latin America has helped to intensify and 
strengthen democracy in the region by incorporating losers into the political game.  
It is uncertain what might happen after leftist parties have been in charge of national 
government for a while. Several scholars have anticipated that this “Left Turn” will endure 
(Castañeda and Navia 2007, Cleary 2006). Cleary points out that “the future of the left in Latin 
America will in large part depend on its ability to strike a balance between the pragmatic need 
for moderation and the moral imperative to pursue strategies of poverty reduction, redistribution, 
and development (2006: 48). Castañeda and Navia (2007) also agree that moderation is the clue 
for the Left to stay in power.  
Their condition of “untainted” parties is lost immediately after gaining access to the 
government. As a result, two possible scenarios can be imagined. In the first one, leftist 
governments succeed in significantly improving the material well-being of Latin Americans and 
reducing the prevalent social and economic inequalities, and as a result, they keep governing for 
several years. However, Castañeda and Navia (2007) argue against this scenario. They consider 
that even if leftists’ parties do not improve the living conditions they will be better positioned 
that rightist, because 80% of the populace in Latin America is under the median, so there is 
public for redistributive appeals.   
In the second scenario, Schlesinger is right: “People can never be fulfilled for long either 
in the public or in the private sphere. We try one, then the other, and frustration compels a 
change in course. Moreover, however effective a particular course may be in meeting one set of 
troubles, it generally falters and fails when new troubles arise.  And many troubles are inherently 
insoluble. As political eras, whether dominated by public purpose or by private interest, run their 
course, they infallibly generate the desire for something different. It always becomes after a 
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while “time for a change” (Schlesinger 1986). In this scenario, after several years, we would 
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The data presented in Section 2 of Chapter 2 shows the vote share obtained by each 
ideological bloc (Left, Center and Right) in congressional elections from 1945 to 2004.  A few 
clarifications about some countries’ electoral results are necessary:  
 
Argentina: Includes congressional elections as well as results for national constituent elections.  
Brazil: Excludes the congressional elections that were carried out during the military regime 
because not all parties were allowed to compete.  
Bolivia: Before 1956 there was no opposition participation and no universal right to vote (the 
law is from 1952), as a result, elections held before 1956 are not included in the dataset.  




Table A-1 Political parties unclassified in the Left-Right dimension (1980-2005) 





Argentina Partido Justicialista 1983 40.2 
 Partido Justicialista 1989 47.3 
 Blanco de los Jubilados 1989 1.9 
 Partido Justicialista 1995 49.8 
 Partido Justicialista 1999 38.1 
 Alianza Social Cristiana 1999 0.3 
 Frente por la Lealtad 
(Menem) (PJ) 
2003 19.5 
 Frente Nacional y 
Popular (Rodriguez Saa) (PJ) 
2003 12.1 
 Union y Libertad 
(Rodriguez Saa) 
2003 2.0 
 Alianza Unidos o 
Dominados (Mussa-Suarez) 
2003 0.2 
Bolivia Movimiento Indio Tupaj 
Katari (MITKA) 
1980 1.2 
 Movimiento Indio Tupaj 
Katari Uno (MITKA-Uno) 
1980 1.3 








Revolucionario Tupaj Katari de 
Liberacion (MRTKL) 
1985 2.1 




Revolucionario Tupaj Katari de 
Liberacion (MRTKL) 
1989 1.6 
 Frente Unico de 
Liberacion Katarista (FULKA) 
1989 1.2 
 Union Civica Solidaridad 
(UCS) 
1993 13.8 
 Conciencia de Patria 
(CONDEPA) 
1993 14.3 
 Union Civica Solidaridad 
(UCS) 
1997 16.1 
 Conciencia de Patria 
(CONDEPA) 
1997 17.2 
 Union Civica Solidaridad 
(UCS) 
2002 5.0 
 LyJ (Libertad y Justicia) 2002 2.7 
 Conciencia de Patria 
(CONDEPA) 
2002 0.4 
 Frente Patriótico 2005 0.3 
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Agropecuario de Bolivia 
(FREPAB) 
 Unión Social de los 
Trabajadores de Bolivia (USTB) 
2005 0.3 
Brazil Partido da Reconstrucao 
Nacional (PRN) 
1989 30.5 
 Partido da Reconstrucao 
Nacional (PRN) 
1994 0.6 
Chile Partido Union de Centro 
Centro Progresista (UCCP) 
1989 15.4 
 Partido Union de Centro 
Centro Progresista (UCCP) 
1999 0.4 
Colombia Movimiento Unitario 
Metapolitico (MUM) 
1986 0.6 
 Movimiento Unitario 
Metapolitico (MUM) 
1990 0.6 
 Movimiento Unitario 
Metapolitico (MUM) 
1994 1.1 
 Independiente 1998 27.1 
 Partido Verde Oxigeno 2002 0.5 
 Movimiento Defensa 
Ciudadana 
2002 0.1 






Costa Rica Unión General 2002 0.2 
Ecuador Partido Roldosista 
Ecuatoriano (PRE) 
1992 22 




 Concentracion de 
Fuerzas Populares (CFP) 
1992 1.3 
 Partido Roldosista 
Ecuatoriano (PRE) 
1996 26.3 




 Concentracion de 
Fuerzas Populares (CFP) 
1996 27.2 
 Alianza  1996 3 




 Movimiento Ciudadanos 
Nuevo Pais (MCNP) 
1998 14.8 
 Autentica (MIRA) 1998 5.1 
 Partido Roldosista 
Ecuatoriano (PRE) 
2002 11.9 
 TSI 2002 3.7 
 Movimiento Patria 
Solidaria (MPS) 
2002 1.1 
 MIAJ 2002 0.8 
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Guatemala Movimiento Emergente 
de Concordia-Frente de Unidad 
Nacional (PUA-MEC-FUN) 
1985 1.9 
 Movimiento de Accion 
Solidaria (MAS) 
1990 24.1 
 Partido Democratico de 
Cooperacion Nacional (PDCN) 
1990 2.1 
 Movimiento Emergente 
de Concordia (MEC) 
1990 1.1 
 Partido Liberador 
Progresista (PLP) 
1995 5.2 
 Partido Progresista (PP) 1995 1.6 
 Partido Reformador 
Guatemalteco (PREG) 
1995 1.1 
 Partido Liberador 
Progresista (PLP) 
1999 3.1 
 DSP 2003 1.4 
 UN 2003 0.4 
 MSPCN 2003 0.4 
Mexico Partido Social Democrata 
(PSD) 
1982 0.2 
 Frente Democratico 
Nacional (FDN) 
1988 31.1 
Paraguay Partido Humanista 
Paraguayo 
2003 0.1 
Peru CAMBIO 90 1990 29.1 
 Frente Popular Agricola 
del Peru (FREPAP) 
1990 1.1 
 CAMBIO 90 1995 64.4 
 Frente Popular Agricola 
del Peru (FREPAP) 
1995 0.8 
 Union por el Peru (UPP) 1995 21.8 
 Movimiento Obras 
Civicas (MOC) 
1995 2.6 
 Frente Popular Agricola 
del Peru (FREPAP) 
2000 0.7 
 Union por el Peru (UPP) 2000 0.3 
 Peru 2000 2000 51.0 
Venezuela Movimiento Integracion 
Nacional (MIN) 
1983 0.3 
 Convergencia Nacional  1993 30.4 
 Integracion, Renovacion 
y Nueva Esperanza (IRENE) 
1998 2.8 



































































































AVERAGE Left AVERAGE center AVERAGE Right
 
Source: based on Coppedge (1997) and Political Database of the Americas (Georgetown University) 
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Table B-1 Correlation matrix with variables included in the regression models of Chapter 3  
 
Left SRI Inflation Growth Unemployment Ideology deologica





Inflation mean 0.2149 -0.3724 1.0000
Growth mean -0.1339 0.2532 -0.5316 1.0000
Unemployment mean 0.2079 0.0227 -0.1478 0.0973 1.0000
Ideology incumbent 0.2510 -0.1977 0.0884 -0.1454 -0.0510 1.0000
Ideological polarization 0.5204 -0.0024 0.1216 -0.0141 0.3679 0.1336 1.0000
Left SRI Inflation Growth Unemployment Ideology deologica





Inflation election year 0.1492 -0.5844 1.0000
Growth election year -0.1189 0.0085 -0.2845 1.0000
Unemployment election year 0.1802 0.1422 -0.2035 -0.2547 1.0000
Ideology incumbent 0.2510 -0.1977 0.1199 0.0186 -0.0478 1.0000
Ideological polarization 0.5204 -0.0024 0.0530 0.0853 0.1972 0.1336 1.0000
Left SRI Inflation Growth Unemployment Ideology deologica




SRI change -0.1373 1.0000
Inflation change -0.0915 -0.1972 1.0000
Growth change 0.0058 -0.0655 -0.2863 1.0000
Unemployment change 0.2473 0.0201 -0.2321 -0.2553 1.0000
Ideology incumbent -0.5598 0.1290 0.1084 -0.0683 -0.0232 1.0000




 Table B-2 The impact of market reforms, economic outcomes and political variables on the 




      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      53 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 22,    30) =    5.07 
       Model |  19293.2374    22  876.965338           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  5191.87993    30  173.062664           R-squared     =  0.7880 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6325 
       Total |  24485.1174    52  470.867642           Root MSE      =  13.155 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        left |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval ]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
SRI          |   48.67155   30.50736     1.60   0.121    -13.63278    110.9759 
Inflatio mean|  -.8069082   2.134532    -0.38   0.708    -5.166205    3.552388 
Growth mean  |  -1.891331   1.558109    -1.21   0.234    -5.073413    1.290751 
Unemploy mean|   1.622153   1.048466     1.55   0.132    -.5190995    3.763406 
Ideology     |   70.16343   29.02355     2.42   0.022     10.88942    129.4374 
Ideology*SRI |  -189.7464   64.78485    -2.93   0.006    -322.0547   -57.43806 
         arg |   10.69577   12.59309     0.85   0.402    -15.02275    36.41428 
         bol |   15.08116   11.13972     1.35   0.186    -7.669193    37.83151 
         bra |   63.27268   12.58751     5.03   0.000     37.56555     88.9798 
         chi |     13.054    12.0653     1.08   0.288    -11.58664    37.69463 
         col |  -8.897001   11.17802    -0.80   0.432    -31.72557    13.93157 
         cri |   55.65963   11.30303     4.92   0.000     32.57577    78.74349 
         dom |    21.3134   16.57562     1.29   0.208    -12.53853    55.16533 
         ecu |   25.81703   10.86037     2.38   0.024     3.637196    47.99686 
         mex |   7.884819   11.06138     0.71   0.481    -14.70554    30.47518 
         per |  -.8182358   12.69203    -0.06   0.949    -26.73882    25.10235 
         pry |  -9.355123   10.78966    -0.87   0.393    -31.39054     12.6803 
         uru |   25.86677   12.01664     2.15   0.040     1.325513    50.40802 
         ven |   34.37295   13.22014     2.60   0.014     7.373826    61.37208 
         nic |   12.96475   16.98315     0.76   0.451    -21.71947    47.64898 
         slv |   9.831182   11.23462     0.88   0.388    -13.11297    32.77534 
         hon |   -6.19534   10.84163    -0.57   0.572     -28.3369    15.94622 




. lincom sri+ideogy*sri 
 
 ( 1)  meansri + ideosri = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        left |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 




 Table B-3 The impact of market reforms, economic outcomes and political variables on the 
change in the vote for leftist parties in Latin America, fixed-effects model without dummies 
 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        53 
Group variable (i): country2                    Number of groups   =        17 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3740                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.0199                                        avg =       3.1 
       overall = 0.0132                                        max =         4 
 
                                                F(6,30)            =      2.99 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4056                        Prob > F           =    0.0208 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        left |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
SRI          |   48.67155   30.50736     1.60   0.121    -13.63278    110.9759 
Inflatio mean|  -.8069082   2.134532    -0.38   0.708    -5.166205    3.552388 
Growth mean  |  -1.891331   1.558109    -1.21   0.234    -5.073413    1.290751 
Unemploy mean|   1.622153   1.048466     1.55   0.132    -.5190995    3.763406 
Ideology     |   70.16343   29.02355     2.42   0.022     10.88942    129.4374 
Ideology*SRI |  -189.7464   64.78485    -2.93   0.006    -322.0547   -57.43806 
       _cons |   1.629437   24.86044     0.07   0.948    -49.14235    52.40123 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  20.633715 
     sigma_e |  13.155328 
         rho |  .71099041   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 





( 1)  sri + ideology*sri = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        left |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 












2000 Election  
             |  retrpoc  retrsoc  dominant  pettyb  workers    educ       nse 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
     retrpoc |   1.0000  
     retrsoc |   0.4339   1.0000  
    dominant |  -0.0400  -0.0609   1.0000  
      pettyb |  -0.0322  -0.0320  -0.0190   1.0000  
     workers |  -0.0259   0.0045  -0.0878  -0.2351   1.0000  
        educ |  -0.1878  -0.0981   0.0501   0.3058   0.0082   1.0000  
         nse |   0.0747   0.0275  -0.0753  -0.1193   0.0891  -0.2343   1.0000  
    ideology |  -0.0517  -0.0427  -0.0208  -0.0316  -0.0059  -0.0412   0.0364  
     distrib |   0.0070  -0.0113   0.0604   0.0069   0.0074   0.0648  -0.0534  
 privat |  -0.0413  -0.0782   0.0548   0.0529  -0.0186   0.0816  -0.0556  
         age |   0.1173   0.0470  -0.0307   0.0207  -0.0445  -0.3741  -0.0322  
      urban |   0.0076   0.0201  -0.0543  -0.0559   0.0571  -0.1200   0.2504  
      leftpi |   0.0398   0.1011   0.0007   0.0413   0.0385   0.0037   0.0383  
     rightpi |  -0.1430  -0.2012   0.0271  -0.0408  -0.0351   0.0027  -0.0158  
        nopi |   0.1454   0.1600  -0.0327   0.0108   0.0155  -0.0312  -0.0273  
   risk |  -0.0124  -0.0142   0.0256   0.0774   0.0326   0.2510  -0.0496  
   Labastida |   0.0902   0.1589  -0.0334   0.0326  -0.0121   0.0496   0.0264  
         Fox |   0.0036   0.0289  -0.0261  -0.0318  -0.0195  -0.1741   0.1414  
    Cardenas |   0.0048  -0.0250   0.0114  -0.0422  -0.0172  -0.1036   0.0497  
 
             |  ideology  distrib  privat      age urbarura   leftpi  rightpi 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
    ideology |   1.0000  
     distrib |   0.0641   1.0000  
      privat |   0.0507   0.1529   1.0000  
         age |   0.0743  -0.0351  -0.0045   1.0000  
       urban |  -0.0630   0.0303   0.0192   0.0056   1.0000  
      leftpi |  -0.1843  -0.0319  -0.1107   0.0007   0.0352   1.0000  
     rightpi |   0.2071   0.0142   0.0742  -0.0085  -0.0462  -0.6211   1.0000  
        nopi |  -0.0766   0.0052   0.0122   0.0225   0.0219  -0.1455  -0.6355  
        risk |  -0.1447  -0.0461   0.0424  -0.0784  -0.0554   0.0756  -0.0941  
   Labastida |  -0.1229   0.0122   0.0344   0.0074   0.0114   0.1464  -0.1864  
         Fox |   0.0306  -0.0286  -0.0960   0.0204  -0.0098   0.1659  -0.1966  
    Cardenas |   0.1633   0.0569   0.0510   0.0638  -0.0795  -0.3994   0.3037  
 
             |     nopi     risk Labastida    Fox   Cardenas 
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
        nopi |   1.0000  
        risk |   0.0327   1.0000  
   Labastida |   0.0909   0.3440   1.0000  
         Fox |   0.0998  -0.3040  -0.1685   1.0000  











             |     left retrsocio retrpock   pettyb  workers education  
income 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
        left |   1.0000  
   retrsocio |   0.2814   1.0000  
  retrpocket |   0.2195   0.5492   1.0000  
      pettyb |   0.0188   0.0319   0.0233   1.0000  
     workers |   0.0227   0.0101  -0.0154  -0.2652   1.0000  
   education |   0.0559   0.0853   0.0699   0.1910   0.0888   1.0000  
      income |  -0.0169   0.0353  -0.0159   0.2033   0.0492   0.5498   1.0000  
         age |   0.0168   0.0452   0.0700   0.0366  -0.0156  -0.3395  -0.0638  
   RiskPrope |  -0.0707  -0.0620  -0.0562  -0.0214  -0.0118  -0.0267  -0.0591  
 
             |      age RiskPrope 
-------------+------------------ 
         age |   1.0000  







             |  sociotr sociopro pocketbo prospock prosinfl prosunem dominant 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sociotr |   1.0000  
    sociopro |   0.2465   1.0000  
    pocketbo |   0.2266   0.1903   1.0000  
    prospock |   0.2330   0.2107   0.2879   1.0000  
    prosinfl |  -0.1658  -0.4237  -0.1020  -0.1409   1.0000  
    prosunem |  -0.2088  -0.3814  -0.0761  -0.1720   0.4788   1.0000  
    dominant |  -0.0116  -0.0361  -0.0323  -0.0189   0.0332   0.0049   1.0000  
      pettyb |  -0.0181  -0.0583  -0.0589  -0.0324   0.0245   0.0134  -0.0749  
     workers |  -0.0073   0.0239   0.0344  -0.0287   0.0309   0.0019  -0.1422  
    educatio |  -0.0408  -0.0883  -0.1882  -0.1176   0.0452   0.0340   0.0199  
         nse |   0.0072   0.0785   0.1895   0.1068  -0.0740  -0.0763  -0.0525  
    exterinv |   0.0436   0.0791   0.1104   0.0971  -0.0474  -0.0396  -0.0564  
    exterdeb |   0.0347   0.0184   0.1017   0.0911  -0.0349  -0.0172  -0.0154  
    privatiz |  -0.0137  -0.0088   0.0067   0.0034  -0.0130  -0.0377  -0.0591  
     imports |  -0.0096   0.0168   0.0320   0.0079  -0.0196   0.0162  -0.0020  
        age  |   0.0585   0.0164   0.1199   0.1787   0.0150  -0.0218   0.0421  
      Urban  |  -0.0027  -0.0320  -0.0647  -0.0037  -0.0248   0.0158   0.0105  
      leftpi |   0.0928   0.0672   0.0802   0.0567  -0.0486  -0.0537  -0.0216  
     rightpi |  -0.1228  -0.1106  -0.1025  -0.0949   0.0689   0.0707  -0.0118  
    risksoci |  -0.0071   0.0195   0.0334   0.0284  -0.0241  -0.0119  -0.0272  
    econrisk |  -0.1669  -0.0933  -0.0358  -0.1087   0.0913   0.0739   0.0273  
 
             |   pettyb  workers educatio      nse exterinv exterdeb privatiz 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
      pettyb |   1.0000  
     workers |  -0.2429   1.0000  
    educatio |   0.4384  -0.1552   1.0000  
         nse |  -0.1858   0.1807  -0.3888   1.0000  
    exterinv |  -0.0341   0.0017  -0.0744   0.0537   1.0000  
    exterdeb |   0.0077  -0.0133   0.0037   0.0376   0.1274   1.0000  
    privatiz |  -0.0673   0.0401  -0.1528   0.1657   0.0820  -0.0239   1.0000  
     imports |   0.0369  -0.0088   0.0611  -0.0071   0.2109   0.0784   0.0124  
         age |  -0.0060   0.0228  -0.3389  -0.0005   0.0071   0.0141  -0.0493  
       Urban |   0.0792  -0.1011   0.2472  -0.1633  -0.0489   0.0183  -0.1587  
      leftpi |  -0.0111   0.0569   0.0162   0.0556   0.0735   0.0818   0.0390  
     rightpi |   0.0234  -0.0379  -0.0115  -0.0506  -0.0781  -0.0749  -0.0325  
    risksoci |  -0.0235  -0.0203  -0.0838   0.0318  -0.0210  -0.0284   0.0124  
    econrisk |   0.0125  -0.0412  -0.0027  -0.0390  -0.0534  -0.0546  -0.0027  
 
             |  imports     age    urban    leftpi  rightpi risksoci econrisk 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
     imports |   1.0000  
        age  |  -0.0239   1.0000  
      urban  |   0.0196   0.0327   1.0000  
      leftpi |   0.0413  -0.0366   0.0040   1.0000  
     rightpi |  -0.0406   0.0058  -0.0143  -0.7204   1.0000  
    risksoci |  -0.0163   0.0382  -0.0331  -0.0674   0.0592   1.0000  










             | dominant   pettyb   formal informal     educ    income 
ideology 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
    dominant |   1.0000  
      pettyb |  -0.0159   1.0000  
      formal |  -0.0953  -0.0702   1.0000  
    informal |  -0.0761  -0.0560  -0.3369   1.0000  
        educ |   0.0934   0.1241   0.2538  -0.0592   1.0000  
      income |   0.2484   0.2295   0.0925  -0.0253   0.3994   1.0000  
    ideology |   0.0100  -0.0070  -0.0539   0.0127  -0.0757  -0.0298   1.0000  
         age |   0.0170  -0.0002  -0.1913  -0.0381  -0.3873  -0.0046   0.0215  
       urban |  -0.0376   0.0142   0.0192   0.0081   0.1399   0.1251   0.0175  
      leftpi |  -0.0272  -0.0118   0.0707  -0.0027   0.0782  -0.0020  -0.1176  
    centerpi |   0.0750  -0.0039   0.0025  -0.0184  -0.0195   0.0023   0.0047  
     rightpi |   0.0320  -0.0125  -0.0432   0.0049  -0.0813  -0.0462   0.1400  
        nopi |  -0.0027   0.0225  -0.0268  -0.0071   0.0032   0.0398   0.0054  
    risklula |   0.0696   0.0255  -0.0350  -0.0110   0.0327   0.0780   0.0900  
    riskciro |  -0.0164  -0.0460  -0.0543  -0.0136  -0.1168  -0.1428  -0.0049  
    riskserr |  -0.0174  -0.0259   0.0002   0.0085  -0.0012  -0.0590  -0.1812  
     libeadm |   0.1058   0.0406   0.0282   0.0359   0.2636   0.2059  -0.0082  
    liberegu |   0.1301   0.0673   0.0048   0.0082   0.2758   0.2301  -0.0523  
     libenat |  -0.0388  -0.0447  -0.0328  -0.0222  -0.1127  -0.1216   0.0237  
 agrarianref |   0.0170  -0.0040  -0.0286   0.0087  -0.0369  -0.0291   0.1029  
 
             |     age    urban   leftpi centerpi  rightpi    nopi   risklula 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
        p157 |   1.0000  
       urban |  -0.0382   1.0000  
      leftpi |  -0.0876   0.0593   1.0000  
    centerpi |   0.0089   0.0033  -0.0225   1.0000  
     rightpi |   0.0729  -0.0215  -0.3012  -0.0166   1.0000  
        nopi |   0.0144  -0.0336  -0.6630  -0.0365  -0.4889   1.0000  
    risklula |   0.1094   0.0417  -0.3343   0.0238   0.1208   0.2148   1.0000  
    riskciro |   0.0200  -0.0017  -0.0446  -0.0468  -0.0841   0.1094   0.1541  
    riskserr |  -0.0093   0.0130   0.2050   0.0108  -0.2348  -0.0018  -0.0799  
     libeadm |  -0.1088   0.0222  -0.0123   0.0398   0.0062   0.0074   0.1161  
    liberegu |  -0.0469  -0.0449  -0.0342   0.0125  -0.0087   0.0351   0.1360  
     libenat |   0.0294  -0.0214   0.0329  -0.0033  -0.0394   0.0048  -0.0773  
 agrarianref |  -0.0397  -0.0281  -0.0972   0.0123   0.0159   0.0785   0.0865  
 
             | riskciro riskserr  libeadm liberegu  libenat   agrarian ref 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
    riskciro |   1.0000  
    riskserr |   0.0703   1.0000  
     libeadm |  -0.0375  -0.0392   1.0000  
    liberegu |  -0.0462  -0.0407   0.2632   1.0000  
     libenat |   0.0625   0.0851  -0.1205  -0.2259   1.0000  











             | sociorea  egoreal    preal inflatio unemploy     pp  privatiz 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
    sociorea |   1.0000  
     egoreal |   0.5984   1.0000  
       preal |   0.5151   0.5927   1.0000  
    inflatio |  -0.1752  -0.1930  -0.2119   1.0000  
    unemploy |  -0.1659  -0.2008  -0.2155   0.3011   1.0000  
          pp |   0.2034   0.2245   0.2354  -0.2120  -0.2729   1.0000  
    privatiz |   0.1452   0.1360   0.1264  -0.1089  -0.1000   0.0575   1.0000  
        educ |   0.0036   0.0176   0.0294   0.0932  -0.0357   0.1047  -0.2065  
      income |  -0.0279  -0.0218  -0.0137   0.0768   0.0202   0.0270  -0.2016  
         age |   0.0518   0.0829   0.0804  -0.0860   0.0353   0.0061  -0.0071  
      pileft |   0.1428   0.1855   0.1444  -0.0374  -0.0889   0.1117   0.0667  
    picenter |  -0.0315  -0.0319  -0.0226   0.0099  -0.0163  -0.0244   0.0104  
     piright |  -0.0903  -0.1150  -0.1099   0.0976   0.1068  -0.0764  -0.0920  
        nopi |   0.0038  -0.0051   0.0241  -0.0612  -0.0203   0.0347   0.0013  
     riskfhc |   0.3632   0.3793   0.3756  -0.2816  -0.3368   0.2512   0.2067  
    risklula |  -0.1635  -0.1899  -0.1725   0.0842   0.0759  -0.0831  -0.1776  
 
             |     educ   income    age     pileft picenter  piright     nopi 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
        educ |   1.0000  
      income |   0.4186   1.0000  
      idade1 |  -0.3028  -0.0413   1.0000  
      pileft |   0.1290   0.0713  -0.0900   1.0000  
    picenter |  -0.0284  -0.0359  -0.0237  -0.1615   1.0000  
     piright |   0.0725   0.0791  -0.0445  -0.1730  -0.1485   1.0000  
        nopi |  -0.0611  -0.0738   0.0892  -0.4118  -0.3536  -0.3788   1.0000  
     riskfhc |  -0.0547  -0.0914  -0.0177   0.2133  -0.0503  -0.1474   0.0044  
    risklula |   0.0245   0.0404   0.0613  -0.2799   0.0488   0.1125   0.0591  
 
             |  riskfhc risklula 
-------------+------------------ 
     riskfhc |   1.0000  








             | sociotro egotropi dominant   pettyb   formal informal   educ 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
    sociotro |   1.0000  
    egotropi |   0.5740   1.0000  
    dominant |  -0.0369  -0.0333   1.0000  
      pettyb |  -0.0237  -0.0364  -0.0378   1.0000  
      formal |   0.0163   0.0551  -0.0797  -0.1940   1.0000  
    informal |  -0.0318  -0.0600  -0.0656  -0.1595  -0.3366   1.0000  
        educ |  -0.0102   0.0410   0.1013   0.1094   0.2248  -0.1467   1.0000  
      income |  -0.0477  -0.0134   0.1516   0.1204   0.1264  -0.1342   0.4985  
         age |   0.0811   0.0814   0.0163   0.0142  -0.1203  -0.1152  -0.2363  
       urban |  -0.0533  -0.0464  -0.0088   0.0149  -0.0245   0.0658  -0.1286  
      pileft |   0.0710   0.0561  -0.0037   0.0179   0.0730  -0.0239   0.1514  
    picenter |  -0.0525  -0.0761  -0.0226  -0.0085  -0.0104   0.0393  -0.0921  
     piright |  -0.0438  -0.0475   0.0070   0.0267  -0.0061   0.0379  -0.0091  
        nopi |  -0.0016   0.0315   0.0180  -0.0091  -0.0292  -0.0319  -0.0146  
 
             |   income      age   urban    pileft picenter  piright     nopi 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
      income |   1.0000  
         age |  -0.0914   1.0000  
       urban |  -0.1540   0.0142   1.0000  
      pileft |   0.0863  -0.1168  -0.0563   1.0000  
    picenter |  -0.0631  -0.0128   0.0461  -0.2147   1.0000  
     piright |  -0.0211   0.0082   0.0750  -0.1238  -0.0917   1.0000  









             | dominant   pettyb   formal informal   educ   ideology    age 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
    dominant |   1.0000  
      pettyb |  -0.0655   1.0000  
      formal |  -0.1109  -0.2894   1.0000  
    informal |  -0.0542  -0.1413  -0.2393   1.0000  
        educ |   0.0832  -0.0551   0.3016  -0.1433   1.0000  
    ideology |  -0.0134  -0.0059  -0.1159   0.1019  -0.2878   1.0000  
          age|   0.0435   0.1201  -0.1189  -0.0197  -0.1396   0.1284   1.0000  
       urban |  -0.0064   0.0327  -0.1629   0.1831  -0.2614   0.1012   0.0406  
      idleft |  -0.0350  -0.0318   0.1482  -0.0420   0.2036  -0.2551  -0.0605  
    idcenter |   0.0022   0.0381  -0.0680   0.0489  -0.1385   0.0716  -0.0445  
     idright |   0.0443   0.0276  -0.0085   0.0004  -0.0426   0.1021  -0.0457  
    nopartyi |  -0.0081  -0.0138  -0.0308  -0.0188  -0.0043   0.0393   0.0850  
    stateint |  -0.0620   0.0492  -0.0641   0.0720  -0.1836   0.0868   0.0234  
 egalitarian |  -0.0940  -0.0373  -0.0153   0.0141  -0.2177  -0.0103  -0.0506  
   socialism |  -0.0797   0.0121  -0.0924   0.0495  -0.2601   0.0364   0.0727  
 
             |     urban  idleft idcenter  idright nopartyi stateint 
egalitarian  
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
       urban |   1.0000  
      idleft |  -0.1347   1.0000  
    idcenter |   0.0939  -0.1533   1.0000  
     idright |   0.0977  -0.1375  -0.1372   1.0000  
    nopartyi |  -0.0415  -0.4204  -0.4195  -0.3764   1.0000  
    stateint |   0.0716  -0.0076  -0.0250   0.0221  -0.0320   1.0000  
 egalitarian |   0.0536   0.0506   0.0085  -0.0024  -0.0683   0.0939   1.0000  
   socialism |   0.1470   0.0373   0.0055   0.0289  -0.0572   0.0817   0.1490  
 
             |   socialism  
-------------+--------- 












             | sociotr   sociotrp sociotrf dominant   pettyb   formal 
informal 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sociotr |   1.0000  
    sociotrp |   0.3428   1.0000  
    sociotrf |  -0.0360   0.0653   1.0000  
    dominant |   0.0249   0.0059   0.0218   1.0000  
      pettyb |   0.0482   0.0091  -0.1416  -0.0577   1.0000  
      formal |   0.1283   0.1369  -0.1138  -0.1240  -0.1073   1.0000  
    informal |  -0.0372  -0.0814   0.0281  -0.1116  -0.0966  -0.2077   1.0000  
        educ |   0.0579   0.0662   0.0230   0.3262   0.1692   0.0839  -0.0814  
      income |   0.1153   0.0466   0.0888   0.2351   0.1641   0.0332  -0.0359  
         age |  -0.0478  -0.0872   0.0069  -0.1189   0.0167  -0.2753  -0.0343  
 
             |     educ   income     age 
-------------+--------------------------- 
        educ |   1.0000  
      income |   0.4327   1.0000  








             |  pocket  pocketpast pocketfut dominant   pettyb   formal 
informal 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
     Pocket  |   1.0000  
   Pocketpast|   0.2940   1.0000  
   pocketfut |   0.2310   0.3826   1.0000  
    dominant |  -0.1066   0.0067  -0.0103   1.0000  
      pettyb |  -0.0678  -0.0323  -0.0048  -0.0612   1.0000  
      formal |   0.0202   0.0017   0.0052  -0.1761  -0.1154   1.0000  
    informal |   0.1239   0.0182   0.0389  -0.1068  -0.0700  -0.2014   1.0000  
        educ |  -0.2281   0.0057  -0.0126   0.3262   0.1398   0.0418  -0.0519  
      income |  -0.3417  -0.0796  -0.0064   0.2818   0.1881   0.0274  -0.0730  
    ideology |  -0.0985  -0.1875  -0.2067  -0.0859  -0.0243  -0.1104  -0.0430  
         age |   0.0485   0.0866   0.1039  -0.0707  -0.0340  -0.2308  -0.0693  
       urban |   0.0520   0.1345   0.1156   0.0231   0.0121  -0.0110  -0.0461  
 
             |   educ    income   ideology   age     urban 
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
        educ |   1.0000  
      income |   0.5118   1.0000  
    ideology |  -0.2654  -0.2162   1.0000  
         age |  -0.3870  -0.1475   0.1859   1.0000  













             | sociotr   Egotropic dominant   pettyb   formal informal educ 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
 sociotropic |   1.0000  
   Egotropic |   0.3644   1.0000  
    dominant |   0.0010  -0.1246   1.0000  
      pettyb |   0.0179  -0.0382  -0.1138   1.0000  
      formal |  -0.0518  -0.0110  -0.1011  -0.0840   1.0000  
    informal |   0.0867   0.0874  -0.2201  -0.1830  -0.1626   1.0000  
        educ |   0.0743  -0.1369   0.4449   0.0454   0.0275  -0.0791   1.0000  
         nse |  -0.0205  -0.1712   0.1980   0.0621  -0.0417  -0.1380   0.3004  
    ideology |  -0.2659  -0.0828  -0.1422  -0.0548  -0.0012  -0.0188  -0.2691  
         Age |  -0.0728   0.0101  -0.1228  -0.0366  -0.0586  -0.2205  -0.3596  
       urban |   0.2205   0.0161   0.0334  -0.0069  -0.0176   0.0401   0.1545  
   colorados |   0.0101   0.0092  -0.0575   0.0444   0.0375  -0.0379  -0.1409  
     blancos |  -0.3449  -0.1216  -0.0220  -0.0204   0.0224  -0.0692  -0.0682  
    nespacio |   0.0282  -0.0094  -0.0100  -0.0161   0.0093   0.0142   0.0575  
      frente |   0.2768   0.0629   0.1261   0.0213  -0.0142   0.0412   0.1819  
 
             |    nse   ideology    Age     urban   colorados  blancos 
nespacio 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
         nse |   1.0000  
    ideology |  -0.1103   1.0000  
         Age |   0.0270   0.1781   1.0000  
       urban |   0.1199  -0.2788   0.0144   1.0000  
   colorados |  -0.0424   0.3420   0.1093  -0.1321   1.0000  
     blancos |  -0.0273   0.2443   0.1243  -0.2134  -0.2734   1.0000  
    nespacio |   0.0006  -0.0289  -0.0311   0.0332  -0.0584  -0.0570   1.0000  
      frente |   0.0492  -0.5494  -0.1089   0.2423  -0.2797  -0.2729  -0.0583  
 
             |   frente 
-------------+--------- 








             |sociotropic Egotropic dominant pettyb formal informal   educ 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
 sociotropic |   1.0000  
   Egotropic |   0.4046   1.0000  
    dominant |   0.0663  -0.0817   1.0000  
      pettyb |   0.0423  -0.0438  -0.1303   1.0000  
      formal |   0.0130   0.0323  -0.1541  -0.1965   1.0000  
    informal |   0.0554   0.0691  -0.1165  -0.1486  -0.1756   1.0000  
        educ |   0.0599  -0.1272   0.4008   0.0994   0.0308  -0.1085   1.0000  
         nse |  -0.0700  -0.1799   0.1939   0.0721  -0.0210  -0.2360   0.3992  
    ideology |  -0.2850  -0.1289  -0.1690  -0.0165  -0.0905   0.0057  -0.2675  
         Age |  -0.1212  -0.0064  -0.0996  -0.0116  -0.2128  -0.1449  -0.2601  
       urban |   0.0881   0.0118   0.0742  -0.0568   0.1016  -0.0964   0.2294  
   colorados |  -0.2678  -0.1340  -0.0855   0.0661  -0.0934  -0.0598  -0.0899  
     blancos |  -0.0186   0.0143  -0.0390  -0.0149  -0.0611   0.0089  -0.1145  
    nespacio |  -0.0013   0.0214   0.0197  -0.0193   0.0130   0.0263   0.0651  
      frente |   0.2590   0.0778   0.1434  -0.0232   0.0501   0.0218   0.2050  
 
             |      nse  ideology    Age     urban  colorados  blancos 
nespacio 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
         nse |   1.0000  
    ideology |  -0.0570   1.0000  
         Age |   0.0894   0.2128   1.0000  
        urban|   0.1614  -0.1908  -0.0012   1.0000  
   colorados |   0.0142   0.3339   0.1521  -0.0167   1.0000  
     blancos |  -0.0261   0.3073   0.1368  -0.1471  -0.1810   1.0000  
    nespacio |   0.0084  -0.0132  -0.0641  -0.0098  -0.0583  -0.0532   1.0000  
      frente |   0.0287  -0.5823  -0.1305   0.1690  -0.2956  -0.2697  -0.0869  
 
             |   frente 
-------------+--------- 









             |  sociotr    egotr sociotrp   egotrp sociotrf   egotrf dominant 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sociotr |   1.0000  
       egotr |   0.4811   1.0000  
    sociotrp |   0.4073   0.2613   1.0000  
      egotrp |   0.4156   0.4517   0.5470   1.0000  
    sociotrf |   0.0830   0.0465   0.0497   0.0270   1.0000  
      egotrf |   0.0318  -0.0223   0.0315   0.0145   0.6761   1.0000  
    dominant |  -0.0107  -0.0143  -0.0323  -0.0168   0.0079   0.0275   1.0000  
      pettyb |  -0.0613  -0.0837  -0.0225  -0.0227   0.0035  -0.0168  -0.0303  
      formal |  -0.0347  -0.0725  -0.0125  -0.0108   0.0095   0.0351  -0.0599  
    informal |   0.0433   0.0253  -0.0184  -0.0010   0.0314  -0.0243  -0.0394  
        educ |  -0.0542  -0.2325   0.0331  -0.0357  -0.0067   0.0889   0.1230  
      income |  -0.1542  -0.3294  -0.0360  -0.1122  -0.0391   0.0935   0.0836  
         age |  -0.0058   0.0680  -0.0850  -0.0171  -0.0262   0.0203   0.0119  
       urban |  -0.1354  -0.1209  -0.1917  -0.1844   0.0190  -0.0381  -0.0057  
    ideology |  -0.3594  -0.2261  -0.2458  -0.2568   0.0386   0.0396   0.0117  
          pc |  -0.2485  -0.1498  -0.1856  -0.1395  -0.0245  -0.0034   0.0764  
          fa |   0.3353   0.1875   0.2399   0.2309  -0.1179  -0.0771  -0.0005  
          pn |  -0.1710  -0.1249  -0.1398  -0.1426   0.0061   0.0001  -0.0237  
          pi |  -0.0539  -0.0159  -0.0154  -0.0345   0.0691   0.0523  -0.0050  
        risk |   0.2751   0.1637   0.2063   0.2047  -0.0551  -0.0636   0.0166  
 
             |   pettyb   formal informal     educ   income    age     urban 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
      pettyb |   1.0000  
      formal |  -0.1948   1.0000  
    informal |  -0.1281  -0.2530   1.0000  
        educ |   0.2564   0.1377  -0.0956   1.0000  
      income |   0.2369   0.1604  -0.1679   0.5420   1.0000  
          age|  -0.0576  -0.1742  -0.1588  -0.2099   0.0041   1.0000  
       urban |  -0.0601  -0.0321   0.0819  -0.2412  -0.2748  -0.0568   1.0000  
    ideology |  -0.0005  -0.1017  -0.0316  -0.1660  -0.0704   0.1420   0.2609  
          pc |  -0.0025  -0.0271  -0.0813   0.0222   0.0956   0.1432   0.0410  
          fa |   0.0069   0.0759   0.0065   0.1487   0.1005  -0.1003  -0.2272  
          pn |   0.0074  -0.0345  -0.0039  -0.0540   0.0144   0.0912   0.1730  
          pi |  -0.0162  -0.0031   0.0159  -0.0252  -0.0117   0.0130   0.0487  
        risk |  -0.0060   0.0801   0.0503   0.1243   0.0441  -0.1046  -0.1361  
 
             | ideology       pc       fa       pn       pi     risk 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
    ideology |   1.0000  
          pc |   0.2890   1.0000  
          fa |  -0.5838  -0.2153   1.0000  
          pn |   0.3523  -0.1261  -0.3293   1.0000  
          pi |   0.0136  -0.0148  -0.0387  -0.0226   1.0000  




Table C-2 Vote determinants for Leftist, Centrist and Rightist parties: Brazil 1994 
 
Multinomial logistic regression                   Number of obs   =       7259 
                                                  Wald chi2(28)   =    1320.61 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -5752.9423                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1238 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
    vote1994 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1            | 
    sociotro |   .7166289   .0563737    12.71   0.000     .6061384    .8271194 
    egotropi |   .4763334    .045325    10.51   0.000      .387498    .5651689 
    dominant |  -.6659137   .2569904    -2.59   0.010    -1.169605   -.1622218 
      pettyb |  -.0372546   .1033532    -0.36   0.719    -.2398231    .1653139 
      formal |   .0700682   .0694617     1.01   0.313    -.0660742    .2062106 
    informal |   .0252829   .0779761     0.32   0.746    -.1275475    .1781133 
      escola |  -.0663233   .0441658    -1.50   0.133    -.1528867    .0202401 
      income |   -.100152   .0253458    -3.95   0.000    -.1498288   -.0504752 
         age |  -.0102091   .0021126    -4.83   0.000    -.0143497   -.0060685 
      metrop |  -.1013905   .0594817    -1.70   0.088    -.2179725    .0151915 
      pileft |   .9775217   .1058016     9.24   0.000     .7701544    1.184889 
    picenter |  -.6503059   .1210536    -5.37   0.000    -.8875666   -.4130452 
     piright |  -.9551164   .1724239    -5.54   0.000    -1.293061   -.6171718 
        nopi |  -.3511498   .1024856    -3.43   0.001    -.5520178   -.1502818 
       _cons |   -1.18761   .1989661    -5.97   0.000    -1.577576   -.7976434 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
3            | 
    sociotro |   .4782562   .0863758     5.54   0.000     .3089627    .6475497 
    egotropi |   .5327773   .0704603     7.56   0.000     .3946777     .670877 
    dominant |   .3471727   .2788504     1.25   0.213    -.1993641    .8937095 
      pettyb |   .2706725   .1550622     1.75   0.081    -.0332438    .5745888 
      formal |   .2182989   .1125672     1.94   0.052    -.0023287    .4389264 
    informal |   .0374862   .1320176     0.28   0.776    -.2212635     .296236 
      escola |   .2042433    .067447     3.03   0.002     .0720495     .336437 
      income |   .0287637   .0411713     0.70   0.485    -.0519307     .109458 
         age |  -.0112295   .0031435    -3.57   0.000    -.0173906   -.0050683 
      metrop |  -.1238476   .0943653    -1.31   0.189    -.3088001     .061105 
      pileft |  -.9629114   .1944036    -4.95   0.000    -1.343935   -.5818873 
    picenter |  -.8921971    .193341    -4.61   0.000    -1.271138   -.5132557 
     piright |   .1302757     .19995     0.65   0.515    -.2616191    .5221705 
        nopi |  -.1257342   .1508619    -0.83   0.405    -.4214182    .1699497 
       _cons |  -3.084176   .3009603   -10.25   0.000    -3.674048   -2.494305 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(Outcome vote1994==2 is the comparison group) 
  
Note: basecategory is Center (2). 1=Left and 3=Right 
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Table C-3 Vote determinants for PT vs PSDB: Brazil 1994 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =       6230 
                                                  Wald chi2(14)   =    1003.49 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -3554.7435                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1598 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
 leftvscleft |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    sociotro |   .8363418   .0625167    13.38   0.000     .7138114    .9588723 
    egotropi |   .5303508   .0474103    11.19   0.000     .4374284    .6232733 
    dominant |  -.6964798   .2603067    -2.68   0.007    -1.206672    -.186288 
      pettyb |  -.0791637   .1056063    -0.75   0.453    -.2861483    .1278209 
      formal |   .0438037   .0720213     0.61   0.543    -.0973554    .1849627 
    informal |  -.0088396   .0811584    -0.11   0.913    -.1679071    .1502279 
      escola |  -.1092117     .04577    -2.39   0.017    -.1989192   -.0195042 
      income |  -.1177339   .0264048    -4.46   0.000    -.1694862   -.0659815 
         age |  -.0115901   .0021621    -5.36   0.000    -.0158278   -.0073524 
      metrop |  -.1240236   .0615802    -2.01   0.044    -.2447186   -.0033286 
      pileft |   .9417786   .1090291     8.64   0.000     .7280856    1.155472 
    picenter |   -.407692   .1254809    -3.25   0.001      -.65363    -.161754 
     piright |  -.9533296   .1771813    -5.38   0.000    -1.300598   -.6060607 
        nopi |  -.3390601   .1054741    -3.21   0.001    -.5457855   -.1323346 
       _cons |  -1.072413   .2046623    -5.24   0.000    -1.473543   -.6712817 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
Note:  1=PT and 0=PSDB 
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 Table C-4 Public Servants and Private Employees as Vote determinants for Leftist parties: 
Mexico 1994 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =       5148 
                                                  Wald chi2(8)    =     422.68 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -1972.0632                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1050 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
        left |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Socio retros |   .7303168   .0586992    12.44   0.000     .6152685    .8453651 
Pocket retro |   .3368253   .0634698     5.31   0.000     .2124268    .4612238 
Public servan|   .2868267   .1312981     2.18   0.029     .0294871    .5441662 
Private emplo|  -.2649063   .1193069    -2.22   0.026    -.4987436    -.031069 
Education    |   .1526883   .0403259     3.79   0.000     .0736509    .2317257 
Family income|  -.1700864   .0464568    -3.66   0.000      -.26114   -.0790327 
Age          |     .02512   .0370665     0.68   0.498     -.047529     .097769 
Risk propensi|  -.5533622   .1440563    -3.84   0.000    -.8357073   -.2710171 




Table C-5 Conditional Effects of Social Class and Urban residence as Vote determinants for 
Leftist parties: Mexico 1988  
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =       1118 
                                                  Wald chi2(25)   =     309.45 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -335.47576                 Pseudo R2       =     0.4572 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
        left |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sociotropic  |   .1251676   .1412171     0.89   0.375    -.1516127     .401948 
Socio prospe |   .0750286   .1469054     0.51   0.610    -.2129007    .3629579 
Pocketbook   |   .1232409   .1719371     0.72   0.474    -.2137496    .4602314 
Pocket retr  |   -.276755   .1173671    -2.36   0.018    -.5067903   -.0467198 
Pocket pros  |   .0156333   .1127974     0.14   0.890    -.2054457    .2367122 
Pros Infla   |   .0525935   .1481269     0.36   0.723    -.2377299    .3429169 
Pros Unemp   |  -.0940617   .1557235    -0.60   0.546    -.3992741    .2111508 
Dominant     |   .7268661   1.305754     0.56   0.578    -1.832365    3.286097 
Pettyb       |  -2.747407   .8476972    -3.24   0.001    -4.408864   -1.085951 
Workers      |  -.1075957   .4844125    -0.22   0.824    -1.057027    .8418355 
Education    |    .151038   .0633039     2.39   0.017     .0269647    .2751114 
Household SES|   .3991405   .1593386     2.50   0.012     .0868426    .7114385 
External inv |   .1763878   .1151534     1.53   0.126    -.0493087    .4020844 
External deb |   .6831332   .2164736     3.16   0.002     .2588527    1.107414 
Privatization|   .0171694   .2195686     0.08   0.938    -.4131772     .447516 
Imports      |  -.0110356    .210222    -0.05   0.958    -.4230631    .4009918 
Age          |  -.0072525   .0103587    -0.70   0.484    -.0275551    .0130501 
Urban        |  -.0637694   .0875805    -0.73   0.467    -.2354241    .1078853 
Left partyid |   2.310419   .3988662     5.79   0.000     1.528655    3.092182 
Right partyid|  -1.635774   .3614262    -4.53   0.000    -2.344156   -.9273918 
Social risk  |   -.022635   .2113157    -0.11   0.915    -.4368061    .3915362 
Economic risk|  -.8855176   .1662672    -5.33   0.000    -1.211395   -.5596398 
Urban*domi   |  -.1899563   .3762914    -0.50   0.614    -.9274739    .5475613 
Urban*pettyb |   .5156078   .2144702     2.40   0.016      .095254    .9359615 
Urban*work   |   .0052276   .1427871     0.04   0.971      -.27463    .2850853 





. lincom  pettyb+ 1*urbanpb 
 
 ( 1)  pettyb + urbanpb = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        left |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |    -2.2318   .6613673    -3.37   0.001    -3.528056   -.9355437 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. lincom  pettyb+ 2*urbanpb 
 
 ( 1)  pettyb + 2 urbanpb = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        left |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -1.716192   .4982144    -3.44   0.001    -2.692674   -.7397096 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. lincom  pettyb+ 3*urbanpb 
 
 ( 1)  pettyb + 3 urbanpb = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        left |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -1.200584   .3886174    -3.09   0.002     -1.96226   -.4389082 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. lincom  pettyb+ 4*urbanpb 
 
 ( 1)  pettyb + 4 urbanpb = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        left |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.6849764   .3818693    -1.79   0.073    -1.433427    .0634737 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. lincom  pettyb+ 5*urbanpb 
 
 ( 1)  pettyb + 5 urbanpb = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        left |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 




Table C-6 Conditional Effects of Social Class and Urban residence as Vote determinants for Leftist 
parties: Mexico 2000 
 
Multiple imputation parameter estimates (5 imputations) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
        left |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Pocket Retros|   .0167324   .1871702     0.09   0.929    -.3501145    .3835793 
Socio Retros |   .0578038   .1910028     0.30   0.762    -.3165548    .4321624 
Dominant     |  -.2867133   .8690095    -0.33   0.741    -1.989941    1.416514 
Pettyb       |   -1.78555   1.530505    -1.17   0.243    -4.785285    1.214185 
Workers   |    .116147   .7109281     0.16   0.870    -1.277247    1.509541 
Education    |   .0764626   .1532817     0.50   0.618     -.223964    .3768892 
House SES    |   .1040962   .2069157     0.50   0.615    -.3014512    .5096435 
Household SES|  -.2050185   .1207877    -1.70   0.090    -.4417581     .031721 
Ideology     |  -.0074665    .058439    -0.13   0.898    -.1220049    .1070719 
Distribution |  -.0215421   .0584346    -0.37   0.712    -.1360717    .0929875 
Privatization|   .0578279   .0733977     0.79   0.431    -.0860289    .2016847 
Age    |   .0141725   .0108503     1.31   0.191    -.0070937    .0354387 
Urban        |   .2437974   .2753365     0.89   0.376    -.2958523    .7834471 
Left partyid |   .9955689   1.032145     0.96   0.335    -1.027399    3.018537 
Right partyid|  -3.952733   .9758226    -4.05   0.000     -5.86531   -2.040156 
No party id  |  -1.904283   .9957418    -1.91   0.056    -3.855901     .047335 
Risk propensi|    -.40491   .4385576    -0.92   0.356    -1.264467    .4546471 
Cap Labastida|   .1373143   .0989931     1.39   0.165    -.0567086    .3313373 
Cap Fox   |   .2989826   .0921042     3.25   0.001     .1184616    .4795035 
Cap Cardenas |  -.2911759   .1112584    -2.62   0.009    -.5092383   -.0731135 
Urbanpb      |   1.215525   .8026654     1.51   0.130    -.3576702     2.78872 
Urbanwork    |  -.5814307   .3952225    -1.47   0.141    -1.356053    .1931912 




. lincom pettyb + 1*urbanpb 
 
 ( 1)  pettyb + urbanpb = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        left |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.5700249   .9010851    -0.63   0.527    -2.336119    1.196069 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. lincom pettyb + 2*urbanpb 
 
 ( 1)  pettyb + 2 urbanpb = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        left |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 




Table C-7 Vote determinants for PRI, PAN and Leftist parties: Mexico 2000 
 
Multiple imputation parameter estimates (5 imputations) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
    vote2000 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
2            | 
Pocket Retros|   .1299369   .1275424     1.02   0.308    -.1200416    .3799153 
Socio Retros |  -.1218722   .1370301    -0.89   0.374    -.3904462    .1467017 
Dominant     |  -1.720107   .9741628    -1.77   0.077    -3.629431    .1892174 
Pettyb       |   .2158165   .4839626     0.45   0.656    -.7327328    1.164366 
Workers      |   .2020926   .2325078     0.87   0.385    -.2536144    .6577996 
Education    |  -.0607943   .1063785    -0.57   0.568    -.2692922    .1477037 
House SES    |  -.1283108   .1310041    -0.98   0.327     -.385074    .1284525 
Household SES|   .1499512   .0881773     1.70   0.089    -.0228732    .3227756 
Ideology     |  -.0464133   .0387831    -1.20   0.231    -.1224268    .0296002 
Distribution |  -.0347595   .0383843    -0.91   0.365    -.1099913    .0404724 
Privatization|   .0293176   .0361906     0.81   0.418    -.0416147    .1002498 
Age          |  -.0216733   .0078604    -2.76   0.006    -.0370794   -.0062672 
Urban        |  -.0367908   .1376478    -0.27   0.789    -.3065754    .2329939 
Left partyid |   16.05492   9.794335     1.64   0.101    -3.141623    35.25146 
Right partyid|  -7.769797   10.21737    -0.76   0.447    -27.79547    12.25588 
No party id  |  -7.563647   10.29911    -0.73   0.463    -27.74954    12.62224 
Risk propensi|  -1.248808   .2530436    -4.94   0.000    -1.744765   -.7528518 
Cap Labastida|     .46842   .1052643     4.45   0.000     .2621057    .6747343 
Cap Fox      |  -.4259293   .1097241    -3.88   0.000    -.6409845   -.2108741 
Cap Cardenas |  -.0537626   .0640827    -0.84   0.401    -.1793623    .0718372 
_cons        |   8.668556   10.60927     0.82   0.414    -12.12523    29.46234 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
3            | 
Pocket Retros|    .180163   .2201768     0.82   0.413    -.2513756    .6117017 
Socio Retros |  -.0155661   .2104725    -0.07   0.941    -.4280847    .3969525 
Dominant     |  -1.941096   1.044064    -1.86   0.063    -3.987424    .1052329 
Pettyb       |   .0859886   .8271688     0.10   0.917    -1.535232     1.70721 
Workers   |  -.6427966   .4095755    -1.57   0.117     -1.44555    .1599567 
Education    |  -.0058396    .172838    -0.03   0.973    -.3445959    .3329167 
House SES    |  -.0971048   .2349722    -0.41   0.679    -.5576419    .3634323 
Household SES|  -.1042746     .13028    -0.80   0.423    -.3596187    .1510695 
Ideology     |  -.0394487   .0640103    -0.62   0.538    -.1649065    .0860092 
Distribution |  -.0599482   .0683585    -0.88   0.381    -.1939283    .0740319 
Privatization|   .0927982   .0769751     1.21   0.228    -.0580703    .2436667 
Age    |  -.0019306   .0127142    -0.15   0.879      -.02685    .0229889 
Urban        |   .0795846   .2356399     0.34   0.736    -.3822611    .5414304 
Left partyid |   16.94386   9.622723     1.76   0.078    -1.916329    35.80405 
Right partyid|  -11.32746   9.932884    -1.14   0.254    -30.79555    8.140637 
No party id  |  -9.443033   9.946343    -0.95   0.342    -28.93751    10.05144 
Risk propensi|   -.929965   .4459082    -2.09   0.037    -1.803929   -.0560009 
Cap Labastida|   .4720721   .1304486     3.62   0.000     .2163975    .7277467 
Cap Fox   |   .0607289   .1334532     0.46   0.649    -.2008346    .3222924 
Cap Cardenas |  -.3136043    .140569    -2.23   0.026    -.5891144   -.0380941 





Note: basecategory is PRI (1). 2=PAN and 3=Leftist parties 
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